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Conventions used
M1 Money supply = Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + savings deposits.
M3 M2 + time deposits.
ALP Liquid assets held by the public = M3 + other liquid assets.
ALPF ALP + fixed-income mutual funds.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
a Projection.
p After a date [January (p)], this means that all the related figures are provisional; after a figure, only
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pp Percentage points.
˘ Annual (˘ 1970) or quarterly data with this symbol are averages of the monthly data of the year or 
quarter; series of monthly, ten-day or weekly data are averages of the daily data for such periods.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance of changes when expressed as rates of
growth.
» Less than half of the last digit indicated in the series.
* Series of seasonally adjusted data.
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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
I.1. THE CULMINATION
OF CONVERGENCE
The year 1998 was one of particular impor-
tance for the Spanish economy. In May, Spain’s
participation in Stage Three of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) along with ten other
European countries was approved. To be
among the founders of EMU after having satis-
factorily met the convergence criteria set was a
most considerable success. Indeed, it broadens
the possibility of drawing the Spanish standard
of living closer to that in the more advanced EU
economies. The degree of nominal conver-
gence achieved is a step forward in this direc-
tion, and the benefits are already being seen.
However, for progress in real convergence,
fresh efforts will be required to further adapta-
tion of the productive structure and economic
institutions to this new setting.
The attainment of nominal convergence has
also been accompanied by high growth in GDP
and employment, balanced external accounts
and a further cut in the budget deficit. These re-
sults were initially favoured by the climate of re-
covery prevailing in the European economies in
the first half of 1998. As from the summer, how-
ever, the climate abroad began to turn increas-
ingly adverse. The crisis in Russia broke and
spread to other transition countries of the for-
mer Soviet Union and to certain emerging
economies, especially in Latin America, gener-
ating great instability on international markets.
Moreover, there was a further worsening of the
Japanese economy, with the south-east Asian
economies showing no clear signs of picking
up. The accumulation of all these problems
drastically changed the outlook for world growth
and intensely impacted certain European
economies via a decline in exports and a loss of
business confidence.
In Spain, culminating nominal convergence
with the EU countries, which has been progres-
sively firmer from 1997 onwards, has entailed a
long and complex process. Its attainment be-
came more pressing with the launching of the
monetary union project and the signing of the
Treaty on European Union in 1992. Under the
Treaty, specific requirements of macroeconom-
ic equilibrium were stipulated (alignment of the
inflation rate and interest rates with those of the
core countries of the area, sustainability of pub-
lic finances and exchange rate stability) for en-
try into the group of countries founding mone-
tary union. The path followed to meet these re-
quirements was initially strewn with obstacles;
there was great uncertainty and considerable
turbulence, and a change in the gearing of the
economic policy mix was required to ensure co-
herence with the stability goals pursued. Cor-
rection of the disequilibria was slow at first but
gained momentum in the following years as the
credibility of the economic policies implemented
progressively increased. This was the case
both of monetary policy, particularly after auton-
omy was granted to the Banco de España and
direct inflation targeting arrangements were set
in place, and fiscal policy, via the introduction of
mechanisms to cut public spending and im-
provements in its control and management.
Thanks to the economic discipline applied,
Spain succeeded in meeting the criteria for
EMU entry. The reduction of the inflation rate,
accompanied by a parallel decline in the out-
look for price growth, and the stability of the ex-
change rate made significant cuts in interest
rates possible. Against the background of a fis-
cal policy aimed at reducing the budget deficit,
all these developments favoured consolidation
of a sustained growth process driven by private
investment and exports. Having passed the
convergence examination, which was conduct-
ed on the basis of 1997 figures, a new econom-
ic policy setting was established for 1998. With
convergence attained, the objective was to sus-
tain the stability achieved and smooth the tran-
sition to fully-fledged EMU membership, sched-
uled for 1999. Foreseeably, maintaining stability
would be assisted, under the new conditions, by
11
the adjustment of inflation expectations and by
the stabilising elements built into public-sector
policy as a result of the restructuring of public fi-
nances. Nonetheless, for these mechanisms to
work it was vital that economic policies should
continue to be consistent with the aforemen-
tioned objective.
Monetary policy design and execution in
1998 were essentially determined by the need
to keep inflation rates low and, at the same
time, to smooth the convergence of interest
rates towards the level that was to mark the
starting point of the single monetary policy. De-
spite the uncertainty for much of the year over
the level of interest rates at which such conver-
gence would be made, it was certain in Spain’s
case that this would involve a sizeable reduc-
tion. Accordingly, the Banco de España decided
to administer the cuts in its rates with caution,
so that they would be compatible with control-
ling inflation and with a stable peseta trading
around its central ERM parity. True, the interna-
tional financial crisis affected Spanish markets
in the summer months, giving rise to fall in
stock market indices and to a moderate widen-
ing of the long-term interest rate spread over
Germany. But these effects proved transitory.
The year ended with a situation of financial sta-
bility and a convergence level for short term in-
terest rates of 3 %. This was lower than expect-
ed during the year owing to the decline in infla-
tion in the euro zone and to the deterioration in
growth expectations for the area as a whole,
mainly as a result of the international crisis.
The control of inflation has been the corner-
stone of the new framework of macroeconomic
equilibrium. In Spain’s case, inflation had been
strongly entrenched in economic agents’ be-
haviour and in the very institutional mecha-
nisms underpinning the workings of the econo-
my. To alter these constraints, an extensive ef-
fort was needed to make the stability-oriented
stance of economic policy credible. Progress in
recent years has been considerable: after the
inflation rate, measured by the CPI, stood at
2 % in 1997, in 1998 it was reduced further, the
year ending with average CPI growth of 1.8 %
and a 12-month growth rate in December of 1.4
% (see Table I.1). Although these levels are
historical lows and compatible with the quantita-
tive definition of price stability adopted by the
European Central Bank, the policies on which
the low-inflation environment are based need to
be strengthened so as to ensure the new situa-
tion lasts.
Among the factors that help explain the
favourable performance of prices in 1998 is the
moderation of wage increases. Nominal wages,
which had already slowed substantially in 1997,
saw their growth rate decline again in 1998. Be-
hind this development was the abatement of in-
lation expectations, which have progressively
been accommodating themselves to increasing-
ly ambitious inflation targets. Even so, wage
settlements pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements (2.6 % on average) stood above
forecast inflation (2.1 % under the 1998 bud-
get), incorporating a purchasing power gain
which was heightened by the fact that actual in-
flation was finally lower than forecast. In any
event, the increase in real wages did not ex-
ceed that in labour productivity. The beneficial
ffect of wage moderation on prices was ac-
companied by other factors exerting great influ-
ence on consumer prices. Notable among these
was the moderate behaviour of agricultural
prices and, more significantly, the downward ef-
fect exerted by external prices, via the decline
in commodity and oil prices and the general sta-
bility of tradeable goods prices. Nonetheless,
despite the good results posted, there were al-
so certain worrying aspects to the price perfor-
mance in 1998. One such facet is the continua-
tion of widely differing rates of change between
different product groups and, in particular, be-
tween manufactures and services, prolonging
the duality which has marked price formation in
the Spanish economy over the past decade.
The ongoing reduction of the budget deficit
was favoured by price stability and low interest
rates against a background of high GDP
growth. The general government deficit fell from
2.6 % in 1997 to 1.8 %, a result on which vari-
ous factors had a bearing. The fall in interest
rates and lower public indebtedness led to a re-
duction in interest payments. Adding to this was
the moderate increase in those expenditure
items indexed to inflation as forecast in the bud-
get (lower than in the 1997 budget) and the on-
going control of other current expenditure items,
such as government consumption. Finally, eco-
nomic growth made for a further reduction in
unemployment-related expenses. Overall, the
weight of general government spending in GDP
diminished by half a percentage point, despite
the fact that public investment grew substantial-
ly above output, giving rise to a restructuring of
spending conducive to bolstering the econo-
my’s growth potential. On the revenue side,
there was a sharp increase in tax receipts, es-
p cially those more closely related to business
activity. The restraint exerted on certain public
spending items by the fall in inflation coupled
with the cyclical effects derived from the situa-
tion of economic buoyancy, which tend to
favour tax takings and to lessen the amount of
certain transfer expenses, ease the task of re-
ducing the budget deficit. The benefits resulting
from this add to the saving generated by the fall
in interest rates when the economy manages to
12
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DEMAND AND OUTPUT AT CONSTANT PRICES (a):
Private consumption 2.9 2.2 –2.2 0.9 1.6 2.0 3.1 3.8
Government consumption 5.6 4.0 2.4 –0.3 1.8 0.9 1.4 1.6
Gross capital formation 1.1 –3.9 –14.0 3.8 8.9 1.2 3.6 10.0
Exports of goods and services 7.9 7.4 8.5 16.7 10.0 10.6 14.8 7.8
Imports of goods and services 9.0 6.9 –5.2 11.3 11.0 7.4 12.2 10.6
Gross domestic product 2.3 0.7 –1.2 2.3 2.7 2.4 3.5 3.8
EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, COSTS AND PRICES (a):
Total employment 1.0 –1.5 –2.9 –0.5 1.8 1.5 2.7 3.3
Compensation per employee 9.5 10.4 6.8 2.8 3.0 3.9 2.3 1.8
Unit labour costs 8.1 8.0 4.9 0.0 2.1 2.9 1.5 1.3
GDP deflator 7.1 6.9 4.3 4.0 4.8 3.2 2.0 2.2
Consumer price index (annual average) 5.9 5.9 4.6 4.7 4.7 3.6 2.0 1.8
Consumer price index
(end-year twelve-month rate) 5.5 5.3 4.9 4.3 4.3 3.2 2.0 1.4
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL BALANCE (b):
Resident sectors: saving (c) 21.5 19.6 19.4 19.2 22.3 22.0 22.2 22.5
General Government (c) 0.3 –0.1 –3.0 –2.5 –3.7 –1.6 0.4 1.5
Resident sectors: investment 24.6 22.6 19.9 20.1 21.1 20.6 20.7 21.6
General government 4.8 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.3
Resident sectors: national net lending (+)
or borrowing (–) –3.1 –3.0 –0.5 –0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 0.9
General government –4.5 –4.1 –7.0 –6.4 –7.3 –4.7 –2.6 –1.8
Gross general government debt (d) 45.6 48.0 60.1 62.6 65.5 70.1 68.8 65.6
MONETARY AND CREDIT AGGREGATES (a):
ALP 11.8 6.3 7.7 7.6 10.0 7.2 5.1 1.5
ALPF (e) 12.9 9.6 7.6 10.2 7.3 9.1 9.1 6.8
M2 15.3 5.6 0.1 8.2 4.0 4.9 10.8 11.1
Domestic credit to households and firms 11.1 8.1 4.6 2.9 6.9 7.9 11.2 14.1
Domestic credit to general government 5.5 3.6 10.8 10.4 22.8 7.1 2.2 –8.7
Total financing to general government (f) 13.9 15.1 15.4 16.8 15.9 12.1 9.6 4.1
INTEREST RATES AND EXCHANGE RATES (g):
Banco de España intervention rate 13.2 12.8 11.3 7.7 8.8 7.5 5.4 4.2
Ten-year government bond yield … 11.7 10.2 10.0 11.3 8.7 6.4 4.8
Synthetic bank lending rate 16.2 15.6 14.5 10.7 11.5 9.7 7.2 5.9
Peseta/D-Mark exchange rate 62.6 65.6 76.9 82.6 87.0 84.2 84.5 84.9
Nominal effective exchange rate 
(developed countries) 100.2 98.0 86.6 80.8 80.3 80.9 77.2 76.9
Real effective exchange rate
(developed countries) 101.5 101.2 90.6 86.3 87.5 89.3 85.4 85.3
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Intervención General de la Administración del Estado and Banco de España.
(a) Rate of change.
(b) As a percentage of GDP.
(c) Includes net capital transfers received.
(d) As a percentage of GDP at market prices (GNP Directive).
(e) Includes all ALP – except those issued by general government – plus that portion of the net asset value of mutual funds not includ-
ed in ALP.
(f) Includes domestic credit to general government, government debt placements with residents and non-residents and foreign direct fi-
nancing.
(g) Levels.
1991
TABLE I.1
Main macroeconomic variables
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
sustain itself on an expansionary course with
price stability.
Broadly speaking, fiscal policy in 1998 may
be considered to have been moderately restric-
tive following the considerable consolidation
drive in the two previous years. Combined with
the increase in public saving and the reduction
in the sector’s financing requirements brought
about by the very process of fiscal consolidation,
this situation contributed to sustaining the cli-
mate of confidence in the Spanish economy; it
smoothed the way for the additional cuts in inter-
est rates during the year; and, in sum, it contin-
ued to make for an environment geared to the
growth of private-sector productive investment.
The above-mentioned macroeconomic set-
ting of low interest rates, price stability, bal-
anced gearing of economic policy and height-
ened confidence owing to Spanish membership
of the monetary union was propitious to the ex-
pansion of spending by households and firms.
As a result, GDP growth in 1998 was 3.8 %, the
highest figure this decade. Employment genera-
tion was also strong, running at a rate of 3.3 %
and culminating a period of progressive recov-
ery in the economy which had begun in 1994.
Higher spending by the private sector was fi-
nanced without problems by the resources gen-
erated by the various economic sectors and
was compatible with continuing equilibrium on
the external accounts.
Household spending on consumer goods
and services and on housing strengthened in
1998, backed by the high growth of real dispos-
able income (3.7 %) and by the increase in con-
sumer confidence. The notable rise in house-
hold spending capacity was principally the re-
sult of job creation and the increase in real
wages. Furthermore, interest rate cuts contin-
ued to exert an expansionary effect on con-
sumption, especially that of durable goods, and
of residential investment. Consumer confidence
improved notably during the year, reflecting the
increasingly firmer favourable outlook for the
Spanish economy. Although this uptrend was
checked by the financial turbulence of the sum-
mer months, the confidence indicator stabilised
at maximum levels in the closing months of
1998 and the beginning of 1999. In any event,
the stable growth profile of consumption during
the year would suggest that the check on the
improvement in confidence levels and a cooling
of economic expectations, further to the wors-
ening of the international crisis, moderated the
momentum of consumption in the second half
of the year, though it ended the year posting av-
erage growth of 3.8 %.
The prospect of increasing demand on the
part of firms translated into substantial growth in
private investment. The corporate sector has
faced the current cyclical upturn attempting to
square expenditure on expanding productive
capacity with intense financial restructuring.
The result has been an appreciable improve-
ment in the sector’s profitability. Not unrelated
to this improvement has been the reduction,
over a period of several years, of firms’ financial
expenses, assisted by interest rate cuts and by
the reduced flow of debt. Under these condi-
tions of corporate financial restructuring and of
high saving levels in other sectors of the econo-
my, the promotion of investment projects was
driven by prospects of high demand at the out-
set of 1998, which accounts for the strong
growth rate in capital investment in that period.
As the year unfolded, there was clearly a pro-
gressive slowdown in firms’ sales and value
added (especially in manufacturing). This was
linked to the crisis on foreign markets which,
along with the stabilising – at high rates – of con-
sumer spending and the worsening of demand
prospects arising from the crisis, led to a fall in
business expectations in industry and to a slow-
down in productive investment. Nonetheless, in
annual average terms, investment in capital
goods increased by almost 13 % in 1998.
Demand by the households and firms sector
was thus on an expansionary course last year,
with national demand accelerating from 2.9 %
in 1997 to 4.9 % in 1998. This contributed to
changing, to some extent, the essentially in-
vestment- and export-driven pattern of growth
seen in previous years. The change in the
make-up of growth was also due to the slow-
down in exports of goods and services (the
growth rate dipped from 14.8 % in 1997 to
7 . 8% in 1998). At the start of the year, sales
abroad still retained considerable momentum,
despite the fact that they had already begun to
feel the effects of the financial crisis in the
Asian economies in 1997. However, as 1998
unfolded, exports to the different geographical
r gions were progressively impacted as the cri-
sis made itself felt, and in the fourth quarter
even sales to the rest of the EU diminished. Ex-
ports may also have been influenced by the
loss of competitiveness of Spanish products on
third markets, given the devaluation in the cur-
rencies of some of the countries most affected
by the crisis and which compete with Spain in
certain product ranges. 
From the domestic standpoint, manufactur-
ing was the activity most affected by the weak-
ening of the external environment. In addition to
inducing a deceleration in activity and a fall in
demand expectations in industry, the interna-
tional crisis prompted a substantial slowdown in
the prices of tradeable goods, obliging the
Spanish manufacturing sector to moderate its
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price increases. Given this deceleration in final
prices, manufacturing unit labour costs rose
somewhat, despite lower wage settlements,
and operating margins tended to slow. Howev-
er, set against this movement in margins, finan-
cial charges again declined significantly in 1998
and the profitability of manufacturing firms con-
tinued to grow, reaching very high levels.
The expansion of the Spanish economy in
recent years has been balanced in a way that
has made for sustainability. However, the
change in the composition of demand in 1998
(in favour of consumption and construction and
at the expense of exports and investment),
which became accentuated as from the autumn
owing to the strong slowdown in exports, could,
if prolonged, result in the medium run in a less-
er expansion of productive capacity and greater
pressure on prices. So far, the weakening of ex-
ternal demand and, to a lesser extent, of capital
investment has translated into a slowdown in
GDP; after running at 3.9 % year-on-year at the
start of 1998, output growth at the end of the
year stood at 3.6 % compared with four quar-
ters earlier. The deterioration in exports has,
moreover, given rise to a widening of the trade
deficit, which has been influential in reducing
the current-account surplus. Consumer prices,
after closing 1998 at a 12-month rate of 1.4 %,
have surged in the opening months of the year
to 2.2 % in March, as a result of the rise in en-
ergy prices, the increase in certain food prices
and the persistence of systematically higher in-
flation rates in services.
For 1999 as a whole, exports may be ex-
pected to begin to pick up in the course of the
second half of the year, whereby their weight in
GDP will cease to diminish, investment expec-
tations should improve and the deterioration in
the trade balance should be contained. Thus,
although it may slow slightly, GDP growth in
1999 will again be above the European aver-
age, giving rise to a fresh increase in employ-
ment. Once the episodes of price increases af-
fecting food (normally the most volatile compo-
nent along with energy) are behind, the inflation
rate should reflect more closely the behaviour
of the more stable factors determining price for-
mation, in particular wage deceleration and the
moderation of external prices. That said, this
would be conditional upon the rise in oil prices
at the outset of 1999 not heightening further
and on confirmation of the mild slowdown in
consumption.
I.2. THE TRANSITION TO THE SINGLE
MONETARY POLICY
The year 1998 was also singular in that it
saw a most important change in the monetary
policy regime. 1998 marked the end of a four-
year period in which monetary policy had been
implemented under a regime of full autonomy,
further to the related Statute granted to the
Banco de España in June 1994. The end of this
period gave way to a new phase involving the
application across the euro area of a single
monetary policy designed and executed by the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
The monetary policy implemented over
these last four years has, with the other eco-
nomic policies, contributed to the slowdown in
inflation prospects and, in sum, to the attain-
ment of nominal convergence. The adoption
from 1995 of a direct inflation targeting frame-
work geared to securing price stability in the
medium term has played a key role in bringing
about these achievements. During this period
the inflation reference values and targets suc-
cessively set by the Banco de España were
progressively met, whereby 1998 concluded
with a situation of virtual price stability (see
Chart I.1). The success of this strategy was
largely due to its ability to influence economic
agents’ price expectations. That said, the contri-
bution of other factors, such as a more appro-
priate economic policy mix or structural
changes that have added flexibility to the Span-
ish economy, has also proven vital.
The formulation of monetary policy for 1998
was conditioned by Spain’s foreseeable incor-
poration into EMU. Consequently, the design of
targets for the year and their implementation
were made taking into account two types of
consideration. One was the requirement to
keep inflation rates low, in step with the prevail-
ing direct inflation targeting framework. And the
second, the advisability of steering a smooth
transition towards a single monetary policy that
would enable the Spanish economy’s monetary
conditions to be aligned with those of the coun-
tries making up EMU. On the first issue it
should be recalled that the entrenchment of low
inflation rates had to be brought about in a set-
ting in which, following the reduction of interest
rates since 1995, there had been an easing of
monetary and financial conditions, which had
exerted an expansionary effect on aggregate
demand. As for the second matter, the Banco
de España intervention rate significantly stood,
at end-1997, 1.5 percentage points above the
official rates of the lowest-inflation EU mem-
bers. As a result, the convergence of short-term
interest rates in late 1998 meant that further
substantial – although uncertain – cuts had to
be made. From the spring onwards, the expect-
ed level of interest rates at the outset of the
Union was successively pared, owing to the un-
certainty generated by the spread of the crisis
on international financial markets and to its pos-
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sible contractionary effects on global economic
growth.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the
Banco de España set a target for 1998 which
involved holding the 12-month growth rate of
the CPI at close to 2 % over the course of the
year. A goal of this nature was considered suit-
able for consolidating price stability in the Span-
ish economy and close, in all certainty, to the
price stability target that the European System
of Central Banks would have to set. The transi-
tion towards a single monetary policy was thus
smoothed. It was sought to pursue this objec-
tive during the year by means of cautiously ad-
ministering the leeway for lowering intervention
interest rates, with the aim of entrenching lower
inflation rates against the above-mentioned
background of sustained output growth.
Nonetheless, the capacity of monetary policy
to influence Spanish prices in the transition to-
wards the single currency was clearly increas-
ingly constrained. Indeed, any deviation by the
Spanish inflation rate from the European aver-
age would have to be corrected via the contrac-
tionary effects of the resulting losses in compet-
itiveness. Consequently, as the proximity of in-
tegration into the euro area gradually eroded
the margin for autonomy of Spanish monetary
policy, it became more important for the other
economic policies to improve their contribution
to attaining price stability. Specifically, policy
had to adjust to the terms laid down in the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact and undertake the struc-
tural reforms needed to make the Spanish
economy more flexible and competitive.
The Banco de España was, in 1998, also
closely involved in the complex decision-making
process behind the launching of the euro and
the start-up of the ESCB’s single monetary poli-
cy (see Box I.1). Further, the Bank continued
working in co-operation with financial intermedi-
aries to adapt the monetary implementation ar-
rangements to the operational framework being
designed for the future single monetary policy.
Thus, throughout the year, the most suitable
timing for the introduction of these instruments
and of the related procedures was gradually de-
fined so that financial institutions could famil-
iarise themselves with the methods to be used
later by the ESCB, as explained in chapter two.
The favourable inflation performance and
price outlook were propitious to drawing Span-
ish monetary conditions closer to those that
would prevail at the start of EMU. The Banco de
España intervention rate was cut by 1.75 per-
centage points in 1998 to 3 %. The succession
of cuts intensified as the year elapsed, reflect-
ing the growing importance that external con-
straints were acquiring in the Banco de Es-
paña’s decisions. The last of these cuts, for a
total of 50 basis points, was on 3rd December.
It was the outcome of concerted action by the
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CHART I.1
Year-on-year inflation
Targets and reference ranges
Source: Banco de España.
(a) The CPI growth rate was, in the opening months of 1997, to be close to 3%.
(b) The twelve-month inflation rate was, at end-1997, to be close to 2.5 %, and around 2 % during 1998.
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BOX I.1
Main measures adopted in 1998 for the introduction of the single currency
March 25 European Monetary Institute Convergence Report
European Commission Convergence Report
April 28 Spanish Parliament Law 12/1998 on the amendment of the Law of the Autonomy
of the Banco de España
May 1-2 European Council Decision on the Member States to adopt the euro
Establishment of the irrevocable conversion rates for the euro
ECOFIN Recommendation on the designation of the members of the ECB
Executive Board
3 European Council Regulation on the introduction of the euro
11 European Parliament Opinion on the appointment of the ECB Executive Board
June 1 European Council Establishment of the ECB
July 7 European Central Bank Decision on the denominations, specifications, reproduction,
exchange and withdrawal of euro banknotes
September 1 ECB/NCBs of non-participating Agreement on the Exchange Rate Mechanism II for countries
Member States with a derogation (ERM II)
European Central Bank Statistical Requirements for Stage Three of Monetary Union
(Implementation Package)
18 European Central Bank Release of the General Documentation on ESCB monetary policy
instruments and procedures
28 Informal ECOFIN Announcement of ERMII fluctuation bands
October 13 European Central Bank Agreement on the ESCB monetary policy strategy
Definition of “price stability”
Eligible assets for ESBC operations
16 European Central Bank Financial Institutions subject to minimum reserves
30 Banco de España Circular 9/1998 on the amendment of the rules governing the
National Electronic Clearing System
Nobember 23 ECOFIN Regulation concerning the application of minimum reserves
Regulation concerning the powers of the ECB to impose sanctions
Regulation concerning the collection of statistical information
by the European Central Bank
December 1 European Central Bank Regulation on the application of minimum reserves
Regulation concerning the consolidated balance sheet of the
Monetary Financial Institutions sector
Announcement of the reference value for monetary growth
ECB/NCBs Agreement on TARGET
Eurosistem Guidelines on single monetgary policy instruments and
procedures
3 NCBs of the Eurosystem Co-ordinated reduction of Member States’ interest rates
11 Banco de España Resolution of the Executive Commission on the adoption of
general clauses applicable to monetary policy operations
17 Spanish Parliament Law 46/1998 on the introduction of the euro
22 European Central Bank Announcement of interest rates applicable to the monetary policy
operations of the Eurosystem
23 Banco de España Circular 11/1998 on the adaptation of the Money Market
Telephone Service to TARGET
Ministry of Economy and Finance Royal Decree 2813/1998 on the redenomination of public debt
in euros
31 European Council Adoption of the irrevocable conversion rates for the euro
European Central Bank Fixing of central and compulsory intervention rates for the
Danmarks Nationalbank currencies participating in ERMII
Bank of Greece
Month Day Origin Content
Date Measures
Note: Measures adopted in Spain as opposed to at the European level are in bold print.
euro-area central banks, in response to condi-
tions across the area, where inflation develop-
ments were not jeopardising price stability and
the growth rate was tending to decelerate,
mainly as a consequence of the conditions pre-
vailing in the international environment. With
this decision, the level of interest rates for the
start of Monetary Union was set in advance, in
accordance with the monetary policy strategy
pre-announced by the European Central Bank
(ECB). These conditions prevailed until 8th April
1999, when the ECB made a further cut of 50
basis points, in response to the firming of price
stability and worsening growth prospects in the
area.
The interest rates and exchange rates of the
euro-area countries were scarcely affected by
the growing instability of the international envi-
ronment that became perceptible as from the
spring of 1998. The cancellation of investment
in emerging economies and the switching of
funds towards dollar- and DM-denominated in-
struments (both traditionally considered as
safe-haven currencies) and towards govern-
ment bond purchases prompted a significant in-
crease in volatility on international stock and
currency markets. Such volatility abated only in
the final quarter of the year, against a backdrop
of more accommodating international monetary
conditions accompanied by certain international
pledges of financial aid to the restructuring pro-
grammes of the economies most affected. The
bout of instability on financial markets was ac-
companied by a deterioration in the outlook for
world economic growth which would last until
the opening months of 1999.
In the countries that would finally make up
the euro area, the crisis was mainly manifest in
a downward revision of interest rate expecta-
tions, motivated by the worsening growth fore-
casts for the European economies, which ac-
centuated the downward course of long-term in-
terest rates and prompted successive cuts in
the interest rates foreseen for the start of the
third stage of EMU. Moreover, European stock
markets were buffeted by short-lived but very
intense bouts of volatility, and the fixed-income
markets showed a certain misalignment of long-
term interest rates. But these had no distorting
effect on the convergence process that would
culminate at the end of the year.
The exchange rates of the currencies to
form the euro area were very stable throughout
1998. This can be linked to the successful cul-
mination of the process of nominal convergence
that had been set as a requirement for consti-
tuting EMU and to the credibility of the pre-an-
nouncement in May of the fixed exchange rates
for the currencies that were to participate in the
third stage of Monetary Union. Under these
conditions, the euro-area currencies gradually
moved closer to their central parities against the
D-Mark as the start of Stage Three drew nearer
and the spreads between short-term interest
rates narrowed.
Interest rates on Spanish financial markets
and the exchange rate of the peseta adjusted
well to this general pattern of behaviour. The re-
duction in Banco de España intervention rates
was accompanied by cuts in money market in-
terest rates, which remained on the falling trend
seen in previous years (see Chart I.2). The
downtrend in long-term interest rates was deter-
mined by certainty about Spanish participation
in EMU and by the expectations about the mon-
etary policy stance at the start of Stage Three.
Hence, after the narrowing early in the year of
the long-term interest rate spread over the low-
inflation European countries, the 10-year
spread over the D-Mark fluctuated around 20
points, at which level it has held since the euro
area came into being. The exchange rate of the
peseta, for its part, moved smoothly closer to its
pre-announced central parity.
In sum, the transition to the single monetary
policy during 1998 unfolded smoothly. The con-
vergence of short-term interest rates and the
pproximation to the fixed conversion rate both
came about in a way that allowed the expan-
sionary effect of progressively easier monetary
onditions on aggregate demand to be moder-
ated. The inflation rate was also maintained,
standing at year-end slightly below the 2 %
threshold set under the monetary programming
exercise for 1998.
I.3. THE START OF SPANISH
PARTICIPATION IN EMU
Participation by the Spanish economy in the
euro area is the culmination of a process of in-
t rnational integration which began in the mid-
eighties following accession to the European
Community. The benefits of integration have
been numerous and have had a bearing on the
more competitive behaviour of the Spanish
markets for goods and capital. Against this
background, the conditions of nominal stability
needed to ensure a sustained, non-inflationary
growth path have been laid down, and Spanish
per-capita income levels have drawn somewhat
closer to those of the more prosperous EU
countries. That said, in 1998 Spanish GDP per
capita stood at 79 % of the related Community
figure and a set of indicators measuring the
growth potential of the economy continued to
fall short in relation to those of the EU (see
Box).
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The starting position of the Spanish econo-
my in EMU is, in principle, a suitable one for
making progress in real convergence. As seen
in previous section, convergence towards sta-
bility has made for output and employment
growth at satisfactory rates. There are, howev-
er, certain downside risks on which economic
policy efforts should focus in the immediate fu-
ture.
The common monetary conditions arising
from the monetary policy implemented by the
Eurosystem with a view to the area as a whole
may prove relatively loose for the Spanish
economy’s current economic circumstances.
Real short- and long-term interest rates in
Spain are standing at historically low levels of
between 1 % and 2 %, and residents’ liquid fi-
nancial assets, along with the financing re-
ceived by households and firms, have contin-
ued to post high growth rates. Such a situation
might lead to excessive growth in domestic de-
mand being financed and to the generation of
upward pressures on prices. These risks arise
not only from the more advanced position along
the cycle of the Spanish economy compared
with other euro-area countries, but also from
the scale of the expansionary boost stemming
from the interest rate cuts made over the last
three years. As in other EU countries, the re-
duction of rates had to be sharper in Spain
since it was departing from a less favourable in-
flation situation and from a higher level of nomi-
nal interest rates. Adding to this is the absence
of a sufficiently entrenched culture of stability in
agents’ behaviour, owing to the recentness of
the new low-inflation regime.
Such a setting has come about without the
Spanish inflation rate, measured on the basis of
the 12-month growth of the consumer price in-
dex, coming to be on a fully equal footing with
that of the euro area, despite its having been
substantially reduced in recent years. The infla-
tion convergence criterion under the Maastricht
Treaty stipulated a maximum difference of 1.5
percentage points in relation to the annual aver-
age inflation of the three best performing coun-
tries in 1997. The Spanish inflation rate met this
requirement comfortably and has since held
within this limit. However, during 1998, the
growth rate of the harmonised index of con-
sumer prices (HICP) for Spain ran systematical-
ly higher than that of its euro-area counterparts,
and by March 1999 a difference of 1.1 percent-
age points in terms of respective 12-month
rates had built up. The persistence of positive –
even if limited – inflation differentials might, in-
sofar as they reflect a worse relative perfor-
mance by costs or rigidities in the workings of
the market for goods, services and factors, ulti-
mately have harmful repercussions for competi-
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CHART I.2
Interest rates
Source: Banco de España.
( a ) Interest rates calculated using GDP-weighted national
interest rates.
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tiveness in the context of the single currency in
the euro area.
The inadequate alignment of the Spanish
growth rate for prices with those of other coun-
tries in the area is essentially due to the limited
adjustment of services prices. The growth rate
in this sector is more than two points above the
related 12-month rate for goods prices in Spain
and two points above that for services in the eu-
ro area (see Box). The duality of Spanish infla-
tion thus remains in place, although the latest
information also points to a certain deterioration
in the prices of industrial goods and in the relat-
ed inflation differential.
There are several reasons for this be-
haviour, first among which is a higher growth
trajectory in unit labour costs in the services
sector, especially when commercial and finan-
cial activities are excluded. The relative rise in
the cost of the labour factor in this sector stems
from the combination of a situation of lower pro-
ductivity gains than in the manufacturing sector
and from centralised wage bargaining arrange-
ments, which tend to unify wage increases
across sectors and to weaken the link that
should exist between wages and productivity
(see Chart I.3). The prevalence of this model of
behaviour has diminished in recent years. This
has been due to the downward effects exerted
on average wages by high employee turnover
in the services sector, which has tended to off-
set the lack of adjustment of wage settlements
to productivity, and to a narrowing of productivi-
ty differences across sectors. Nonetheless, the
duality of Spanish inflation continues to evi-
dence the persistence of the distortions derived
from the current characteristics of the cost for-
mation process.
It is difficult to identify with any certainty the
determinants of productivity differences across
sectors, given the diverse factors combining in
these types of processes. In principle, the posi-
tive impact exerted by technological progress
on labour productivity in the manufacturing sec-
tor, which arises because of its capital-intensive
productive structure and as a result of the in-
centives to innovate in the face of exposure to
competition, might explain the sector’s higher
relative growth of productivity. However, the
Spanish case appears to be highly influenced
too by the differential behaviour of employment;
in manufacturing, employment has tended to re-
act with greater intensity during cyclical down-
turns, determining more marked growth in actu-
al labour productivity. This feature, which is
largely due to the costs of employment adjust-
ment in manufacturing, appears to have been of
somewhat less significance than in the recent
period.
A second reason for higher inflation rates in
the services sector is the greater presence of
markets sheltered from competition. This allows
higher operating margins that are insensitive to
market conditions to be sustained, leading to
greater permissiveness in the face of cost in-
creases and an inadequate feed-through of the
ongoing advances in cost moderation. That
contrasts with the pattern in the manufacturing
sector. There, the need to align final price in-
creases to those determined on international
markets has limited the pass-through of cost in-
creases, prompting significant adjustments in
unit margins and, ultimately, more moderate
price growth (see Chart I.4).
Such differing behaviour is further en-
trenched by the differences in the final destina-
tion of output in both sectors. The supply of ser-
vices is, predominantly, for consumption on do-
mestic markets relatively sheltered from foreign
competition. That weakens the pressure exert-
ed, in the manufacturing sector, by the need to
compete with foreign products on domestic or
international markets. The impact of this effect
is heightened, moreover, by the very regula-
tions governing the markets for certain services,
where liberalisation is lagging compared with
goods markets. In some cases, this relative lag
is due to the very nature of certain services ac-
tivities, which have had to be organised in a
rather uncompetitive manner. In other cases,
however, excessive regulations or more or less
explicit barriers to entry are the cause of the
lack of flexibility of services prices.
In this respect, mention should also be made
of the high sensitivity of the prices of certain ter-
tiary activities to the behaviour of the prices of
property and of renting commercial and office
premises. Here, price formation in services is
affected by the insufficient regulation of the
market for land use, which severely constrains
supply and ultimately generates upward pres-
sures on property and rental prices, especially
when the cost of financing is low. Thus, the
well-known adverse effects that the inefficien-
cies of the market for land use have on occupa-
tional mobility and wage-setting are exacerbat-
ed by the inflationary biases acting on the be-
haviour of services prices.
It should be borne in mind that the upward
propensity of services prices may ultimately af-
fect profitability in industry and feed through to
the rest of the economy. It may do this either di-
rectly, via the rise in the price of the services
used as production inputs in other sectors, or
indirectly, through the influence exerted on the
overall behaviour of wages, owing to the weight
of services in consumer purchases.
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BOX I.2
Spain vis-à-vis Europe: real convergence
The real convergence of the Spanish economy, understood as the approximation of its level of per-capita income to the levels pre-
vailing in the more advanced European countries, has been one of the main objectives pursued by Spain: initially through integration in-
to what is today called the EU, and subsequently through participation in EMU.
The relative position of the Spanish economy in 1986 (when it joined the European Community), in terms of a set of variables ap-
proximating its level of welfare and its growth potential vis-à-vis the EU, is summarised in Chart 1 below (starting position). In 1986,
Spanish per-capita GDP stood at 69 % of EU GDP. This level was due both to the lower level of apparent labour productivity (95 % of
that of the Community countries as a whole) and to the low proportion of the population employed in the Spanish economy (73 % of the
related Community rate).
Chart 1 below also shows the comparative level, in 1986, of some of the indicators of the determinants of labour productivity, such
as the stocks of physical, human, technological and infrastructure capital (the latter approximated via an indicator of the public capital
stock). The relative position of each of these components was, as can be seen in the chart, at a considerable disadvantage to the EU-
wide figure.
In the 1986-1998 period, the drive by the Spanish economy to reduce these differences was substantial. This is reflected below in
Chart 2 (effort made), which shows the cumulative rates of change for Spain and the EU of the variables depicted in Chart 1. During this
period, Spanish per-capita GDP grew 39 %, 17 percentage points above the related increase in Community per-capita GDP. This in-
crease was due to similar growth in productivity and in the employment rate (17 % and 19 %, respectively), while in the EU the expan-
sion of GDP was due almost exclusively to the growth of labour productivity.
The headway made in labour productivity has been the outcome of improvements in the endowment of the rest of the productive
factors. This has been reflected in a build-up in the related stocks which was greater in this period than that of the EU as a whole. Of par-
ticular note has been the growth of the public capital stock, which has meant a most significant improvement in infrastructure. The in-
crease in the stock of technological capital has been most notable, although the starting levels were extremely low, and investment in
R+D remains very low in relation to the EU (0.8 % of GDP for Spain and 1.8 % of GDP for the EU).
It should be noted, however, that progress in employment creation by the Spanish economy during the period under review has,
though substantial, not sufficed to reduce significantly the unemployment rate. Spanish unemployment is still eight percentage points
above the European average, since there has been a sizeable growth in the labour force. This but partial improvement in the labour mar-
ket situation not only reflects rigidities in this market, but also indicates still-inadequate productivity factor endowment, thereby preventing
full harnessing of the possibilities provided by potential employment. Further, the growth of productivity has been less than in the EU as
a whole, although the trend across sectors has differed greatly. Thus, while the increase in productivity in the services sector has been
virtually zero, in the manufacturing branches it has been close to 30 %. 
Nonetheless, and despite the efforts made, the distance separating the Spanish economy from the levels of welfare of the most ad-
vanced Community countries is still wide, as Chart 3 (current situation) shows. Thus, in 1998, Spanish per-capita GDP stood at a level of
79 % of Community GDP, the result of a worse relative position of labour productivity in relation to the 1986 situation. However, this has
been offset by an increase in the proportion of the population in employment. Stocks of productive factors, which indicate the economy’s
growth potential, continued to show Spanish levels at a disadvantage to the EU.
Sources: Stocks of productive factors: Dep. Estudios Europeos, FUNCAS. Other: Eurostat.
( a ) GDPcp and productivity at constant prices and in PPS, based in 1990. GDP not adjusted for exhaustiveness. On provisional data, Spanish
GDPcp, adjusted for exhaustiveness, is at 80.4 % of the related Community figure.
(b) Rate of employment: employed as a proportion of total population.
(c) The latest year available for the stocks is 1997.
1.  STARTING POSITION: SPAIN VIS-À-VIS EUROPE IN 1986. EU15=100
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These cost- and price-formation problems
become more pressing in the light of the rela-
tively easy monetary and financial conditions
marking the Spanish economy at the outset of
EMU and given the change in the structure of fi-
nal demand arising as a result of (i) the decline
in exports, induced by the international eco-
nomic crisis, and (ii) the buoyancy of private
consumption and construction spending. The
persistence of the inflation differentials with the
euro area might jeopardise the economy’s pos-
sibilities of non-inflationary growth and, there-
fore, of progress in real convergence.
So that the Spanish economy may draw
closer to the average levels of income and well-
being in the euro area, two things will be neces-
sary. First, Spain must maintain persistently
higher rates of growth than the area as a whole,
without demand pressure eroding the competi-
tiveness of national output. And further, growth
in employment must be intensive enough to ab-
sorb progressively the greater level of unem-
ployment still besetting the Spanish economy.
For these goals to be attained, the demand
policies retained under national sovereignty
should be geared to offsetting, in the short run,
the expansionary effect of the monetary and fi-
nancial conditions prevailing. Also, supply-side
policies should be pursued with a view to pro-
moting the growth potential of the Spanish
economy and competitiveness, in keeping with
the new setting arising from the creation of
EMU. In this respect, the implementation of the
single monetary policy virtually limits the range
of demand policies available to national eco-
nomic authorities to fiscal policy, and heightens
the importance of the contribution that supply-
side policies will have to make in adapting the
Spanish economy to EMU.
Fiscal policy management will have to be
geared to compliance with the commitments
made under the Stability and Growth Pact. The
Pact has been designed to reinforce the stabil-
ising nature of fiscal policy in the euro area in
the medium term and to define thereby the fis-
cal discipline framework in which the single
monetary policy will have to be pursued. The
EU countries have undertaken to bring their
budgetary positions closer to equilibrium over
the medium term so that fiscal deficit/GDP ra-
tios throughout the cycle are always below the
3 % threshold. The Stability and Growth Pact
thus provides some leeway for the built-in sta-
bilisers to operate in periods of slowing activity.
Under these constraints, Spanish fiscal poli-
cy should act in the short term to offset the ex-
pansionary effect derived from monetary and fi-
nancial conditions and thus ease the pressure
from demand on prices and competitiveness.
The implementation of a tighter fiscal policy will
ease adaptation to the new personal income tax
arrangements, which will involve a significant
reduction of the tax burden, on an as yet some-
what uncertain scale. And, at the same time, it
will smooth transition towards the balanced
budget position, the attainment of which is en-
visaged under the Stability and Growth Plan for
the year 2002, allowing counter-cyclical room
for manoeuvre to be had should its use be nec-
ssary in the medium term. Lastly, a stability-
oriented fiscal stance focused on the tight con-
trol of spending will contribute to shaping a suit-
able economic policy mix from the standpoint of
the composition of final demand. And it will also
make for more efficient allocation of resources,
given that the maintenance of low interest rates
and of moderate growth rates in government
consumption will have a favourable impact on
investment, exports and prices. In the medium
and long term, budgetary policy should continue
to rationalise public spending and, in particular,
to adjust those spending components which, for
structural reasons, are more prone to overrun in
the future.
Supply-side policies will have to play a key
role in preventing the persistence over time of
inflation differentials which, by eroding competi-
tiveness, may hamper economic dynamism and
employment generation. These policies should,
firstly, promote the expansion of economic
growth potential, through the development of in-
frastructure, human capital formation, incen-
tives for innovation and greater technological in-
vestment. Further, they should push through
the necessary changes in regulations and in the
structure of the markets for goods, services and
factors so as to break the inflexibility underlying
the persistence and excessive duality of infla-
tion.
It will be of particular importance in this con-
nection to further and deepen the programme of
liberalising reforms already under way, so as to
eliminate the persisting distortions in cost and
price formation. To date, this process has been
based on structural reforms in the sectors and
markets with the biggest working shortcomings,
on a relatively extensive privatisation policy and
on the bolstering of competition policy. Also un-
der this heading are the measures adopted by
the government in April, affecting a range of
sectors and activities overly sheltered from
competition. These measures are two-pronged:
some are more structural, and mainly involve
bringing forward the timetable for liberalisation
previously set for certain sectors; others have a
more short-term effect, with an immediate bear-
ing on the inflation rate by directly reducing cer-
tain regulated prices.
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BOX I.3
Inflation differentials with the euro area in the services sector
The phenomenon of dual inflation, understood as
the systematic tendency of inflation rates to be higher
in non-tradeable goods sectors (largely those engaged
in providing services) than in tradeables sectors (es-
sentially those that produce goods), is a feature com-
mon to various developed economies. Theoretical mod-
els coincide in that a significant explanatory factor of
this differential lies in the productivity differences be-
tween goods sectors respectively exposed to and shel-
tered from competition. Yet it is a much more complex
task to detect the ultimate causes of the observed dis-
crepancies (technological progress, a shift in economic
agents’ preferences towards the demand for non-trade-
able goods, public-sector measures, inefficiencies in
factor and product markets, etc.). Another key factor for
explaining dual inflation is the different competitive en-
vironment of both sectors, which alters the capacity to
adapt final prices to costs incurred. In this respect, the
services sector, which is scarcely exposed to foreign
competition, evidences high price-setting power.
In any event, the intensity of inflation duality differs
from country to country, just as sectoral trends in pro-
ductivity and the degree of competition in product and
factor markets differ. The adjoining top chart shows the
average inflation differential between goods and ser-
vices in the various EU countries for the years 1997
and 1998. Since national consumer price indices have
notable methodological differences, this box uses the
harmonised indices of consumer prices. These, though
not problem-free, are considerably more suitable for
making international price comparisons. The chart
shows that the growth rate of services prices is higher
than that of goods for all the countries considered. The
average differential in the euro area is 1.3 percentage
points (pp), rising to 1.7 pp in the EU. Spain, with a dif-
ferential of 2.5 pp, lies second to Portugal in the euro
area in terms of the highest degree of inflation duality.
In the EU it ranks fourth, additionally behind the United
Kingdom and Greece. Greater inflation duality in Spain
is basically the result of high rates of increase in ser-
vices, which are out of kilter with price-formation pat-
terns in other EU countries. Thus, the average growth
of services prices in Spain amounted to 3.6 %, against
2.2 % in the euro area as a whole. Meantime, the aver-
age increase in goods prices in Spain was 1.1%, only
two-tenths of a point above euro-area prices.
The higher growth rate of services prices in com-
parative terms does not, however, affect all its components to the same extent. The bottom chart duly gives average dif-
ferentials in the period 1997-1998 between Spain and the euro area for certain specific groups of services. It should be
borne in mind when interpreting the chart that the uniformity of the underlying information, despite harmonised indices
being used, is not absolute. In any event, the chart highlights the heterogeneity existing between price growth rate dif-
ferentials. Some activities, such as recreational services, hold at price-growth rates lower than in the euro area as a
whole and others, such as hotels, bars and restaurants, maintain positive but moderate differentials. Of greater concern
are the towering differentials in sectors where liberalising measures have as yet proven insufficient (postal services and
communications, transport services), or in the case of rentals and insurance, although this assessment should be qual-
ified by certain sectoral considerations. Hence, the difference in the growth rate of insurance prices relates, at least par-
tially, to recent rises in indirect taxation. And in the case of telecommunications, differences may be due to the fact that
price reductions as a result of greater competition between operators have not yet fed through, for methodological rea-
sons, to consumer price indices.
Degree of inflation duality
Source: Eurostat.
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CHART I.3
Prices and costs in manufacturing and services (a)
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
(a) Calculated by the Banco de España on the basis of quarterly indicators. The services aggregate excludes, in addition to non-market
services, financial services and distribution. There has been high productivity growth in this latter branch in recent years.
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The liberalisation policies have begun to
bear fruit, especially in the public services sec-
tor, which was more regulated and subject to
greater degrees of monopoly. Nonetheless, to
bring about the necessary transformation, poli-
cy measures must be deepened and extended
with a medium and long-term perspective.
Thus, in the telecommunications and gas sec-
tors, a definitive boost must be given to liberali-
sation to heighten the level of competition.
Progress must also be made on the regulation
of land use, retail trade and road haulage,
where co-operation from regional and local gov-
ernment is pivotal. Lastly, it will be necessary to
refine certain aspects of the legal system which
have an adverse effect on economic activity
through the uncertainty they cause in connec-
tion with the cost of certain legal processes,
through hampering debt collection or through
making the administrative charges levied on
businesses excessively complex.
The labour market reforms of recent years
have also been in the right direction. The Span-
ish economy’s capacity to generate employ-
ment has perceptibly increased and, over the
past year, stable employment has progressed
in response to the regulatory amendments
aimed at promoting this type of employment.
Nonetheless, the unemployment rate and the
proportion of temporary to permanent employ-
ees remain very high. The gap between the re-
spective costs of permanent and temporary hir-
ing is still significant, especially as regards their
non-wage component. In this respect, a conclu-
sive boost to permanent hiring and the success
f the new hiring arrangements being pursued
to this end will only be achieved when effective,
lasting cuts are made to permanent hiring
costs.
Lastly, the contribution of wages will be deci-
sive for ensuring the Spanish economy’s contin-
uing competitiveness within the euro area. As
indicated in the first section of this chapter,
wage moderation has spread to all sectors of
he economy and, in recent years, to services.
The successive labour market reforms have
had a particularly marked impact in services in
bringing about a greater degree of labour
turnover and lower wage settlements over the
recent period. Nonetheless, containing labour
costs in services may still be insufficient from
the standpoint of the sector’s productivity gains.
Further, to prevent wage costs in Spain from
compromising competitiveness, wages should
desirably take inflation in the euro area as a
whole as a reference, duly adapting to produc-
tivity differences across sectors or businesses.
In short, the Spanish economy has moved
into EMU under favourable economic conditions
for reducing the per capita income differences
with the more prosperous member states. To
ensure further progress, however, the risks of a
loss of competitiveness derived from the persis-
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CHART I.4
Cost and margins in manufacturing and services (a)
Contributions to the growth of final prices
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
(a) Calculated by the Banco de España on the basis of quarterly indicators.
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tence of duality in price formation must be elim-
inated, such duality being the main cause why
Spain is running higher inflation rates than in
the area as a whole.
Overcoming the risks that losses of competi-
tiveness might entail for output and employment
growth will require budgetary policy to accentu-
ate its stabilising functions so as to lessen the
accommodating character of the common mon-
etary policy. Above all, however, the supply-
side policies aimed at increasing growth poten-
tial and competitiveness must be reinforced, ex-
tending and completing the liberalising reform
of the markets for goods, services and factors.
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CHAPTER II
THE EURO AREA
AND THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
II.1. INTRODUCTION
In 1998 the developed countries generally
continued to post high growth rates, with the
clear exception of Japan, which remained be-
set by a deep-seated recession. This perfor-
mance was accompanied by a reduction in in-
flation virtually across the board, placing it at
historical lows in many countries. Employment
likewise responded favourably, as reflected by
the fall in national unemployment rates. Among
the developed countries the key features were
the extension of the upturn in the United
States, the slowdown in the UK economy and
the ongoing recovery in the euro area.
Nonetheless, the second half of the year saw
something of an accentuation of the cyclical
differences between the US economy on one
hand, and the European economies on the oth-
er. This was the outcome of the greater con-
tractionary effect exerted on Europe by the cri-
sis in the emerging economies and, in particu-
lar, by its having spread to new regions from
mid-1998 onwards.
For the developing countries and, in particu-
lar, the emerging economies, 1998 was strewn
with difficulties. While the Asian economies af-
fected by the mid-1997 crisis were making, with
differing degrees of resolve, the necessary ad-
justment plans to correct disequilibria and over-
come the economic downturn, other emerging
economies with weak fundamentals were ad-
versely affected by fresh bouts of international
financial instability. Notable in this respect was
the onset of the Russian crisis in the central
months of the year, the scale and subsequent
spread of which to various Latin American
countries had serious repercussions for the sta-
bility of international financial markets. The cri-
sis substantially worsened the external financ-
ing conditions these countries had until then en-
joyed. The securities markets in the developed
economies were affected to some degree by
this turbulence, especially those in which for-
eign investment exposure to these areas was
greater. Nonetheless, the subsequent mea-
sures by the monetary authorities who, in the
absence of inflationary pressures, cut interest
rates to alleviate the risks of activity slowing,
contributed significantly to restoring calm to the
markets.
In any event, the problems of both the south-
east Asian economies and the Russian econo-
my in 1998, coupled, in general, with the finan-
cial turbulence buffeting the emerging
conomies, have highlighted major shortcom-
ings in the workings of the international financial
system. In particular, weaknesses have been
apparent in the mechanisms for preventing and
containing the effects of international financial
crises against a background of high capital mo-
bility and the growing importance of internation-
al financial markets in crisis contagion (see Box
II.1).
A salient feature of international economic
developments in 1998 was the ongoing de-
cline in energy and non-energy commodities
prices, this being one of the main determinants
of the low inflation rates worldwide. At the
same time, the fall in commodities prices has
exacerbated the problems of the emerging
economies, substantially diminishing their ex-
port revenue from these goods, of which some
of the countries in crisis are the leading world
p r o d u c e r s .
Closer to home, 1998 will go down in history
as the year in which eleven EU countries met
the economic conditions required to create a
monetary union, the concrete expression of
which was the birth of the single European cur-
rency, the euro, on 1st January 1999. Likewise,
in July 1998, the European Central Bank com-
menced operating. The ECB is the supranation-
al monetary authority for the eleven euro-area
countries, and is entrusted with defining the sin-
gle monetary policy, which will be executed
mainly through the National Central Banks of
the participating countries.
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Developments on European financial mar-
kets during 1998 were governed by the decline
across the eleven euro-area countries in the in-
flation rate and the convergence requirements
for short-term interest rates. Likewise, on the
foreign exchange markets, in a setting of grow-
ing stability, the behaviour of the eleven euro-
zone countries’ exchange rates was influenced
by the prior announcement in May of the con-
version parities for the euro. And this while the
background was dominated by the greater
volatility of the dollar against the main curren-
cies.
The period to date in 1999 has been marked
by a high degree of uncertainty over the world
economic outlook. The US economy has re-
mained notably buoyant. But growth in the Eu-
ropean countries has generally held on a slow-
ing trend, varying in intensity from country to
country, and whose most general source is the
contraction of exports. In any event, forecasts
suggest that this decline in productive activity
could be temporary, whereby the world econo-
my as a whole would resume a more vigorous
growth path in the year 2000.
The ECB’s first monetary policy actions took
the foregoing slowdown in the European econo-
my and its low-inflation environment into ac-
count. After the co-ordinated reduction in the
National Central Banks’ intervention interest
rates in December 1998, which set in advance
the starting rate for EMU at 3%, the ECB Gov-
erning Council decided in April to make a fur-
ther cut of half a percentage point to the main
interest rate, placing it at 2.5 %.
II.2. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
OF THE EURO AREA
II.2.1. The developed countries: United
States, Japan and United Kingdom
In 1998, the US economy continued on the
expansionary course it had followed since the
second half of 1991. From then until the fourth
quarter of 1998, US GDP increased 27 % in re-
al terms, a performance that has proven com-
patible with a gradual decline in the inflation
rate. Specifically, in 1998, GDP growth was
3.9%, the unemployment rate was at an histor-
ical low (4.5 %) and consumer-price inflation
stood at 1.6 %. The data for the opening
months of 1999 confirm the sustained, non-in-
flationary vigour of the US economy, similar to
that of the preceding months and years. The
length of this upturn against a background of
lower inflation has, however, been favoured by
circumstantial factors such as the reduction in
energy prices in recent years. At the same time,
the firming of a stable macroeconomic environ-
ment, to which rapid technological develop-
ments and the economic policies implemented
during these years have – along with the
greater flexibility of goods and factor markets–
contributed, has played a pivotal role in increas-
ing the growth potential of the US economy.
This is due to the increases in productivity gen-
erated and the gains in efficiency obtained in
the allocation of available resources.
Nonetheless, though these results are very
satisfactory overall, the breakdown of growth in-
to its components reveals a deep-seated imbal-
ance between the forceful buoyancy of domes-
tic demand and the progressive deterioration in
the trade balance. The thrust of domestic de-
mand was driven essentially by private con-
sumption growth, financed by a considerable in-
crease in household debt. That led to a most
significant reduction in the saving ratio, which
even turned negative in certain months in 1998
(see Chart II.1). Set against the climate gener-
ated by the soundness of the economy and, in
particular, by high job creation, the expansion of
consumption largely responds to the effect of
the strong rise in stock market prices seen in
recent years. Taking the onset of the current cy-
cle (late 1991) as a starting point, the average
price of shares had increased by 200 % by
March this year, placing stock market indices at
historical highs.
Naturally, in these conditions, the sustain-
ability of consumption growth over the medium
term depends on the future course of stock
market prices. Thus, the current high level of
share prices in relation to customary corporate
profit levels is an objective factor of risk. An
abrupt correction of prices could increase the fi-
nancial fragility of households, given their high
debt, and alter their consumption plans, thereby
checking economic activity. Nonetheless, it
seems more likely at present that the maturity
of the business cycle will, in the near future, be
conducive to a mild, gradual moderation in the
GDP growth rate.
As regards external sector developments,
the US trade imbalance steepened in 1998,
placing the current-account deficit at 2.7 % of
GDP. A consequence of this was the increased
contractionary effect of the contribution of net
external demand to GDP growth (–1.6 percent-
age points). The vigour of domestic demand
and the loss of competitiveness of the dollar
combined with the fall in foreign demand for US
products resulting from the slowdown in activity
in the rest of the world.
On the prices front, buoyant domestic de-
mand and labour market tightness (of which the
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BOX II.1
Initiatives for reforming the international financial system
Since the Asian crisis broke in 1997, a number of proposals have been put forward by public and private agencies
in both the national and international domain aimed at suggesting possible reforms of various aspects of the architec-
ture of the international financial system. The aim is to limit the likelihood of fresh crises occurring and to ensure that the
international community is better prepared to withstand anythat do occur. The discussion of this set of proposals in var-
ious international fora has led already to the adoption of some of them. In many cases, however, discussions are still at
the preliminary stage. Yet, foreseeably, significant headway should be made in the near future in the specification and
adoption of decisions in the appropriate fields.
The proposals designed to reform the international financial system in order to forestall financial crises or, at least,
limit their consequences, are summarised in the following table.
1. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
Approved or approval under way:
Adoption of standards relating to:
— Banking supervision (by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision)
— Regulation of securities markets (International Organisation of Securities Commissions)
— Supervision of insurance companies (International Association of Insurance Supervisors)
— Disclosure of information for cross-border offerings of securities
Creation, following a G7 initiative, of the Financial Stability Forum, aimed at improving the co-ordination
of work geared to reinforcing financial regulation and supervision
Under study:
Creation of incentives for the application of standards already approved. These would include granting
publicity for countries’ adherence to standards and the establishment of a link between the capital
requirements of a country’s financial institutions and the quality of its supervisory mechanisms
Reinforcement of the supervision of highly leveraged institutions (hedge funds) and of offshore centres
2. IMPROVED TRANSPARENCY
Approved or approval under way:
Adoption by the IMF of a Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, the Special Data Dissemina-
tion Standards and (under preparation) a Code of Good Practices on Transparency of Monetary and
Financial Policies
Under study:
Creation of incentives for countries to adhere to these codes and standards similar to those studied in the
case of financial supervision and regulation standards
Approved or approval under way:
Adoption of a presumption in favour of information disclosure
Under study
Preparation of internal evaluation mechanisms in relation to policy effectiveness
Approved or approval under way:
Adoption by the International Accounting Standards Committee of International Accounting Standards
Adoption by the OECD of a code of principles of sound corporate governance (under preparation)
3. MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS
Under study:
Amendment of the “Articles of Agreement” to allow greater involvement by the IMF in the definition of the
sequence for the liberalisation of capital flows
Desirability of establishing measures penalising short-term capital inflows under specific circumstances
Under study:
Study of the circumstances determining the suitability of alternative exchange-rate regimes in each spe-
cific case
4. PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL CRISES
Under study:
Adoption of clauses in bond issuance contracts providing for co-ordinated action by creditors in the event
of crisis
Introduction of rollover options in all international debt contracts entiling borrowers to extend the maturity
of the debt in the event of crisis for a specified period and at penal interest rates
Obligation for bond-issue placement companies to underwrite a portion of such issue
Arrangement of contingent credit facilities with the private sector
Possible extension of loans by the IMF to debtors that have agreed with creditors to amend their debt fi-
nancing terms
Approved or approval under way:
Establishment of a contingent credit facility by the IMF to prevent and counter potential speculative at-
tacks against a country whose macroeconomic and financial situation is sound
5. SOCIAL EFFECTS OF CRISIS
Approved or approval under way:
Adoption by the World Bank (WB) of the Principles of Good Practice in Social Policy
Regular examination of each developing country by WB to identify potential structural weaknesses that
may exacerbate the consequences of the crisis
Under study:
Increased resources for the IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and for the Highly Indebted
Poor Countries initiative
2.1. Public sector
2.2. International financial
institutions (IFIs)
2.3. Private sector
3.1. International capital flows
3.2. Exchange-rate regimes
4.1. Private-sector involvement
4.2. Other aspects
wage settlements in certain sectors and the an-
nual growth in manufacturing unit labour costs
are indicative) are, despite the low inflation
posted in 1998, shaping a setting in which cer-
tain inflationary pressures should not be ruled
out. But the highly favourable behaviour of com-
modities prices in 1998, the ongoing apprecia-
tion of the dollar (to a greater extent against the
European currencies than against the yen [see
Chart II.2]) and the flexibility of price formation
mechanisms in the US economy are fundamen-
tal to explaining the relative stability of prices in
1998.
Regarding economic policies, the tight man-
agement of public finances in recent years is
worthy of mention. According to IMF estimates,
the structural balance, which was already posi-
tive in 1997, stood at 0.8 % of GDP in 1998.
The fiscal consolidation drive undertaken and
the favourable impact of economic growth on
the cyclical component of the budget balance
provided for a significant surplus (1.3 % of GDP
in 1998) for the second year running.
Monetary policy had to be pursued in 1998
in a complex environment marked by the strong
buoyancy of economic activity, by certain
doubts about the soundness of the private sec-
tor’s financial position and by the repercussions
of the turbulence on international financial mar-
kets. Granted, the continuing pressure of
spending on plant capacity appeared to call for
contractionary demand-side policies. Yet high
private-sector indebtedness, underpinned by a
strong rise in stock market prices, and the ex-
posure of the domestic financial sector to the
crisis-ridden emerging economies were both a
deterrent against adopting measures that might
have prompted a sudden correction in share
prices and increased the fragility of financial in-
stitutions.
Against this backdrop, the Russian crisis
broke in August. Several developments en-
sued: a sizeable fall on the stock market; a sub-
stantial depreciation of the dollar against the D-
Mark and the yen; a significant deterioration in
the financial position of major investors in the
countries affected by the crisis (primarily Rus-
sia, and then Latin America); and a notable in-
crease in risk premia on private debt. Given the
possibility of this instability heightening and
spreading to the whole of the financial system,
the Federal Reserve reduced its official interest
rate on three occasions between September
and November from 5.5 % to the current rate of
4 . 7 5%. This decision was followed by a rally
on stock markets, the resumption of relatively
normal conditions on financial markets, a
strengthening of the dollar against the euro-
area currencies (it continued depreciating
32
CHART II.1
United States: private consumption
and explanatory factors
Sources: National statistics and REUTERS.
(a) Year-on-year growth rate.
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against the yen until January 1999) and re-
newed vigour in domestic demand. All of these
factors have, moreover, persisted in the open-
ing months of 1999.
The economic situation described for the
United States is in stark contrast to the reces-
sion beleaguering Japan since late 1997. In
1998, Japanese GDP declined by 2.9 % (see
Table II.1), a contraction unprecedented since
1974 and which was the outcome of a 3.5 % fall
in domestic demand, only partly offset by for-
eign demand. The heavy deterioration in the
general economic climate, as evidenced by the
historical lows in consumer and business confi-
dence indices, and the rise in the unemploy-
ment rate to an unparalleled high (4.6 % in
February 1999) prompted a drop in private con-
sumption of 1.1 % and a fall of 9 % in gross
fixed capital formation. As to the external sec-
tor, imports of goods and services plummeted
by 7.7 %, led by the decline in domestic de-
mand, while exports were 2.3% down as a re-
sult of the fall in global demand. Consequently,
the current-account surplus, which was 3.2 % of
GDP in 1998, amply exceeded the related 1997
figure of 2.3 %.
Throughout 1998 and in the opening months
of 1999, prices have followed a deflationary
path. The consumer-price inflation rate is very
low (0.4 % on average in 1998 and –0.1 % in
the 12 months to February 1999). If fresh food
is excluded from the general index, inflation has
been negative since July. Producer prices, too,
posted negative year-on-year rates during
1998, standing at between –4 % and –5 % in
the first two months of 1999.
The macroeconomic situation can be set
against the background of deep-seated fragili-
ty in the banking system and the serious struc-
tural shortcomings on Japanese markets. In
response to the situation, the government set
in train in 1998 a major bank restructuring
plan which included the provision of sizeable
public funds and the establishment of mecha-
nisms to restructure the control and enhance
the management of ailing banks. Further,
macroeconomic and structural policies aimed
at boosting activity and reinvigorating the
workings of the economy began to be pur-
sued. However, these bank restructuring plans
have not yet made for an appreciable increase
in the credit system’s soundness. The succes-
sive fiscal packages have been applied with
heavy delays and it is not certain how they will
unfold in 1999. And the structural reform poli-
cies adopted, appropriately aimed at greater
liberalisation in domestic markets and greater
external openness, are making little impact in
p r a c t i c e .
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CHART II.2
Interest rates and exchange rates
Sources: Banco de España and BIS.
(a) Three-month interbank market interest rates. Euro area:
to December 1998, GDP in PPS-weighted average of the
eleven countries. In 1999: three-month EURIBOR.
( b ) Ten-year government bond yields. Euro area: GDP in
PPS-weighted average of the eleven countries.
(c) A fall in the index denotes a depreciation of the curren-
cy against the dollar or the rest of the currencies making up the
grouping, and vice-versa.
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Against this backdrop, the scope of demand-
side policies has diminished appreciably. On one
hand, the expansionary budgetary measures
(with a budget deficit of 6.1 % of GDP in 1998,
which could be higher in 1999) have led the bal-
ance of public debt to levels exceeding 100 % of
GDP in 1998. That has generated financing diffi-
culties and, at certain times, it has been con-
ducive to an increase in long-term interest rates,
despite the deflationary environment (see Chart
II.2). On the other, monetary policy, implement-
ed via interest-rate cuts, has exhausted its room
for manoeuvre (the official interest rate is cur-
rently at 0.15 %) and the monetary transmission
mechanism has been weakened, owing to the
fragility of the banking system and the scant de-
mand for credit. The sustained appreciation (by
over 25 %) of the yen against the dollar from Au-
gust 1998 to January 1999 and the aforemen-
tioned rise in long-term interest rates restricted
even further the effectiveness of the expansion-
ary monetary policy. Despite signs during the
first quarter of 1999 of a potential improvement
in the economic situation over the following
months, the difficulties of the demand for invest-
ment and private consumption picking up in the
Japanese economy remain.
Lastly, among the EU countries not part of
the euro area, the slowdown in activity in the
United Kingdom during 1998 was notable. Its
main source lies in the contraction in exports re-
sulting from the Asian crisis and from the
strength of sterling, which appreciated by 30 %
in real terms from mid-1996 to end-1998. This
deceleration in activity, which has proven partic-
ularly sharp in industry, was not enough (until
well into the year) to reduce the upward pres-
sure on wages in a labour market which contin-
ued to be very buoyant. Testifying to this was
the fact that the unemployment rate has held
stable at 4.6 % since August 1998, the lowest
level for 18 years. Consumer-price growth, ex-
cluding mortgage interest payments, did not re-
sume a path consistent with the official target of
2.5 % until the second half of the year.
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UNITED STATES:
GDP (a) 2.3 3.5 2.3 3.4 3.9 3.9
Domestic demand 2.9 3.9 2.1 3.6 4.2 5.0
External demand (b) –0.7 –0.5 0.1 –0.2 –0.4 –1.4
Public-sector balance (c) –3.6 –2.3 –1.9 –0.8 0.5 1.3
CPI (a) 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.3 1.6
Current-account balance (c) –1.3 –1.8 –1.6 –1.8 –1.9 –2.7
Unemployment rate 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5
ULCs (a) 2.3 1.6 2.6 1.3 2.3 2.3
JAPAN:
PIB (a) 0.3 0.6 1.5 5.0 1.4 –2.9
Domestic demand 0.1 1.0 2.3 5.7 0.1 –3.6
External demand (b) 0.2 –0.3 –0.8 –0.5 1.4 0.7
Public-sector balance (c) –1.6 –2.3 –3.6 –4.2 –3.3 –6.1
CPI (a) 1.2 0.7 –0.1 0.1 1.7 0.4
Current-account balance (c) 3.1 2.8 2.2 1.4 2.2 3.2
Unemployment rate 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 4.2
ULCs (a) 2.0 1.8 0.2 –2.9 1.0 2.2
REINO UNIDO:
PIB (a) 2.3 4.4 2.8 2.6 3.5 2.5
Domestic demand 1.8 3.2 1.8 3.1 3.8 3.4
External demand (b) 0.1 0.9 1.0 –0.5 –0.3 –1.3
Public-sector balance (c) –7.8 –6.8 –5.5 –4.5 –1.9 0.6
CPI (a) 3.0 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6
Current-account balance (c) –1.6 –0.2 –0.5 –0.2 0.6 –0.4
Unemployment rate 10.3 9.3 8.0 7.3 5.5 4.7
ULCs (a) 0.4 –0.6 1.3 2.4 3.2 5.0
Sources: IMF and OECD.
(a) Rate of change.
(b) Contribution to GDP growth.
(c) As a percentage of GDP .
TABLE II.1
Main macroeconomic indicators of the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
UK economic policy has been clearly geared
to nominal stability. Budgetary policy continued
to be steered by fiscal consolidation, whereby
the general government balance showed a sur-
plus of 0.6 % of GDP in 1998 (–1.9 % of GDP in
1997), with a reduction in the structural deficit of
1.3 percentage points of GDP. The Bank of
England altered its monetary policy stance after
the summer, in line with the improvement in
price prospects. In the period to June, it pro-
gressively raised the intervention rate to 7.5 %.
From September, and in successive stages, it
reduced the rate to the level of 5.25 % by April.
Consequently, short and long-term interest
rates have been on a virtually uninterrupted
downward trajectory since mid-1998, while ster-
ling has held stable against the dollar and ap-
preciated against the euro on the foreign ex-
change markets.
II.2.2. The emerging economies
II.2.2.1. The emerging economies in Asia
and Europe
Economic activity in the south-east Asian
countries in 1998 was governed by develop-
ments in the wake of the crisis in the summer of
1997. Overall, the region’s economy contracted
strongly in 1998. Thus, GDP declined by 5.5 %
in South Korea, 8 % in Thailand and Malaysia
and 14 % in Indonesia (see Table II.2).
Nonetheless, in the second half of last year
there were initial signs that the summer 1997
crisis might have touched bottom so that, in the
first two countries mentioned, economic activity
might have rebounded.
In general, all the countries continued to pur-
sue policies of macroeconomic adjustment and
structural reform, in particular in the financial
sector, albeit to highly differing degrees of in-
tensity. The cumulative depreciation by these
countries’ exchange rates and the impact on
imports of the contraction in domestic demand
made for a turnaround in the current-account
balance; at the end of 1998, significant surplus-
es were being run in many of the countries.
From the summer onwards, an easing of finan-
cial conditions could be seen. Indeed, set
against something of a recovery in investor con-
fidence, it was possible to reduce interest rates
substantially in most of these countries, with
levels similar to those prevailing before the cri-
sis in some. There was also an improvement on
securities markets and the exchange rate of the
countries in this region tended to stabilise (see
Chart II.3). However, although most of these
economies have begun to recover, elements of
fragility remain. These are linked in particular to
the position of their financial systems, which
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CHART II.3
Exchange rates and stock market performance
Source: REUTERS.
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GDP (a):
Asia
South Korea 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 5.5 –5.5
Thailand 8.5 8.6 8.8 5.5 –0.4 –8.0
Indonesia 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.0 4.6 –13.7
Malaysia 8.3 9.3 9.4 8.6 7.7 –6.8
Russia –10.4 –11.6 –4.8 –3.5 0.8 –4.8
Latin America 3.9 5.2 1.3 3.6 5.2 2.3
Argentina 6.3 8.5 –5.8 4.8 8.6 4.2
Brazil 4.9 5.9 4.2 2.8 3.2 0.2
Chile 7.0 5.7 10.6 7.4 7.1 3.3
Mexico 2.0 4.4 –6.2 5.2 7.0 4.9
INFLATION (a):
Asia
South Korea 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.4 4.4 7.5
Thailand 3.4 5.1 5.8 5.9 5.6 8.1
Indonesia 9.7 8.5 9.4 7.9 6.6 60.7
Malaysia 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.5 2.7 5.3
Russia 895.9 302.0 190.1 47.8 15.0 28.0
Latin America 209.0 208.9 35.9 20.8 13.9 10.5
Argentina 10.6 4.2 3.4 0.2 0.8 0.9
Brazil 2,103.3 2,123.7 59.6 11.1 7.9 3.5
Chile 12.7 11.4 8.2 7.4 6.1 5.1
Mexico 9.8 7.0 35.0 34.4 20.6 16.7
PUBLIC-SECTOR BALANCE (b):
Asia
South Korea (c) 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 –3.2
Thailand 2.1 2.0 2.6 1.6 –2.1 …
Indonesia –0.7 0.0 0.8 1.4 … …
Malaysia –2.6 2.5 3.8 4.2 … …
Russia –9.4 –10.4 –5.4 –7.9 –7.0 –6.0
Latin America
Argentina –0.8 –2.3 –4.0 –3.7 –2.5 –2.1
Brazil –58.1 –44.3 –7.0 –5.9 –6.1 –8.1
Chile 1.8 1.4 3.1 1.4 0.1 –1.2
Mexico 0.7 –0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.3 –1.2
CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCE (b):
Asia
South Korea (c) 0.1 –1.0 –1.9 –4.7 –1.8 13.1
Thailand –5.0 –5.6 –8.0 –7.9 –1.9 12.2
Indonesia –1.5 –1.7 –3.3 –3.3 –3.0 –0.1
Malaysia –4.8 –7.8 –10.0 –4.9 –5.1 12.3
Russia 3.4 3.8 1.3 0.5 –0.2 –0.5
Latin America
Argentina –3.1 3.8 –1.7 –2.2 –3.7 –4.3
Brazil –0.1 –0.3 –2.5 –3.0 –4.2 –4.5
Chile –4.5 –1.2 –2.1 –5.4 –5.3 –6.6
Mexico –5.8 –7.0 –0.6 –0.6 –2.0 –3.9
Sources: IMF AND Russian European Centre for Economic Policy.
(a) Rate of change.
(b) As a percentage of GDP.
(c) Includes certain Social Security transactions.
TABLE II.2
Emerging-market economies: main macroeconomic indicators
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
must be corrected so as to avoid vulnerability to
disturbances on international markets.
A clear example of the international trans-
mission of bouts of instability was the financial
crisis in Russia in the summer of 1998. Russia
was particularly vulnerable to the changes in
the perception of the risk inherent to investment
in emerging economies brought on by the Asian
crisis, given the state of heavy deterioration
marking its economy. Between 1992 and 1998,
Russian GDP had undergone a cumulative de-
cline of almost 50 % in real terms, investment
had fallen by 70 % and social conditions had
seriously worsened. Budgetary problems, large-
ly of a structural nature, were evident mainly in
Russia’s scant tax-raising capacity (the result of
its relatively stunted tax base, of high tax eva-
sion and of the effects of lower sales and a low-
er oil price), in the difficulties encountered in pri-
vatisation and in the expenses incurred in keep-
ing inviable or inefficiently managed public-sec-
tor companies afloat. The high general govern-
ment borrowing requirement (the budget deficit
exceeded 6 % of GDP in 1997 and 1998)
meant, in turn, a notable increase in the out-
standing balance of public debt which, from
1995, had very short maturities and, to a large
extent, was held by foreigners (over 30 % in
May 1998).
In these conditions, the mid-1997 Asian cri-
sis considerably exacerbated the financial situa-
tion in Russia. It induced a generalised reduc-
tion in the propensity of international investors
to purchase assets issued in countries with
emerging economies and a subsequent rise in
the interest rates demanded on debt issued by
such countries. The tightening of debt financing
conditions, set against a chronic shortage of fis-
cal resources and a growing current-account
deficit, generated selling pressure on the rouble
and heavy foreign reserve losses. The signing
of the agreement between the Russian govern-
ment and the IMF in July, involving an extraor-
dinary financing arrangement, was unable to
contain these losses. On 17th August, the Rus-
sian authorities announced a drastic set of
measures. These included the devaluation of
the rouble (which was subsequently floated on
3rd September), a unilateral 90-day moratorium
on the servicing of private banks’ external debt,
the obligatory conversion of rouble-denominat-
ed short-term public debt into new long-term in-
struments and the suspension of the servicing
and trading of such instruments.
Since then the economic situation has pro-
gressively worsened. It is estimated that GDP
fell by almost 5 % in 1998, inflation has quick-
ened to a rate of 103 % in February 1999 com-
pared with a year earlier, the rouble has depre-
ciated by more than 75 % between August and
March 1999 (see Chart II.3) and the banking
system is deep in crisis. Nonetheless, foreign
debt may once more be refinanced thanks to
the financial support Russia is to receive from
international financial institutions, from Japan,
from the Paris Club and from international
banks in respect of the so-called “Soviet debt”
(debt incurred by the former USSR prior to
1.1.1992).
To date, the direct impact of the Russian cri-
sis on the euro area has been limited. The link
is tighter on the financial side (especially in Ger-
many’s case) than on the trade side. At the end
of 1997, bank loans from the euro area to Rus-
sia accounted for 10 % of international loans
nd exports for 2.7 % of the total. Yet the over-
all scale of the impact also depends on its con-
sequences for the rest of the central and east-
ern European economies. In this respect, the
influence of the Russian crisis has been sub-
stantial only in the countries belonging to the
former Soviet Union. In the main economies of
the area (Poland, Czech Republic and Hun-
gary), with which the euro area has very close
trade ties, the repercussions have been limited
owing to the relative soundness of these coun-
tries’ situation and economic policies.
Nonetheless, the recent military conflict in
Kosovo appreciably heightens the uncertainty
over the region’s immediate economic future.
II.2.2.2. The Latin-American economies
In 1998 the Latin-American economies were
adversely affected by the reduction in global de-
mand for commodities induced by the south-
east Asian economic crisis. In the second half
of the year, the situation worsened considerably
as a result of the instability generated on inter-
national markets by Russia’s financial problems
and by certain countries’ domestic difficulties,
particularly Brazil, in making headway in reduc-
ing macroeconomic disequilibria. These devel-
opments were accompanied by a reduction in
capital flows to the Latin-American economies,
since international investors preferred to place
funds in higher quality assets.
Since 1994, Brazil had been successfully
applying a structural adjustment programme.
This had enabled it to curb the hyperinflation
dynamics besetting it since the previous
decade, to correct to a large extent its swollen
budget deficit and to attract stable and very
sizeable foreign capital flows. However, signs
that this programme had run its course became
progressively manifest during 1998. Internation-
al investors’ confidence was weakened, giving
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rise to selling pressures on the Brazilian curren-
cy, the real, which maintained a crawling peg to
the dollar. In the first half of 1998, the budget
deficit exceeded 7 % of GDP, as a result of a
growing interest burden not offset on the rev-
enue side and of profligate spending in the run-
up to the elections. The current-account deficit,
meantime, amounted to 4.5 % of GDP. Against
this backdrop, the moratorium on Russian debt
in August led international investors’ confidence
in Latin America and, especially, in Brazil’s abil-
ity to meet its financial commitments, to plum-
met. Capital flight ensued along with strong sell-
ing pressures on the real, generating sizeable
losses in reserves and most significant rises in
short-term interest rates, which climbed to 42 %
in November.
In this situation the Brazilian authorities ob-
tained a financial aid package from the IMF tied
to their implementing a stringent budgetary ad-
justment plan. In January 1999, in the light of
the difficulty of putting the required budgetary
reforms into practice, capital outflows accelerat-
ed and the interest rate spreads required of
Brazilian issuers widened, whereby the authori-
ties ended up abandoning the peg to the dollar.
After a sharp depreciation (close to 40 %)
against the dollar in the first two months the real
floated freely, it has since tended to stabilise.
As from early March, it has appreciated slightly,
in a setting of still-high interest rates and an in-
cipient renewal of capital inflows following the
introduction of certain fiscal reforms. In any
event, the flatness of Brazilian output, which
has given rise to a recession in 1999, means
that the forecast exit from the crisis has current-
ly been postponed until the year 2000.
The Brazilian crisis and the general move-
ment in search of quality saw the reappearance
of doubts on the markets about the soundness
of the economic adjustment applied in other
Latin-American countries. The risk associated
with investment in emerging markets was simi-
larly re-assessed, translating into a tightening of
the financial conditions prevailing in the area as
a whole.
The financial crisis assailing the Latin-Ameri-
can region led to a collapse in stock market
prices, heavy selling pressures on exchange
rates requiring the intervention of central banks
on the foreign exchange markets, sizeable rises
in interest rates and, in certain cases, the down-
grading of debt issues (see Chart II.3). Finally,
countries such as Colombia and Ecuador had
to alter their crawling band to the dollar (see
Box II.3). The tightening of financial conditions,
set against the holding or falling commodity ex-
port prices of these countries, affected the
area’s GDP growth rate, which declined notably
in the second half of the year to 2.3 % on aver-
age in 1998 compared with 5.2 % in 1997. Like-
wise, the fall in demand and in export unit value
meant a notable deterioration in the current-ac-
count deficit for the area as a whole, which was
estimated to have reached $90 billion (almost
40 % up on 1997).
The crisis has affected some countries more
than others, depending on their macroeconomic
situation, their relative indebtedness and the
degree of concentration of their exports. Unlike
in other similar situations, Mexico, Argentina
and Chile managed, once the critical moments
of the speculative bouts were behind, gradually
to restore normality to their monetary and finan-
cial conditions. That reflects the markets’ confi-
dence in their reforms, the healthy state of their
public finances and, above all in Argentina’s
case, the soundness of their monetary policy
regime. That said, the economic outlook for the
area as a whole hinges on how successful
Brazil proves in its process of adjustment and in
i s economic recovery. Significantly, Brazil ac-
counts for around 40 % of the Latin-American
region’s GDP and has close trade ties with the
main countries in the area, most especially with
Argentina.
II.3. THE EURO AREA
II.3.1. Economic conditions
in the euro area
In the euro area, the high growth recorded in
1998 was accompanied by the absence of infla-
tionary pressures. As a result, the economic
conditions prevailing at the outset of EMU were,
generally, suitable for the launching of the euro.
Nonetheless, the expansion in activity during
1998 as a whole was accompanied by a no-
table slowdown in growth in the second half of
the year. And the decline in inflation benefited
from the positive contribution of certain tradi-
tionally somewhat erratic prices, which masked
the downward stickiness of other components
of the general price index. Finally, the correc-
tion of fiscal imbalances and the structural re-
forms under way made relatively limited
progress in 1998.
Economic growth last year, running at 2.9 %,
aw the extension of the recovery that began in
1997 (see Table II.3), following the mediocre re-
sults obtained between 1995 and 1996. As a re-
sult, the GDP growth rate in 1998 was the high-
st since the start of the decade. However, after
the first half of the year when the peak of the
current upturn was reached, the buoyancy of
activity moved onto a declining trend, since do-
mestic demand was unable to counter what
38
39
BOX II.2
Exchange-rate regimes in emerging countries
A good number of the emerging-market countries recently –a d particularly as from the start of the nineties– adopted economic
policy strategies aimed at achieving a sufficient degree of macroeconomic stability that would enable them to attain full integration into
the international financial community. These stabilisation plans generally included measures aimed at ensuring full trade openness, fur-
thering market deregulation and liberalising cross-border capital flows. The liberalising measures were accompanied by the adoption of
exchange-rate regimes involving, to a greater or lesser extent, the nominal anchoring of the economy to exchange-rate developments.
As the adjoining table shows, before the 1997 and 1998 foreign exchange crises most of the emerging economies had fixed or se-
mi-fixed exchange rate systems in place. The extreme expression of this was the currency board (where the monetary base in circulation
must be fully backed by the foreign reserves available) adopted by Argentina and Hong Kong. In general, the south-east Asian countries
opted for a fixed exchange rate in relation to the dollar, while the Latin-American countries opted for crawling rate regimes, according to
pre-announced rules (crawling pegs or crawling bands). From 1993 to 1996, the proportion of IMF member countries with this type of ex-
change-rate regime rose from 68 % to 73 %. Such an exchange-rate policy strategy was adopted mainly for three reasons:
• An attempt to reduce exchange-rate risk or the associated hedging costs for foreign investors.
• To progress towards price stability, so that the discipline imposed by international competition and the exchange-rate regime on
the sectors most exposed to international competition might extend to the economy as a whole.
• To reduce the degree of domestic monetary policy discretionarity so as to achieve a sufficient degree of credibility conducive to
the attainment of price stability targets and reduce counter-inflationary policy costs. This strategy seemed the logical response to
the failure of counter-inflationary strategies based on prices and incomes policies and to the growing dollarisation of means of
payment in these economies.
Despite the initial success of strategies based on maintaining exchange-rate stability, several countries have undergone foreign ex-
change crises in recent years. Such crises have generally been unleashed against a background of heightening imbalances in the
economies affected. Thus, for example, the crises affecting the Mexican peso (December 1994), the Russian rouble (August 1998) and
the Brazilian real (January 1999) were preceded by a notorious worsening of fiscal imbalances. The Czech koruna crisis (May 1997) was
brought on by a growing current-account deficit which placed foreign debt at barely sustainable levels. Finally, in the case of the crisis of
the south-east Asian currencies, high private-sector foreign debt associated with the surplus of domestic private investment and the
channelling of foreign capital flows via fragile and inadequately supervised domestic financial systems played a prominent role.
Nonetheless, notably influential at least in the outbreak and deepening of the most recent crises (Russia and Brazil) – apart from the
economic disequilibria of the affected countries – have been not strictly domestic aspects such as the generalised scaling back of invest-
ment in emerging markets induced by the south-east Asian crisis. Moreover, the strongly leveraged position of a significant portion of in-
ternational investment has, in many cases, exacerbated portfolio restructuring and price movements on financial markets.
In any event, the collapse of an exchange-rate regime normally implies the unwinding of the economic policy strategy in the face of
the change in economic setting. In this respect, the technological and regulatory changes recently enacted in the international domain,
and the low return on domestic investment in the developed countries, have driven the transformation of these countries’ domestic sav-
ings into international capital flows. Thus, the economic policy strategies based on exchange-rate stability that were adopted by the
emerging economies had to be pursued under conditions of heavy and in many cases speculative capital inflows. This heightened their
vulnerability to the international financial environment and made the economic conditions required for the maintenance of the exchange-
rate regime more demanding.
Against this backdrop, the crises in recent years have reopened the debate about the conditions that make policies with explicit ex-
change-rate targets viable. They have also tended to polarise the debate on which exchange-rate systems are most suitable for the
emerging economies. In this respect, given that virtually all the countries that have been obliged recently to modify their exchange-rate
regime had either traditional fixed exchange-rate systems or crawling pegs, and that both Argentina and Hong Kong have managed to
maintain their exchange-rate regimes, some analysts have suggested currency boards or even complete dollarisation as the only viable
alternatives to a free-float system in the current circumstances. However, setting general rules in this field is enormously complex in view
of the interplay between a country’s exchange-rate regime and its economic situation and outlook, and of the great diversity which, in this
respect, the so-called “emerging economies” currently display.
Exchange-rate arrangements in certain emerging and developing economies since 1993
Asia:
Thailand Pegged to the dollar (a) July 1997 Float
Indonesia Pegged to the dollar (a) August 1997 Float
Philippines Pegged to the dollar (a) August 1997 Float
South Korea Pegged to the dollar (a) November 1997 Float
Malaysia (b) Pegged to the dollar (a) August 1997 / September 1998 Float/Pegged to the dollar
Hong-Kong Fixed to the dollar under a currency — Fixed to the dollar under a currency
board arrangement board arrangement
Latin America:
Mexico Crawling peg to the dollar December 1994 Dirty float
Brazil Crawling peg to the dollar January 1999 Dirty float
Ecuador (c) Crawling band in relation to the dollarFebruary 1999 Float
Peru Dirty float — Dirty float
Columbia (d) Crawling band in relation to the dollarAugust 1998 Crawling band in relation to the dollar
Venezuela Crawling band in relation to the dollar— Crawling band in relation to the dollar
Argentina Fixed to the dollar under a currency — Fixed to the dollar under a currency
board arrangement board arrangement
Chile Band around currency basket — Band around currency basket
(80% dólar) (80% dollar)
Central and Eastern Europe:
Russia Bands in relation to the dollar August 1998 Float
Poland Crawling band in relation to basket — Crawling band in relation to basket
Hungary Crawling band in relation to basket — Crawling band in relation to basket
Czech Republic Crawling band in relation to basket May 1997 Dirty float in relation to the DM
Slovakia Band around basket October 1998 Float
Bulgaria Float June 1997 Fixed to the DM under a currency
board arrangement
Romania Fixed May 1997 Float
(a) Formally, they followed a basket of currencies in which the predominant currency was the dollar.
(b) Controls on capital outflows were introduced in Septermber 1998.
(c) Devaluation of the central parity (August 1998).
(d) Devaluation of the central parity.
Currency Board:fixed exchange rate where the monetary base is backed, by law, by foreign exchange.
Crawling peg:the exchange rate depreciates at an officially pre-announced rate.
Crawling band:crawling peg where bands that depreciate at the same pre-announced rate are imposed.
Former exchange-rate arrangement Changed in Current arrangement
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was a progressively more adverse external en-
vironment. Hence, the negative contribution of
external demand to GDP growth increased con-
siderably in the second half of the year in most
countries (see Chart II.4).
Initially, the financial turbulence that first be-
gan to affect the emerging economies in the
summer of 1997 contributed to the fall in long-
term interest rates in the euro area (and in other
industrialised countries). Likewise, lower de-
mand for oil and for other commodities by these
countries led to the decline in the prices of such
products on international markets and, by ex-
tension, to the containment of inflationary pres-
sures.
However, during 1998, with the spread of
the crisis to other countries, its adverse effects
on the euro area became increasingly manifest.
First, its negative influence was reflected in the
diminished buoyancy of external demand as a
result of the deterioration in activity in the coun-
tries affected. Subsequently, the prolongation of
the crisis began to impair business confidence
and, as a consequence, to heighten doubts
about sustained growth being maintained in the
area as a whole.
Domestic demand remained notably resilient
throughout 1998, albeit on a mildly declining
path in the second half of the year. Component
by component, the buoyancy of consumption,
which tended to heighten in the second half of
the year, was driven by the increase in real
household disposable income stemming from
job creation and from the modest increase in re-
al wages derived from the improved inflation
outlook. This was further magnified by the im-
provement in households’ confidence, which in-
creased their propensity to consume. Against
this background, the effect arising from the
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (a):
Gross domestic product –1.1 2.7 2.2 1.6 2.5 2.9
Domestic demand –2.6 2.3 1.9 1.2 1.9 3.4
Private consumption –0.9 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.4 3.0
Government consumption 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.7 0.3 0.4
Gross fixed-capital formation –7.9 2.1 3.4 0.4 2.1 4.2
Exports 1.1 8.7 8.1 4.4 10.3 6.0
Imports –4.1 7.6 7.4 3.3 9.0 7.3
Contributions to GDP growth (b):
Domestic demand –2.6 2.3 1.9 1.1 1.9 3.3
External demand 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 –0.3
PRICES AND COSTS (a):
Consumer prices (annual average) 3.7 3.0 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.1
Consumer prices
(end-year 12-month rate) 3.6 2.8 2.8 1.9 1.5 0.8
Unit labour costs … … 1.7 1.8 0.6 …
Compensation per employee … … 3.5 3.4 2.6 …
GENERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS (c):
Current expenditure 51.0 50.1 49.7 49.7 48.6 47.4
Interest charges 5.7 5.4 5.7 5.5 5.0 4.5
Current revenue 49.4 48.6 48.5 48.8 49.0 48.6
Public investment 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3
Primary deficit (–)/surplus (+) 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.3 2.5 2.4
Deficit (–)/surplus (+) –5.5 –5.1 –5.0 –4.1 –2.5 –2.1
LABOUR MARKET:
Total employment (a) … … 0.4 0.2 0.3 1.3
Unemployment (d) 10.9 11.7 11.4 11.6 11.6 11.0
Sources: ECB and European Commission.
(a) Rate of change.
(b) Rate of change of GDP in percentage points.
(c) As a percentage of GDP.
(d) As a percentage of labour force.
TABLE II.3
Euro area. Main macroeconomic indicators
199819971996199519941993
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stock market upturn played a relevant role, al-
beit a less significant one than in the United
States in view of the lower share of equity hold-
ings in the wealth of households resident in the
euro area.
Lower inflation, the continuing downtrend of
interest rates and exchange rate stability in the
euro area all shaped a macroeconomic climate
propitious to the expansion of investment. Yet
the conjunction of these elements proved insuf-
ficient to avoid the gradual slowdown in some of
its components at the end of the year. Logically,
the gradual deterioration in the outlook for the
external sector may have prompted greater pre-
caution in corporate investment plans and, thus,
have accounted for the deceleration in gross
capital formation between the first and final
quarter of the year. Nonetheless, two-thirds of
the reduction in the contribution of investment
to growth were due to the behaviour of stocks.
The trend in stocks cannot be readily interpret-
ed owing to the relative inaccuracy with which
they are estimated and to the difficulty of identi-
fying the voluntary or involuntary nature of actu-
al stock adjustment.
The performance of exports was the biggest
check on the expansion of activity in 1998.
Trade flows underwent a sustained and pro-
nounced deceleration, which was sharper in the
case of exports than in that of imports. As a re-
sult, the contribution of external demand to
GDP growth turned negative in 1998 after hav-
ing been positive since 1993. The export perfor-
mance can largely be explained by the deterio-
ration in growth in countries with emerging mar-
kets and by the appreciation of the real effective
exchange rate of the euro area over most of the
year.
The latest indicators for the opening months
of 1999 point to an extension of the moderate
slowdown in activity. The deterioration in busi-
ness expectations is confirmed by the decline in
the business confidence index. In contrast to
the strong positive correlation it has historically
shown, this index has, since mid-1998, trended
contrary to the consumer confidence indicator,
which has held at its highest levels since the
series first began to be calculated in 1985 (see
Chart II.4). The differing pattern of behaviour
between both types of indicators largely reflects
a differentiated trend of activity in the various
productive branches; while services output is
running at a sustained level, weakness is con-
centrating in industry, which is more directly af-
fected by the deterioration of the foreign sector.
In the main, the ranking of the euro-area
countries on the basis of GDP growth rates re-
mained unchanged in 1998 in relation to the
CHART II.4
Euro area: composition of growth, confidence indicators
and employment over the course of the cycle
Sources: Banco de España, European Central Bank, Euro-
pean Commission, national statistics.
(a) Balance of replies.
(b) Index of the level of the variable: first quarter of 1993 =
100.
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preceding year (see Table II.4). The most no-
table exception is France. Having grown below
the average in 1997, it was two-tenths of a point
above it in 1998. Germany and Italy continued
growing at a slower rate than the other mem-
bers and, along with Belgium, they were the on-
ly countries with growth rates lower than the av-
erage for the area. This classification of coun-
tries according to their respective output growth
rates cannot be transferred mechanically to
their relative position in the business cycle,
since potential growth rates differ from one
country to another. However, the countries with
higher potential growth rates tended to coincide
in 1998 (as was the case in 1997) with those
further along the cycle in terms of the difference
between actual and potential GDP growth rates.
Accordingly, the degree of cyclical diachrony
among the euro-area economies did not
change significantly in 1998 in relation to 1997.
During 1998, euro-area inflation, measured
by the average rate of change of the har-
monised index of consumer prices (HICP), con-
tinued on the progressively slowing path of re-
cent years. The HICP, which grew 1.6 % in
1997, moderated further in 1998 to 1.1 %.
However, the performance of the general in-
dex masks diverging trends regarding both the
behaviour of the various components and of the
different countries. Product groups whose
prices ran, on average, at a lower growth rate
than a year earlier included services and ener-
gy goods (see Chart II.5). In the case of ser-
vices, however, the muted improvement com-
pared with 1997, which was concentrated at the
start of the year, did not prevent the traditional
reluctance of price growth in this component to
converge towards the general level. More sig-
nificant was the slowdown in the rate of in-
crease of energy goods prices. The oil price fell
on international markets, partly as a result of
the drop in demand brought on by the crisis of
the emerging economies and the absence of
agreement among the oil exporting countries to
adjust their output to the new demand condi-
ions. This prompted a fall in the price of the en-
ergy goods included in the HICP of 2.6 % for
the year as a whole, compared with an increase
of 2.7 % the previous year, a fall which intensi-
fied notably in the second half of the year. The
considerable scale of the decline in this compo-
nent accounted for a substantial part of the
slowdown in the general index, despite its rela-
tively limited weight in the index (see Chart II.5).
As to the remaining components, processed
food prices increased in 1998 at the same rate
as in 1997, while the pace of prices of unpro-
cessed food and non-energy industrial goods
increased. The upward momentum was more
pronounced in the case of unprocessed food.
But it was also less significant since this is a
volatile component whose prices slowed strong-
ly in the final course of the year after a tempo-
rary surge in the spring, owing to the impact of
bad weather during these months and to the ef-
f ct on 12-month growth rates of the favourable
performance the previous year. Unprocessed
food was, along with services, the most infla-
tionary component in 1998.
Thus was the trajectory of the prices of ener-
gy goods and fresh food, two markedly erratic
general index components. That aside, the
slight moderation in services inflation and the
somewhat more expansionary pattern of non-
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Belgium –1.5 2.4 2.1 1.5 2.9 2.9
Germany –1.2 2.8 1.3 1.3 2.3 2.5
Spain –1.2 2.3 2.7 2.4 3.5 3.8
France –1.3 2.8 2.1 1.6 2.3 3.2
Ireland 3.7 8.1 11.8 8.3 10.7 11.9
Italy –1.2 2.2 2.8 0.9 1.5 1.4
Luxembourg 8.7 4.2 3.8 3.0 3.7 5.7
Netherlands 0.8 3.2 2.3 3.1 3.6 3.7
Austria 0.4 3.1 1.8 1.6 2.5 3.3
Portugal –1.4 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.5 4.0
Finland –1.2 4.6 5.1 3.6 6.0 5.3
Euro area –1.1 2.7 2.2 1.6 2.5 2.9
Sources: Eurostat, European Commission and national statistics.
TABLE II.4
Euro-area countries: annual GDP growth
199819971996199519941993
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energy industrial goods led, in 1998, to a nar-
rowing of the spread between the price growth
rates of the products most exposed to interna-
tional competition (processed food and non-en-
ergy industrial goods) and those more sheltered
from it (services). However, the narrowing of
the gap for the area as a whole coincided with it
widening for some countries.
The bigger productivity gains normally
recorded in the tradeable goods sector can be
explained, in principle, by the persistence of a
certain inflation differential between the two
product groups, the scale of which is difficult to
pinpoint. Generally, however, this gap tends to
be greater in countries where demand pressure
is more intense. This causes inflationary pres-
sures in the services sector, whose prices, un-
like in the goods sector, are less influenced by
international competition. In practice, a very
high correlation could in fact be seen in 1998
between the business cycle position of the vari-
ous countries and their inflation differentials be-
tween both groups of products. The reason for
this is that much of the dual inflation phe-
nomenon is due to the existence of barriers to
free competition and inflexibilities in price for-
mation mechanisms in the sectors sheltered
from international competition.
The ongoing strengthening of the rate of job
creation that began in the spring of 1997 contin-
ued on labour markets during 1998. Over the
year as a whole, job creation grew at a rate
slightly higher than 1 %. It was assisted by the
firm trend of economic activity, the moderation
of wages (which grew below productivity) and
the favourable effects of the reforms that have
begun to be introduced into certain domestic
markets for labour and for goods and services.
The slowdown in activity in the final course of
the year had a limited effect which, moreover,
was confined to the manufacturing sector with-
out, so far, having affected services.
The growth of the labour force (attributable
largely, perhaps, to the favourable trend of the
euro-area labour market) prevented job creation
from expressing itself as a sharper reduction in
the unemployment rate. Nonetheless, after
peaking in the central months of 1997, the un-
employment rate fell progressively to 10.5 % in
the first two months of 1999, its lowest level for
the past five years. Notwithstanding, from a
medium and long-term perspective, the labour
market situation is far from satisfactory in view
of the structural nature of most of the remaining
unemployment. The divergence between the re-
sults obtained by the various countries, which
are more favourable in those which have more
resolutely tackled this unemployment compo-
CHART II.5
Euro area. Harmonised indices
of consumer prices
Sources: Eurostat and in-house.
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nent via structural reforms, are particularly illus-
trative.
II.3.2. Economic policies in the euro area
In the euro-area countries, there was some-
thing of a pause in 1998 in the fiscal consolida-
tion process that began in 1994. Although the
overall budget deficit fell to 2.1 % of GDP (com-
pared with 2.5 % in 1997), this reduction was
underpinned by the lower cost of debt refinanc-
ing (because of the downward course of inter-
est rates) and by the favourable impact of activ-
ity on the cyclical components of revenue and
expenditure. As a result, the primary surplus
worsened for the first time since 1994, moving
from 2.5 % to 2.4 % of GDP, while the structural
budget deficit, i.e. that calculated under neutral
cyclical conditions, underwent a slight increase
according to various estimates.
Among the main countries in the area, the
far-greater-than-expected scale of the improve-
ment in the German budget deficit was particu-
larly significant: it ran a deficit of 2 % of GDP.
This result may be attributed, in part, to the
generalised containment of spending at all lev-
els of general government, but above all to the
cyclical recovery in tax receipts. In France, the
deficit underwent a marginal reduction of 0.1 %
of GDP to 2.9 %. The improvement, which is no
greater owing to the introduction in 1997 of re-
versible budgetary consolidation measures (of
the order of 0.5 % of GDP), is due in particular
to the performance of revenue, compared with
the difficulties experienced in controlling expen-
diture. Finally, in Italy, the reduction in interest
payments exceeded forecasts, helping counter
the weakness of tax receipts.
The aims of budgetary plans for 1999 are, in
some cases, not ambitious enough. This is be-
cause the improvements envisaged in results
tend to reside to a greater extent on the
favourable effects of the exogenous factors de-
scribed above continuing (in particular, the re-
duction in debt service costs) rather than on a
genuine fiscal consolidation drive. In the medi-
um run, the Stability Programmes, the presen-
tation of which by the euro-area countries con-
cluded last January, outline the goals that each
member expects to achieve in the coming years
(see Table II.5). In certain cases, the rate at
which it is planned to draw closer to the goal of
achieving a balanced budget by the year 2002
(which some countries have already achieved)
seems appropriate. In other cases it would
probably have been desirable for the projected
consolidation path to have been more resolute.
Among the second group are the three biggest
countries in the area; given their current fiscal
position, they are all among those which tend to
show less flexible leeway, in budgetary terms,
to withstand, via the built-in stabilisers, a hypo-
thetical slowdown in activity.
In any event, fiscal policy faces very impor-
tant challenges which advise benefiting, as far
as possible, from any opportunity to accelerate
progress towards attaining structural balances
in equilibrium. Likewise, overcoming the short-
comings on the various product and factor mar-
kets should be a priority in all the member
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Belgium –1.3 –1.0 –0.7 –0.3
Germany –2.0 –2.0 –1.5 –1.0
Spain –1.6 –1.0 –0.4 0.1
France (a) –2.3 –2.0 –1.6 –1.2
Ireland 1.7 1.4 1.6 —
Italy –2.0 –1.5 –1.0 —
Luxembourg 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.7
Netherlands (a) –1.3 — — –1.1
Austria –2.0 –1.7 –1.5 –1.4
Portugal –2.0 –1.5 –1.2 –0.8
Finland 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.3
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Euro area –1.8 –1.6 –1.2 –0.8
Source: National stability programmes.
(a) Lower economic growth scenario.
TABLE II.5
Deficit targets in the stability programmes
(as a percentage of GDP)
2002200120001999
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states. In this respect, the recent initiatives of
the European Council are promising. Under the
“Luxembourg and Cardiff processes”, it is
planned to create an institutional framework
which, on one hand, encourages co-ordinated
moves to reform national markets and, on the
other, promotes the monitoring of the progress
made under the multilateral surveillance exer-
cises.
II.3.3. Monetary and financial conditions
in the euro area
During 1998, monetary and financial condi-
tions in the countries that would make up the
euro area drew progressively closer, as reflect-
ed in the high stability of bilateral exchange
rates and the narrowing of interest rate spreads
at all maturities. This process was a conse-
quence of the nominal convergence attained by
the economies concerned which, in turn,
strengthened the markets’ confidence about the
culmination of Monetary Union on schedule.
Broadly, monetary conditions across the eu-
ro area in 1998 could be considered as accom-
modating: real interest rates were at historical
lows, below 3 %, and the growth of the narrow
monetary aggregates and of credit variables
was high, especially in the countries with higher
growth rates. From May, the exchange rates
between the currencies of the countries that
would make up the euro area generally re-
mained very stable, at levels close to the ERM
central parities. The exception here was the
Irish pound, whose strength, tied to that of ster-
ling at that time, made a 3 % revaluation of its
central parity necessary in March. The conver-
gence of exchange rates towards their central
parities quickened further to the announcement
on 3rd May that the conversion rates of each
currency against the euro would observe the
ERM central bilateral parities. The Irish pound,
despite its revaluation in March, held signifi-
cantly above its central parity until the end of
the year, owing to the lesser speed with which
the Irish central bank cut its intervention interest
rates to align them with those prevailing in the
core countries of the area.
National monetary policies in 1998 were
strongly influenced by the ongoing convergence
of interest rates and by the need to take into ac-
count, to an increasingly greater extent, consid-
erations relative to the euro area as a whole. In-
deed, the central banks of Germany, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland kept their
intervention rates similar for virtually the entire
year, and they did not change until December.
The other central banks, with higher interest
rates, could have regard only to the specific
conditions of each economy in administering
over time the existing leeway for reducing their
intervention rates.
In this respect, the economies with higher in-
terest rates in relative terms were, with the ex-
ception of Italy, those running higher growth
rates and, therefore, those potentially vulnerable
to greater inflationary risks. Hence, the respec-
tive national central banks modulated the reduc-
tion of their intervention interest rates in an at-
tempt to soften the potential expansionary ef-
fects of these cuts on aggregate demand. Such
potential effects were pertinent in view of the
low level of real interest rates and of the strong
rise in the public’s financial wealth that had gen-
CHART II.6
Interest rates
Source: Banco de España.
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erally resulted from the reduction in interest
rates and the favourable performance of equity
markets on the international stage. The national
central banks of these economies thus tended
to assign the biggest portion of the cut in their
interest rates to the second half of the year,
once the decision had been adopted to begin
Stage Three of EMU in 1999 and their position
in terms of price stability was more entrenched.
Notably, moreover, in view of the widespread
uncertainty over how the international financial
crisis would unfold, the level at which the ECB’s
intervention rates were to be set at the outset of
Stage Three was not decided until December. It
was on 3rd December that the national central
banks, in concert, reduced their intervention
rates to 3 %. The exception was the Bank of
Italy, which followed suit on 22nd December.
On that date, the ECB announced that the inter-
est rate on its first main refinancing operation
would be 3 % (see Chart II.6).
The trend of shorter-dated interest rates at
the national level, especially in the countries
where reductions were greatest in 1998, did not
have a significant bearing on the rates expected
over longer horizons. Indeed, long rates were
largely influenced by common factors linked to
conditions in the euro area as a whole and to
agents’ expectations about the monetary condi-
tions that would prevail beyond the start of
Stage Three of EMU. Such developments were
the outcome of the credibility accorded by eco-
nomic agents to EMU months before it came in-
to being.
Long-term interest rates in the euro-area
countries continued in 1998 on the downward
trend observed throughout the nineties. It was
interrupted only by certain temporary episodes
which also affected the other industrialised
countries (see Chart II.6). This trajectory was
connected with a notable and generalised de-
cline in inflation expectations and the ongoing
reduction in real interest rates and inflationary
risk premia. Events on international capital
markets did, however, have an effect, especial-
ly in the second half of 1998. Then, as a result
of the crisis affecting Japan, Russia and certain
other emerging markets, there was an ensuing
increase in the volatility of public debt prices. In
fact, the heightening mid-year of the uncertain-
ty over the scale of the effects of the crisis on
the industrialised countries, coupled with the
volatility shown by financial markets, altered
agents’ perception of the risk involved and
prompted changes in their portfolio selection
d e c i s i o n s .
Investors duly opted for the financial assets
considered to be most liquid and safe. This
gave rise to switching from equities to fixed-in-
come instruments, from debt issued in emerg-
ing markets to instruments issued in the more
stable developed countries, and, among the lat-
ter, to short-dated debt. These movements,
along with the earlier mentioned scaling back of
growth and inflation expectations in the industri-
alised countries in the closing months of 1998,
prompted further cuts in long-term interest rates
in the euro-area countries.
During 1998, the average yield on ten-year
bonds in the area fell by 150 basis points to
3.95 % at year-end. Movements across the dif-
ferent countries were very uniform and, as a
consequence, long-term interest rate spreads
generally remained fairly stable, after having
significantly narrowed in previous years.
Nonetheless, after the summer crisis, the
“flight to quality” witnessed on the financial
markets temporarily affected rate spreads,
which widened slightly. But, in the closing
months of the year, this phenomenon was fully
corrected. The levels of average long-term
spreads over Germany in the euro area stood,
at year-end, in a range from almost zero in
France’s case to 30 basis points in the case of
P o r t u g a l .
The long-term interest rate spread of the eu-
ro area over the United States increased some-
what. This was due to the bigger reduction in in-
terest rates in Europe and to the perceptible di-
vergence between the cyclical positions of the
United States and the euro-area economies.
The spread stood at around 70 basis points at
the end of the year.
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CHART II.7
Monetary and credit aggregates
in the euro area
Source: Banco de España.
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Turning to the euro-zone stock markets,
these generally performed similarly to their US
counterpart, albeit with a variable degree of
synchrony. In any event, market volatility in-
creased significantly during 1998 as a result of
worldwide financial instability. Thus, in the first
half of the year, there were sizeable increases
on European markets, as reflected in the 45 %
rise from end-1997 to mid-July in the share
prices of the Dow Jones EURO STOXX general
index. However, further to the turbulence
caused by the Russian financial crisis in the
summer, to the increase in uncertainty and to
the emergence of doubts about the sustainabili-
ty of the marked uptrend on international stock
markets, the associated indexes fell. The reflec-
tion of this in Europe was a 35 % decline in the
EURO STOXX index from July to October. Fi-
nally, as from October, there was a rally on se-
curities markets which offset the previous falls.
In this financial setting, the monetary and
credit aggregates of the various euro-area
countries behaved in a relatively homogeneous
way in 1998, similar to 1997. The fall in the op-
portunity cost of holding liquid financial assets
contributed to increasing the rate of expansion
of the narrow monetary aggregates, especially
in those European countries experiencing high-
er economic growth. In turn, the lower cost of
debt financing prompted a quickening in credit
extended to non-financial firms and households,
this acceleration proving sharper in the more
buoyant economies. The financing of general
government continued to diminish significantly,
in line with the improvement in budget deficits.
As a result of all these movements, the narrow
monetary aggregates held at considerably high-
er growth rates than the broad aggregates, and
high rates of expansion were posted for financ-
ing obtained by the resident sectors. According
to the definition used for the euro area, the M3
aggregate ran at a year-on-year rate of be-
tween 4 % and 5 % during 1998, while the M1
aggregate grew at between 8 % and 11 %. Fi-
nally, financing to the resident sectors in-
creased in December at an annual rate of 9.8 %
(see Chart II.7).
II.4. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
AND MONETARY POLICY
AT THE OUTSET OF EMU
At the start of Stage Three of EMU, inflation
in the euro area as a whole stood at a 12-month
growth rate below 1 %, which was consistent
with the price stability target as defined by the
ECB (see section II.5). The favourable perfor-
mance of prices was accompanied by satisfac-
tory economic growth. This was the outcome of
the cyclical conditions prevailing in the euro
area and of the favourable outlook generated
by the introduction of the single currency follow-
ing the culmination of nominal convergence
among the founder members and the attain-
ment of a high degree of macroeconomic stabil-
ity.
Yet although monetary policy did not have to
contend with situations of immediate risk for
price stability, the ECB had to adopt its first de-
cisions in a complex setting. Constraints includ-
ed, on one hand, the technical difficulties of im-
plementing a monetary policy derived from the
introduction of the single currency and, on the
other, the prevailing uncertainty over the future
course of the key economic variables.
Conducting the single monetary policy
would require the preparation of new statistics
for the euro area and the availability of aggre-
gate time series for a large number of vari-
ables, whose properties it had not been possi-
ble to study comprehensively beforehand. In
turn, the very introduction of the single currency
entailed changes in agents’ behaviour, thereby
hindering the use of models estimated with his-
torical data for the definition of targets and the
preparation of projections for monetary policy
e n d s .
The euro-area economy was, moreover,
ubjected to opposing forces arising from the
xternal sector and from domestic demand. In
the case of the external sector, the sluggish-
ness of exports, associated with the internation-
al economic instability, exerted a considerable
check. Nonetheless, domestic demand re-
mained relatively buoyant, underpinned by the
strength of consumption, although the deterio-
ration in fixed capital investment in the closing
months of the year contributed to moderating its
growth rate.
In the opening months of the year, domestic
demand expanded on the basis of relatively
easy monetary and financial conditions. Real
short- and long-term interest rates thus stood at
2 % and 3 %, respectively. The exchange rate
of the euro stood, at the end of March, 6 %
down in nominal effective terms compared with
the beginning of the year. In turn, stock market
prices were at very high levels, once the effects
of the Russian crisis were behind. Finally, the
monetary and credit aggregates (the narrow
ones in particular in the case of the former)
were expanding vigorously. Specifically, the
growth of M3 in the first half of the year stood
above the reference value set by the ECB (4.5
% in annual year-on-year growth terms), al-
though this behaviour was partly the outcome of
temporary factors associated with the transition
to the single currency.
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The price outlook in April 1999 was therefore
governed by a slowdown in demand (the result
of the behaviour of the external sector and of in-
vestment) and by uncertainty as to the continu-
ity of the supply-side factors that had contribut-
ed favourably to the low inflation rate recorded
in 1999. The main risks for sustaining low infla-
tion rates were associated with the behaviour of
commodity prices. In particular, the oil price had
risen appreciably in March and April. Likewise,
wage settlements in certain countries could
have a negative bearing on the inflation rate,
especially if they were to be emulated in other
countries.
Nonetheless, economic activity in the euro
area was showing signs of evident deterioration
which, against a background of very low infla-
tion, made a rise in prices that were to place the
inflation rate permanently above 2 % in the
short and medium run unlikely. In this respect,
the weakening in foreign trade in recent
months, the slowdown in investment and the
progressive deterioration in business confi-
dence augured diminished buoyancy in the
economy’s final demand. Moreover, were the
instability on international financial markets to
extend over time, the resulting uncertainty over
the prospects of certain economies and their
ability to meet their commitments to the rest of
the world could prompt a further shrinkage in in-
ternational trade and inhibit productive invest-
ment to a greater than expected degree. All
these factors had triggered the generalised
downward revision of the latest growth fore-
casts for the euro area and contributed to the
low level of long-term interest rates.
Under these conditions, and in the light of
the monetary policy strategy adopted (see sec-
tion II.5), the ECB decided on 8th April to cut its
main intervention rate (that on the weekly ten-
der) from 3 %, at which it had stood since the
start of the year, to 2.5 %. It also placed the
marginal lending facility rate at 3.5 % and the
deposit facility rate at 1.5 %. Given the absence
of significant risks for price stability, the ECB
sought through this measure to contribute to
strengthening economic growth and restoring
confidence in the economy.
The measure adopted by the ECB is admit-
tedly tailored to the needs of the area as a
whole. But it is likely that its influence will differ
according to each economy’s situation, and this
may have a bearing on price growth differen-
tials, so that the competitiveness of those
economies where inflation is higher will be af-
fected. In this respect, it should be borne in
mind that price prospects differ as a result,
among other factors, of the limited cyclical syn-
chrony still shown by the various countries,
linked to their different degree of exposure to
the rise in the imported oil price and to the dis-
parate results of wage bargaining to date in
1999. Further, although monetary and financial
conditions have eased in all countries of the
area, such easing has been appreciably more
intense in those economies in which interest
rate convergence during 1998 meant a greater
reduction in their central banks’ intervention in-
terest rates.
II.5. THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
FRAMEWORK OF THE
EUROSYSTEM’S MONETARY POLICY
The year 1998 saw the completion of the
preparatory work for the start-up on 1st January
1999 of the Eurosystem’s single monetary poli-
cy. The task was a very complex one. Lengthy
planning periods were needed to harmonise
major areas of the national central banks’ oper-
ational procedures, monetary policy instruments
and payment systems, adapting them to a com-
mon model. Accordingly, the process was set in
train many years in advance, as far back as
1990, in the former Committee of Governors of
the European Union Central Banks. With the
creation in 1994 of the European Monetary In-
stitute, which took over co-ordination of the bulk
of the preparatory work for Monetary Union, sig-
nificant impetus was given to the process.
During the second half of 1998, the Euro-
pean Central Bank, established further to the
European Council decision last May, approved
the preparations and finalised certain unre-
solved matters regarding the definition of the
operational framework of the single monetary
policy. Regarding the monetary policy strategy,
where the European Monetary Institute had left
options more open, the Governing Council of
the ECB ratified a set of general principles that
were to govern the framework of monetary poli-
cy objectives (effectiveness, accountability,
transparency, medium-term orientation and
continuity in respect of the experience built up
at the respective national central banks). An all-
encompassing strategy pragmatically combin-
ing features of different monetary policy models
was selected. In adopting this decision, the
Council examined in particular the relative mer-
its of strategies based on intermediate money
supply targets and on direct inflation targets.
Regard was had to the particularities of the eu-
ro area and the uncertainty as to how specific
aspects of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism would work in the area as a whole.
Such uncertainty arose especially from the pos-
sible change in economic agents’ conduct as a
result of the structural change inherent to the
start of Monetary Union.
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BOX II.3
Changes in the implementation of monetary policy
Previous situation in Spain
Open market operations
Marginal lending and deposit facilities • None. • Marginal lending facility and credit facility with
interest rates set at 3.5% and 1.5%, respec-
tively. Relatively insignificant and, after initial
phase, sporadic use.
Minimum reserves
Assets eligible as collateral
Risk control measures
Eligibility mechanism
• Reserve ratio of 2%.
• Broad reserve base
• Ten-day and concurrent calculation and main-
tenance periods, with a two-day lag at the be-
ginning.
• Non-remunerated.
• Certificates of the Banco de España (CBE)
and book-entry government debt.
• Unnecessary.
• Repo operations.
• Reserve ratio of 2%.
• The reserve base has undergone changes
which, in the Spanish case, have meant a net
increase of approximately 20%.
• Calculation of reserve requirements on last
day of month and lagged maintenance period,
starting on 24th calendar day of following
month.
• Remunerated at the ESCB rate for main refi-
nancing operations.
• Allowance of EUR 100,000 to be deducted.
• Tier “one” of the Banco de España, including,
basically, government and regional and local
government debt, matador bonds and mort-
gage bonds.
• Tier “two” of the Banco de España, including
other debt instruments with limited credit risk,
Ibex-35 non-banking securities and non-mort-
gage loans.
• Tier “one” and “two” assets of the other Nation-
al Central Banks of the Eurosystem.
• Valuation “haircuts” depending on the type of
asset and maturity, and initial margin for all
monetary operations depending on maturity.
• Repo operations.
• Pledged assets.
1. MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS
2. ELIGIBLE ASSETS
• Ten-day tenders with ten-day maturities,
through which more than 90% of liquidity was
provided. American-type variable-rate auc-
tions.
• Very frequent fine-tuning operations (on more
than 80% of market days) with 13 market-
makers. Conducted with a one-day maturity
and accounted for less than 10% of the liq-
uidity provided.
• Main refinancing operations: weekly tenders
with a maturity of two weeks, which provide
around 70% of the total amount allotted.
Fixed-rate tenders with strong rationing (in
6 0 % of tenders the allotment ratio has been
lower than 10%).
• Longer-term refinancing operations: monthly
tenders with a maturity of three months ac-
counting, approximately, for 30% of the total
amount provided. American-type variable-rate
auctions.
• Fine-tuning and structural operations may be
carried out, but as yet not used.
Situation in EMU
• Banks, savings-banks and credit co-opera-
tives (around 250).
• All credit institutions (around 400).
3. COUNTERPARTIES
• Domestic payments through the Money Mar-
ket Telephone Service, which operated as an
end-of-day gross settlement system.
• Cross-border large-value payments through
SEPI (Spanish interbank payment service)
(around EUR 35 billion daily).
• Correspondent accounts.
• Cross-border payments through the ECU
Clearing System of the EBA (around EUR 120
billion daily for the euro area as a whole.
• Domestic payments through the Banco de Es-
paña Settlement Service, as the Spanish com-
ponent of TARGET, converted into a real-time
gross settlement system.
• Cross-border payments mainly through TAR-
GET (around EUR 400 billion daily for the euro
area as a whole), and, to a lesser extent,
through the Euro Clearing System (formerly
ECU Clearing System) of the EBA and other
net multilateral systems. In addition, corre-
spondent accounts.
4. LARGE-VALUE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
The first element of the Eurosystem’s mone-
tary policy strategy agreed on by the Governing
Council of the ECB is the definition of the price
stability objective laid down in article 105 of the
Treaty on European Union. This objective has
been defined as maintaining a 12-month growth
rate for the euro-area Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices of below 2 % over the medi-
um term. This definition is notable in several re-
spects. First, by implicitly excluding deflation as
compatible with price stability, the latter is effec-
tively defined in terms of an inflation corridor
between 0 % and 2 %. Second, the definition
adopted is in line with those applied prior to the
start of Monetary Union by many euro-area
central banks, including the Banco de España.
Third, in placing the objective in the medium
term, it is stressed that the Eurosystem mone-
tary policy stance shall be considered over this
horizon. In that way, deviations from the target
deemed as temporary may be tolerated and, in
the face of sharp short-run variations in the lev-
el of prices, an immediate return to the target
will not be pursued, since that would require
abrupt changes in the monetary policy stance
that might generate excessive cyclical volatility
in the economy. Finally, the definition is a re-
minder that the price performance of relevance
or monetary policy decisions refers to the euro
area as a whole; accordingly, the single policy
will not react to specific national or regional situ-
ations.
The Eurosystem pursues the above-defined
price stability objective through an assessment
of the inflation outlook in the euro zone drawing
on a systematic analysis and overall evaluation
of a broad set of area-wide economic, monetary
and financial indicators. However, a leading role
is given to the trend of the money stock, in
recognition of the essentially monetary nature
of inflation in the medium and long term. Thus,
using the terms coined by the ECB, the money
stock is the “first pillar” and the set of economic
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FINANCIAL ASSETS M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Cash in circulation 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sight deposits 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time deposits
Up to two years 3 3 3
Over two years 3
Deposits redeemable at up
to three months’ notice 3 3 3 3
Repurchase agreements 3 3
Shares in Money Market
Funds (MMFs) and money
market instruments 3
Securities other than shares
up to two years 3 3
Note: “3 ” denotes items included in the respective definition.
TABLE II.6
Definitions of monetary aggregates in the euro area
Euro areaSpain before EMU
ISSUING SECTORS
Euro-area credit system
Euro-area money market funds
Residents in euro area:
• Non-financial firms and households
• Private non-profit institutions
• Insurance companies
• Pension funds
• Mutual funds (except FIAMMs)
• Securities dealer companies
and agencies
• General government, except central
government
Residents in Spain:
• Non-financial firms and households
• Private non-profit institutions
• Insurance companies
• Pension funds
• Mutual funds
• Securities dealer companies
and agencies
• Administrative agencies
HOLDING SECTORS
Spanish credit system
and financial indicators the “second pillar” of the
monetary policy strategy adopted.
The importance of the monetary aggregates
in the Eurosystem’s strategy could be seen in
the fact that the ECB Governing Council set a
reference value for the growth of the M3 aggre-
gate. This aggregate was selected after a com-
parative analysis of the stability of the demand
for different definitions of the money stock and
their properties as leading indicators of price
developments. A comparison between the mon-
ey stock definitions adopted by the Eurosystem
and those previously existing in Spain is given
in Table II.6. The year-on-year growth of this
aggregate, which was considered compatible
with the definition of price stability, was set at a
level of 4.5 %. To underscore the Eurosystem’s
intent to avoid mechanistic responses to tempo-
rary deviations by monetary growth from the
reference value set, and, therefore, without too
much informative content on medium-term price
prospects, it was decided that such deviations
would be evaluated in terms of the moving av-
erage of the year-on-year growth of M3 over the
previous three months.
The definition of the monetary policy strate-
gy and the adoption of the associated key deci-
sions were thus necessarily centralised in the
Governing Council of the ECB. But for the im-
plementation of such policy the Eurosystem
opted for an essentially decentralised model.
That allows harnessing of the technical and per-
sonal skills, the experience and the compara-
tive advantage of the national central banks in
respect of their knowledge of national markets
and their relationship with the banking industry
in their respective countries. Box II.3 details the
specific characteristics of the instruments avail-
able to the Eurosystem, the general features of
which are discussed below.
Monetary policy is essentially implemented
through open market operations. As a general
rule, the operations are conducted by means of
weekly tenders, where loans at two weeks are
extended, and monthly tenders, where three-
month loans are granted. In addition, the possi-
bility of conducting specific operations of a
more structural nature has been envisaged
when, in the opinion of the ECB, conditions so
require it in order to affect the structural position
of banks’ liquidity.
The weekly and monthly tenders are the
main sources of liquidity for banks, although the
bulk of liquidity is supplied by the weekly ten-
ders, whose interest rates are the valid refer-
ence of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy
stance. Financial and monetary institutions can
adjust their daily liquidity requirements by re-
sorting to the Eurosystem’s lending and deposit
facilities. The interest rates on these standing
facilities form a corridor which bounds overnight
interest rate fluctuations. Under the Treaty, all
liquidity injection operations require that suffi-
cient collateral be provided by the recipient in-
stitutions.
The ECB decided to impose a minimum re-
serve requirement, whose level it set at 2 %.
This reserve ratio is calculated on the basis of
credit institutions’ average reserve holdings
over a maintenance period of one month, which
should contribute to reducing the volatility of
very short-term interest rates. The reserve hold-
ings are remunerated at the weekly tender rate,
whereby the reserve requirement arrangements
entail no cost for the institutions affected.
The adoption of this common operational
framework for the implementation of the Eu-
rosystem’s monetary policy has required signifi-
cant changes in the national central banks’ in-
tervention procedures and instruments. As
mentioned, Box II.3 provides some extra details
on the features of the new operational frame-
work, comparing it with the previous situation in
Spain. Although there were a series of changes
n Spanish monetary policy implementation dur-
ing 1998 aimed at smoothing the transition to
the new framework, these changes are not tak-
en into consideration in the box so as to high-
ight the differences between the new and for-
mer framework. Notably, too, the data offered in
relation to the new operational framework refer
to the first four months of 1999.
To date, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy
has been implemented without particular diffi-
culty, despite the scale of the changes involved
for national central banks and for market oper-
ators. Contributing significantly to this has been
the sound working of the interbank market,
thanks, among other factors, to the effective
coming on stream of the TARGET interbank
operations settlement system. TARGET en-
ables institutions to transfer to or receive funds
from institutions resident in euro-area countries
with the same security and speed with which
these operations were previously made be-
tween institutions in a single country. TARGET
is a real-time gross-settlement system, which
requires payer institutions to have sufficient
funds in their accounts at the related central
bank or sufficient collateral so that the central
bank in question may extend it the necessary
c r e d i t .
Generally, monetary policy implementation
and liquidity management by credit institutions
have been conducted without significant fric-
tions. That said, some of the features of the
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weekly tenders initially entailed adaptation
costs for institutions, especially those in certain
countries not accustomed to obtaining financing
at fixed-rate tenders with strong rationing of the
amounts allotted. This situation created liquidity
redistribution problems. But these gradually
eased as the Eurosystem adopted a more flexi-
ble liquidity-supply policy, enabling the
overnight interbank interest rate to oscillate
around the weekly tender rate, and as the inte-
gration of the various national segments of the
euro money market was gradually completed.
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CHAPTER III
THE SPANISH ECONOMY
III.1. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, as mentioned in Chapter I of this re-
port, the Spanish economy took full advantage of
the climate of stability achieved, which was con-
ducive to higher rates of growth and job creation.
On initial National Accounts (CNE) data, GDP at
constant prices grew by 3.8 %. This was higher
than the rate achieved in 1997 (3.5 %) and also
higher than the EU average. Meanwhile employ-
ment grew by 3.3 %, giving rise to a significant
reduction in the rate of unemployment. A bal-
anced economic policy mix enabled this high
growth to be accompanied by a further reduction
in the rate of inflation, against a backdrop of
heavy falls in commodity prices on international
markets and containment of wage settlements.
The rate of growth of national demand quick-
ened notably over the year as a whole to 4.9 %,
assisted by the improvement in agents’ expec-
tations regarding the economic situation and by
the gradual loosening of monetary conditions,
which took real interest rates to historically low
levels. For its part, net external demand made a
negative contribution of 1.2 percentage points
to output growth, which increased as the year
elapsed.
In the first half of 1998, the advanced stage
of the cyclical expansion entailed a significant
increase in imports. However, the continued
strength of exports prevented an excessive fall
in the contribution of external demand to GDP
growth, in a setting of recovery in the European
economies, albeit with certain differences in
their cyclical positions (see Box III.1). Nonethe-
less, the spreading of the effects of the interna-
tional financial crisis led to a drastic slowdown
in manufacturing exports in the second half of
the year, which strengthened the negative con-
tribution of net external demand. Although the
deterioration in the external environment
prompted a decline in firms’ demand expecta-
tions, which ultimately fed through to their in-
vestment plans, domestic demand continued to
grow at high rates. It was driven by the strength
of construction spending (the aggregate least
sensitive to external events), the strength of pri-
vate consumption and the thrust that continued
to emanate from capital investment despite its
slowdown. Hence, the pattern of growth
changed as the year unfolded. From being un-
derpinned largely by the buoyancy of exports
and private productive investment, growth came
to depend on household spending and con-
s ruction.
From the viewpoint of the productive branch-
es, the most notable feature in 1998 was the
gradual slowdown in value added in manufac-
turing, affected by the weakness of external
sales. Meanwhile, market services displayed a
more sustained rate of growth during the year,
construction activity recovered strongly, in line
with spending, and primary activities emerged
from the recession that affected them in 1997.
III.2. DEMAND
The expansionary thrust experienced, to a
greater or lesser degree, by all the components
of national demand in 1998 is evident in Table
III.1, which shows aggregate demand and GDP.
Government consumption was the most moder-
ate component. Both exports and imports
slowed during the year, especially the former.
Nonetheless, their rates of growth remained
well above those of domestic spending, so that
the degree of openness of the economy – i.e.
the sum of exports and imports as a percentage
of GDP at constant prices – rose to 76.2 %. The
following sections analyse these results in
terms of the spending decisions taken by the
various economic agents.
III.2.1. National demand
Table III.2 provides an estimate – provisional
in the case of the most recent years – of the
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breakdown of the most significant components
of national demand, in terms of the spending
decisions of the various economic sectors and
agents: households, firms and general govern-
ment. From this viewpoint, the strength of do-
mestic demand in 1998 was a consequence of
a substantial acceleration in the spending of
households on private consumption and hous-
ing. Business investment also grew at very high
rates, increasing its weight among the compo-
nents of demand, so that capital investment
was, for the second year running, the compo-
nent of domestic demand with the highest rate
of growth, despite having slowed in the second
half. General government demand accelerated
slightly over the year as a consequence of the
larger impulse from investment.
Private consumption grew at an average
real rate of 3.8 % in 1998, as against 3.1 %
the previous year. This aggregate was more
dynamic in the first part of the year, subse-
quently tending to stabilise at high, though
slightly declining, rates of growth. The main
factor driving consumption in 1998 was the in-
crease in the spending capacity of house-
holds. However, the improvement in consumer
confidence and, in general, the trends in finan-
cial variables also contributed. The latter in-
cluded the continued decline in interest rates,
the further revaluation of wealth and the strong
growth of credit.
In fact, real household disposable income
grew by 3.4 % in 1998, as against the estimate
of 1.7 % for 1997. This acceleration was basi-
cally a result of the performance of wage in-
come, a consequence, in turn, of the high rate
of job creation and a certain increase in real
wages, due to wage settlements under collec-
tive agreements (2.6 %) and the fact that annu-
al inflation was lower than initially expected.
Non-wage income also accelerated consider-
ably. Particularly notable was the increase in in-
come relating to business activities carried out
by households for their own account. By con-
trast, income relating to the remuneration of
savings made a negative contribution, albeit
somewhat smaller than in 1997. The succes-
sive cuts in interest rates led to a decline in the
returns from holding financial assets, and an in-
crease in the volume of indebtedness, with a
consequent rise in interest payments. Finally,
the contribution of general government to the
increase in household income – through the
combined effect of taxes and social security
contributions and benefits – was small, and of a
similar magnitude to previous years. The in-
crease in disposable income helped to finance
the larger increase in consumption, in real
terms, although there was also a reduction in
the savings ratio, which stood at 10.1 % of dis-
posable income.
Apart from the contractionary effect on
household disposable income, the decline in in-
terest rates had important expansionary effects
on consumption through other channels. First,
the financial wealth of households has been
substantially revalued in recent years, boosted
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TABLE III.1
Main macroeconomic aggregates
Real rate of change
National private consumption 62.3 1.6 2.0 3.1 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7
Government consumption 16.0 1.8 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 24.2 8.2 1.3 5.1 9.0 8.4 9.1 9.3 9.4
Construction 14.0 6.6 –2.0 1.3 6.5 5.0 6.2 7.1 7.8
Capital goods and other 10.2 11.2 7.1 11.0 12.7 13.6 13.3 12.5 11.6
Change in stocks (b) 0.3 0.2 0.0 –0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
National demand 102.8 3.2 1.6 2.9 4.9 4.7 5.0 4.9 4.9
Exports of goods and services 36.7 10.0 10.6 14.8 7.8 10.6 8.5 6.5 5.9
Final demand 139.5 4.6 3.6 5.7 5.6 6.2 5.9 5.4 5.2
Imports of goods and services 39.5 11.0 7.4 12.2 10.6 12.5 11.3 9.5 9.4
Gross domestic product 100.0 2.7 2.4 3.5 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.6
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Net external demand (b) –2.8 –0.6 0.7 0.5 –1.2 –0.8 –1.1 –1.2 –1.4
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
(a) Annual percentage change.
(b) Contribution to GDP growth.
% GDP
1998 1995 1996 1997 1998
1998 (a)
Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4
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BOX III.1
The relationship between the Spanish and European business cycles
The growing synchrony in the cyclical fluctuations of
the economies of the developed countries is particularly
important for economies involved in integration processes,
like EMU. To assess to what extent these economies dis-
play similar and synchronised responses to disturbances,
or whether their business cycles differ in intensity and du-
ration, or are out of phase, are crucial questions. The pur-
pose of this box is to present certain indicators of the de-
gree of synchrony between the cyclical fluctuations of the
main Spanish economic aggregates and those of the other
main European economies.
The adjoining chart shows the cyclical component(1)
of Spanish real GDP superimposed on that of the aggre-
gate euro-3, which summarises the performance of the oth-
er main euro area economies: France, Germany and Italy.
These economies are also Spain’s main trading partners
and those potentially having the greatest influence on
Spanish aggregate cyclical fluctuations. The series for the
euro-3 aggregate are a weighted average of the related
French, German and Italian series, in which the weights re-
flect the weight of each country in Spain’s total trade with
these three countries. Although the cycle of Spanish real
GDP lags somewhat behind that of the euro-3 in the first
half of the sample period, the lag shortens thereafter until
almost complete synchrony is attained by the end of the
period. The high degree of synchrony between the cyclical
components of the French and German series is also no-
table in the period studied (except around the time of Ger-
man reunification), as seen in the adjoining chart.
The adjoining table summarises the results of a more
detailed analysis of the degree of joint fluctuation, based
on the calculation of cross correlations between the cyclical
components of the Spanish series and those of the series
of the other main European economies(2). The series
studied are GDP and some of the main components of ag-
gregate demand, at constant prices and per capita, as well
as employment as a percentage of the labour force and to-
tal hours worked per capita. The data are quarterly, run-
ning from 1970 Q1 to 1996 Q4. The main result of the anal-
ysis is confirmation of the strong synchrony between the
Spanish and European business cycles, with a coinciding
joint fluctuation of GDP, private investment, imports and
net exports. However, the cyclical fluctuation of private
consumption in Europe is more than one year ahead of that
observed in Spain, as is that of employment. The least cor-
related cyclical components are those of government con-
sumption (probably due to the different national fiscal poli-
cies) and exports (due to the different destinations of those
of each country). The strong relationship found with the eu-
ro-3 aggregate is basically due to the high degree of corre-
lation and synchrony between the Spanish business cycle
and the French one, and to a lesser extent the Italian one
too, while the interdependence with the German cycle is
characterised by a high degree of correlation, but with the
German cycle about one year ahead of the Spanish cycle.
In sum – with the exception of the existence of a cer-
tain lag in the cyclical fluctuations of certain Spanish vari-
ables – evidence is found of similarity and synchrony be-
tween the cycles of Spain and of the other main euro area
economies. Moreover, the similarity has become more pro-
nounced as the degree of integration between these
economies has increased.
Source: Banco de España.
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Cyclical fluctuations of GDP
Maximum correlation between the cyclical components
of the Spanish series at t and that of the
aggregate euro-3 at t + k, k being the number
of quarters’ difference in brackets
GDP 0.59 (a) (0)
Private consumption 0.72 (a) (–5)
Government consumption 0.12 (–1)
Private investment 0.72 (a) (0)
Exports –0.28 (–4)
Imports 0.63 (a) (0)
Net exports 0.61 (a) (0)
Employed 0.78 (a) (–5)
Total hours 0.67 (a) (–2)
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Correlation coefficients significantly different from zero.
(1) Obtained by applying to the original series a linear band filter
proposed in Baxter, M. and R. King (1995), Measuring Business
Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters for Economic Time Series,
NBER Working Paper no. 5022.
(2) See Ortega, E. (1998), The Spanish Business Cycle and its
Relationship to Europe, Banco de España, Working Paper no.9819.
by the extensive shift in savings from more tra-
ditional investments – such as time deposits –
towards other higher yield instruments, such as
mutual funds. The latter have been revalued
more than other assets in recent years, largely
due to the path of interest rates. However, it
should be noted that it is difficult to estimate the
size of the effect that this increase in wealth
may have had on consumption demand. Sec-
ond, the expansionary effect of interest rate
cuts on consumption through the substitution
effect – by lowering the relative cost of deciding
to spend earlier in time – has been significant,
especially in the case of consumer durables,
the acquisition of which is linked to the availabil-
ity of financing (see Chart III.1).
In any event, the increase in household dis-
posable income was rapidly passed through to
their spending decisions, against a backdrop
of growing optimism regarding the general
economic situation and, in particular, employ-
ment. The consumer confidence index im-
proved substantially as the year elapsed, fi-
nancial market turmoil in the second half hard-
ly impeding its upward path in the final quarter,
and it ended the year at levels comparable to
the peaks reached in the last cyclical expan-
sion. The improvement in consumer confi-
dence was boosted by the changes in the
composition of the employment generated dur-
ing the year; the weight of permanent con-
tracts grew, reducing the uncertainty in the fu-
ture income expectations of employed per-
s o n s .
Of the main spending categories of con-
sumption, the continued buoyancy of the acqui-
sition of durable goods is notable. It was under-
pinned not only by the extraordinary growth in
the demand for motor vehicles, but also by the
expansion of spending on those categories of
goods closely related to the acquisition of new
houses, such as electrical appliances and other
household equipment. The consumption of ser-
vices accelerated slightly over the year, while
spending on food rose moderately.
The recovery in housing investment, after its
hesitancy in 1997, linked to the temporary stag-
nation in housing start indicators, was fully con-
solidated in 1998, when residential investment
sustained very high rates of growth (see Chart
III.2). The increase in household disposable in-
come and the significant decline in mortgage
rates in recent years gave rise to a consider-
able improvement in the terms of household ac-
cess to the acquisition of housing, although its
relative price rose considerably. Over the last
four years an unsatisfied demand has emerged,
accumulated from previous cycles, when high
house prices, high interest rates and uncertain-
ty regarding job stability curbed the acquisition
of housing, although those sections of the pop-
ulation with the greatest tendency to form new
households had increased substantially. The
buoyancy of residential investment was also
boosted in 1998 by factors relating to the pur-
chase of houses as an alternative asset in
which to hold wealth, due to the decline in the
returns on financial assets subject to risk. In ad-
dition, foreign investment in property has in-
creased very considerably in the last two years,
helping to explain the growth in the demand for
housing and the pressures on prices in coastal
areas.
Although the household saving ratio held
more or less stable in 1998, the expansion of
residential investment entailed a reduction in
the financing capacity of the sector which, on
provisional estimates, stood at 2.7 % of GDP.
This rate was still higher than that achieved in
the most advanced stages of the previous cycli-
cal expansion.
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TABLE III.2
Consumption and gross fixed capital formation
by institutional sector (a)
Real rate of change
Households
Private consumption62.3 1.6 2.0 3.1 3.8
Gross fixed capital
formation (b) 4.5 7.1 9.1 –0.7 8.0
Firms
Gross fixed capital
formation (c) 15.9 12.8 2.4 8.0 8.0
Construction 7.0 8.0 –1.7 4.2 3.2
Equipment 9.0 18.0 6.5 11.5 12.0
General
government
Government
consumption 16.0 1.8 0.9 1.4 1.6
Gross fixed capital
formation 3.7 –4.9 –11.1 –0.1 15.4
Of which:
Construction 2.5 3.0 –18.0 –3.0 14.0
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Gross fixed capital
formation 24.2 8.2 1.3 5.1 9.0
Construction 14.0 6.6 –2.0 1.3 6.5
Equipment 10.2 11.2 7.1 11.0 12.7
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de Es-
paña.
( a ) Some figures are provisional Banco de España esti-
mates.
(b) Domestic residential investment.
( c ) Private productive investment; includes investment by
individual entrepreneurs.
% GDP
1998 1995 1996 1997 1998
In 1998, general government demand con-
tinued to be governed by the authorities’ com-
mitments to contain public spending and correct
the budgetary imbalance, although its composi-
tion was orientated, to a greater extent than in
previous years, to improving the economy’s
productivity. The adjustment drive was thus
concentrated on government consumption,
which sustained the moderate tempo that had
characterised it in previous years, while invest-
ment increased considerably. According to fig-
ures published by the National Statistics Office
(INE), real government consumption grew at a
rate of 1.6 % in 1998, very similar to the rate in
1997, while in nominal terms it grew by 3.5 %,
with each of its components behaving different-
ly. Compensation of wage-earners accelerated
slightly, as a consequence of the increase in
the remuneration of public sector employees in
line with expected inflation, compared with the
freeze of the previous year, while the growth in
the number of wage-earners was once again
very modest. The rate of growth of net purchas-
es of goods and services edged downwards, al-
though there was an upward deviation in those
made by the State in relation to the total bud-
geted. Finally, fixed capital consumption also
decelerated slightly, increasing moderately, in
step with the contraction in the stock of public
capital in recent years, as a consequence of the
cut in investment spending.
After five consecutive years of sizeable real
decreases, public investment commenced a
timid recovery in 1997, which strengthened sub-
stantially in 1998, when its real rate of growth
stood at around 15 %. The recovery was partic-
ularly significant in the case of Territorial Gov-
ernment, while Central Government spending
remained very moderate. As to the type of in-
vestment, the expansion of investment in con-
struction (the largest component), which had
fallen considerably in the two preceding years,
was notable. Moreover, the scant information
available on public investment in capital goods
indicates that this item was also very buoyant
in 1998.
Productive investment – in capital goods and
in private non-residential construction – by the
business sector has been the most expansion-
ary component of domestic demand since
1996. As a percentage of GDP, having fallen
significantly in the first few years of the
Nineties, it has subsequently increased consid-
erably, to stand at levels similar to those at-
tained in the previous expansion of the econo-
my. In fact, in 1998 as a whole the rate of
growth of private productive investment
strengthened slightly.
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CHART III.1
Private consumption (a)
S o u r c e s :Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
(a) Year-on-year real rate of change.
(b) Wealth calculated at the begining of the period.
( c ) Includes, inter alia, short-term securities, technical in-
surance reserves and bonds.
(d) Credit to individuals for purchase of own dwelling.
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As seen in Chart III.3, in which the profile of
productive investment has been approximated
by capital goods investment, this impulse was
especially significant in the first half of the year,
in a context of strong growth in final demand.
The latter led to an increase in the level of ca-
pacity utilisation, and expectations that demand
would remain expansionary, generating a need
to increase productive equipment. The restraint
in the rate of growth of final demand in the sec-
ond half of the year, caused by the weakness of
exports and the deterioration of demand expec-
tations, linked to the climate of uncertainty then
prevailing, prompted a downward adjustment of
firms’ investment plans. In any event, invest-
ment remained considerably buoyant, a result
that the favourable terms of borrowing and the
high levels of profitability of Spanish firms help
to explain.
On Central Balance Sheet Office data, the
favourable trend in activity during the current
recovery, together with the gradual decline in
interest rates and the moderate growth in oper-
ating costs, as a consequence of the slowdown
in wages and salaries, have given rise to suc-
cessive increases in the profitability of non-fi-
nancial firms, which reached very high levels in
1998. The growth of self-financing, due to the
healthy profits earned, has enabled firms to un-
dertake restructuring, in the form of an ongoing
reduction in levels of borrowing. However, in
1998, the combination of low interest rates and
high returns on assets led firms, for the first
time since 1993, to increase their recourse to
external funds to undertake new investment
projects. Also, a certain slowdown was dis-
cernible in funds generated in 1998, which par-
ticularly affected manufacturing activity, al-
though without preventing its profitability rate
from improving.
In the specific case of industrial firms, infor-
mation is available on the purpose of the invest-
ment undertaken in 1998, based on the results
of the half-yearly survey of investment carried
out by the Ministry of Industry and Energy. Ac-
cording to this survey, the main purpose of in-
vestment was to increase capital, although the
rationalisation of productive processes – a con-
cept which includes labour substitution, as well
as the introduction of new technologies and the
saving of raw materials – continued to be a very
significant reason for firms’ investment plans.
The survey has also captured the negative im-
pact of the international crisis on investment
plans for 1999. Of the factors determining the
scheduling of investment, a reduction has been
detected in the importance of the expansion of
productive capacity, while the introduction of
improvements in performance has acquired
greater prominence.
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CHART III.2
Residential investment
S o u r c e s :Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Ministerio de Fo-
mento and Banco de España.
(a) Real rate of change.
(b) This indicator attempts to approximate some of the fac-
tors determining the capacity of a family to purchase a dwelling.
It has been constructed on the basis of the relative price of hous-
ing, the mortgage interest rate and household income, approxi-
mated by income from work per wage-earner.
(c) Estimated as the difference between the rate of change
in the price of a new home and the nominal interest rate on al-
ternative assets, approximated here as the yield on ten-year
government bonds.
(d) In relation to the private consumption deflator.
(e) Net of contributions and expressed in real terms.
(f) 1991 = 100.
( g ) Uncentred 12-term moving average of the buildable
floorage (expressed in square metres) for residential use, ac-
cording to the official “Edificación y Vivienda” (Building and
Housing) statistics.
(h) Annual National Accounts figures converted to a quar-
terly basis. 1986 constant pesetas.
(i) Banco de España estimate for 1998.
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Information is also available on business in-
vestment in construction by productive activity.
Within this component, the building of premises
for industrial uses was seen to be highly buoy-
ant, in line with the expansion of this activity.
Likewise, the construction of offices and com-
mercial premises grew significantly, somewhat
relieving the scarcity of this type of building. In
contrast, there was a slowdown in investment in
buildings for agricultural use, closely linked to
the moderate advance of activity in the primary
sectors.
Finally, stockbuilding made a positive contri-
bution of two percentage points to GDP growth
in 1998, in contrast to the 0.3 points it deducted
the previous year. The successive cuts in inter-
est rates and the fall in commodity prices on in-
ternational markets led to a significant reduction
in the cost of holding stocks, which firms ex-
ploited by voluntarily increasing their levels of
stocks. The increase in the desired levels of
stocks must have been particularly significant in
the first half of the year, when very favourable
expectations prevailed regarding the path of fi-
nal demand in the economy. However, with the
growing weakness in sales on external markets
as the year elapsed, business surveys revealed
an increase in the number of employers report-
ing higher-than-desired levels of stocks, indicat-
ing an increase in the involuntary component of
stock building. This undesired increase in levels
of stocks was greatest among the producers of
inputs, while producers of capital goods held
stocks closer to the desired level, due to the
strength of the demand for such goods both on
external markets and at home.
III.2.2. External demand
In 1998, the contribution of net external de-
mand to output growth was –1.2 percentage
points, in contrast to the positive contribution of
0.5 points in 1997. The contractionary effect
was mainly a consequence of the sharp slow-
down in exports of goods and services, with av-
erage real growth of 7.8 % in 1998, well below
the 14.6 % growth in the previous year. Imports
also contributed to the contractionary impulse in
the first few months of the year, when they at-
tained a high rate of growth, which subsequent-
ly stabilised, although at a slightly lower level.
The real rate of growth of imports in the year as
a whole was 10.6 %, somewhat below that of
the previous year.
As seen in Chart III.4, goods exports contin-
ued to grow at very high real rates at the begin-
ning of 1998, despite the fall in demand from
Asian countries, which were in deep recession
from mid-1997. The small share of Asian coun-
tries in Spanish exports and, above all, the
strength of sales to euro area markets, against
a background of progressive strengthening of
these economies, were instrumental here. How-
ever, the situation changed considerably in the
second half of the year, with the international
crisis spreading to other emerging economies,
including notably the Latin American countries,
with which Spain has closer trade links. Sales
to these markets began to display great weak-
ness, aggravated by the petering out of the pos-
itive effects of the previous year’s improvement
in competitiveness vis-à-vis the dollar-area
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CHART III.3
Private productive investment
S o u r c e s :Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Banco de España
and Ministerio de Industria y Energía.
(a) Year-on-year real rate of change and differences for ca-
pacity utilisation.
( b ) Net turnover deflated by the final demand deflator.
The domestic-demand deflator and the exports deflator have
been used for its domestic and external components, respec-
t i v e l y .
(c) Data to 1997 obtained from the annual figures released
by the Central Balance Sheet Office and for 1998 from the
quarterly figures.
(d) Nominal interest rate on one- to three-year bank loans.
(e) Nominal rate of change of the level of both variables.
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countries. Furthermore, some of these coun-
tries introduced protectionist measures to re-
duce imports and so relieve the effects of the
fall in commodity prices on their trade balances.
Finally, the International crisis eventually affect-
ed the euro area countries, curbing the recov-
ery apparent in the first half of the year and
prompting a further slowdown in external sales.
The latter ended the year with a real rate of
growth of 2.6 %, in contrast to the 10.4 % in-
crease in the first quarter (see Box III.2).
On average in 1998, exports to the euro
area grew by 9.2 %, in nominal terms, as
against almost 15 % in the first half of the year.
Within this area, sales to France rose by
1 4 . 1%, well above the rate of the previous
year, despite slowing sharply as the year
elapsed. By contrast those to Italy and Ger-
many advanced very moderately. Outside the
euro area, sales to the UK grew at a similar rate
to 1997, driven by the appreciation of sterling in
the first half of the year, while those to the US
slowed drastically. The latter are strongly domi-
nated by consumer manufactures, the competi-
tiveness of which was negatively affected by
the devaluations of the Asian countries’ curren-
cies. Finally sales to Japan and Asian countries
fell heavily, while those to Latin America and
Central and Eastern European countries grew
slightly on average during the year. Nonethe-
less, within the latter group of countries, exports
to those which have signed trade agreements
with the EU were very expansionary.
In contrast to the weakness of goods ex-
ports, tourism receipts accelerated further in
1998, growing at a real rate of 11 % in the year
as a whole. The buoyancy of this component of
external demand is related to the improvement
in the factors determining consumption in the
main European economies, which translated in-
to a larger influx of tourists from France and
Germany. Tourism from the UK remained no-
tably strong, bolstered by the appreciation of
sterling to mid-1998. In addition, the promotion-
al campaigns of recent years, aimed at reduc-
ing the pronounced seasonality which has tradi-
tionally characterised tourism, by promoting al-
ternative tourist destinations and products to
those offered by the coastal regions, seem to
be bearing fruit, having stimulated a larger in-
flux of visitors outside the summer months.
Goods exports grew by 8.3 % in 1998,
somewhat below the 10.3 % rate of 1997, in
line with the slight slowdown in final demand.
By contrast it is not possible to attach much im-
portance to changes in the competitiveness of
imported products, since import prices moved
very much in line with the prices of domestically
produced goods. Analysing the composition of
imports by product group, it can be seen that
purchases of non-energy intermediate goods
were the most hesitant, owing to the slowdown
in certain industrial activities that make inten-
sive use of imported inputs. On the other hand,
imports of capital and consumer goods quick-
ened, in step with the strength of these compo-
nents of aggregate demand. Of consumer
goods, the growth of car purchases was partic-
ularly strong, possibly driven by a shift in de-
mand from cars towards a range of vehicles not
produced domestically. Energy imports also
rose significantly, reflecting the recovery in the
refining industry over the last two years associ-
ated with the low oil price.
As for other external demand transactions,
tourism payments grew by 10.1 % in 1998, un-
derpinned by the improvement in the confi-
dence of Spanish consumers and by the pese-
ta’s stability against the dollar during the year,
following the depreciation of 1997. Finally, re-
ceipts and payments for services other than
tourism sustained very high real rates of growth
as a consequence of the increase in freight and
passenger transport operations, and the expan-
sion of certain services items provided to firms,
which have been boosted in recent years by the
liberalisation measures adopted by the World
Trade Organisation.
III.3. OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
In 1998 as a whole, the acceleration in na-
tional demand offset the slowdown in exports,
with the result that final demand rose by 5.6 %,
very close to the rate estimated for 1997. De-
spite this stable growth in final demand, the
rates of change of the flows of products to satis-
fy it – imports and GDP – changed, with a cer-
tain weakness in external purchases and a re-
covery in domestic output. This somewhat un-
even behaviour may have been related to the
greater moderation in those components of de-
mand most closely linked to imports (such as
exports), while domestic activity was stimulated
by the considerable recovery in construction. In
fact, the acceleration in output in 1998 was not
common to all the productive branches; while
construction and agriculture were expansionary,
industry – affected by the performance of ex-
ports – decelerated, and the services branches
also slowed somewhat.
On QNA estimates, the rate of job creation,
boosted by the recovery in GDP, rose to 3.3 %,
six tenths of a percentage point higher than in
1997. Consequently, for the third year running,
apparent labour productivity grew at a low rate.
During the year, output and employment fol-
lowed different paths. GDP sustained rates of
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BOX III.2
An approximation to the effects of the international financial crisis
on Spanish economic activity: the foreign trade channel
In 1998, foreign trade flows were strongly influenced by the development of the international financial
crisis. The financial and exchange instability afflicting the emerging Asian economies from 1997 intensified
as the year elapsed and ended up affecting other areas, in particular Russia and the Latin American coun-
tries. The slump in the economic activity of these countries and the devaluations, in certain cases, of their
currencies have led to a significant deterioration in Spanish trade with these markets.
This box presents a quantitative approximation of the effects of the emerging market crisis on Spanish
net exports and national output using various econometrics models estimated at the Banco de España. It
should be borne in mind that these estimates are subject to numerous caveats. In particular, the crisis has
had repercussions of a very general nature, given its impact on financial markets, on prices and on agents’
confidence, which go beyond the direct impact arising from trade flows and which are not addressed in
this analysis. Hence, the results obtained should be considered as the lower limit to the overall impact.
Before analysing the results, it should be pointed out that the magnitude of the bilateral trade relations
between Spain and the economies stricken by the crisis is relatively small. In fact, as a whole, these coun-
tries (including Japan) account for slightly less than 13 % of all external sales and 14 % of imports. These
percentages are slightly lower than the EU averages and well below those of the US, which has closer
trade links with these economies. Accordingly, the direct impact of the crisis will have been limited. How-
ever, to the extent that the crisis has resulted in a slowdown of demand in the industrialised countries,
which are Spain’s main trading partners, the effects will be greater. 
The adjoining table presents, first, the estimates of the effect on the national and external demand ag-
gregates and on GDP of the fall in demand from the countries directly affected by the crisis. To evaluate
these effects, first of all the possible impact on external sales is analysed, comparing the results obtained
by simulating the exports function under two alternative scenarios: the first uses the actual values of the
basic determinants of exports (export markets and competitiveness) for 1997 and 1998 and the forecasts
for 1999; while the second is what might have happened if the emerging, economies had sustained over
these three years similar rates of growth to those in the period prior to the crisis and if their real exchange
rates had remained unchanged.
According to the results obtained, the effect of the crisis on exports in 1997 is practically nil. By con-
trast, in 1998 it is estimated that export growth may have been reduced by 2.4 percentage points, a very
similar figure to that estimated for 1999. Furthermore, the greater slackness of external sales has reper-
cussions on the behaviour of capital investment, since final demand – i.e. the sum of national demand and
exports – is one of the basic determinants of this macro-economic aggregate. However, the total impact
on national output would have been moderated as a consequence of the slower growth of imports caused
by the slowdown in final demand, which would more than offset the fall in their relative prices. Hence, the
direct impact of the crisis in the emerging economies may have involved a reduction in GDP growth of 0.1
percentage points in 1997, rising to 0.2 percentage points in 1998 and 1999.
In addition, an approximation has been made
of the indirect effects that may have stemmed
from the slower growth in the industrialised coun-
tries. The same calculation has been repeated,
taking into account the differences between the
growth forecasts for this area of various interna-
tional agencies immediately before the crisis and
the estimates made today. As can be seen in the
adjoining table, the slower growth in the industri-
alised countries would translate into a 0.1 per-
centage point reduction in the growth of activity
in 1998 and 1999.
In sum, the impact of the crisis in the emerg-
ing economies through foreign trade flows, con-
sidering the direct and indirect effects, may
have reduced GDP growth by 0.1 percentage
points in 1997 and by 0.3 percentage points in
1998 and 1999.
Effects of the internacional economic crisis on the
Spanish economy: the foreign trade channel
Percentage points
DIRECT EFFECTS:
Net external demand — –0.1 –0.1
Exports –0.4 –2.4 –2.3
Imports –0.3 –1.8 –1.3
National demand –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Gross domestic product –0.1 –0.2 –0.2
INDIRECT EFFECTS:
Exports — –0.2 –1.1
Gross domestic product — –0.1 –0.1
TOTAL EFFECT:
Exports –0.4 –2.6 –3.4
Gross domestic product –0.1 –0.3 –0.3
1997 1998 1999
growth close to 4 % in the first half of the year,
and slowed gradually in the second half, while
employment gathered momentum until the
summer months, its acceleration being curbed
thereafter (see Chart III.5). These output and
employment paths led to a reduction in the
rate of growth of productivity as the year un-
f o l d e d .
III.3.1. Output and employment in the
different productive branches
The recovery in activity in the primary
branches in 1998 enabled the negative rates of
change of the preceding year to turn positive. In
1998, gross value-added in the primary branch-
es grew by 0.8 %, in real terms, compared with
a fall of 1.3 % in 1997. Analysis of the quarter-
on-quarter growth rates shows that the recovery
in activity in these branches basically occurred
in the first half of the year, while in the second
half there was a considerable slowdown, pri-
marily caused by the scant rainfall during that
period in a large part of Spain. In consequence,
there were significant increases in the growth
rates of products harvested in the first half of
the year, such as grains, citrus fruits and olives,
while serious reductions were recorded in the
output of those products harvested in the sec-
ond half of the year, such as fruit and wine
grapes. Employment in agriculture, having fall-
en in 1997, declined further, which explains the
recovery in productivity.
In 1998 as a whole, industrial activity re-
mained highly buoyant. Its value added grew on
average by 5.1 %, three tenths of a percentage
point less than in 1997. This strength enabled
the industrial branches to continue to make a
significant contribution to GDP growth (1.4 per-
centage points) (see Chart III.6). However, their
performance over the course of the year was
not even. In the first half of 1998 year-on-year
rates of growth of close to 6 % were recorded.
The international financial crisis and its subse-
quent impact on the EU countries led to a grad-
ual reduction in industrial goods exports, so that
activity slowly moderated in the second half,
and in the fourth quarter the GVA of the indus-
trial branches grew at a year-on-year rate of
around 4 %. Employment in industry rose by
5.3 %, since it began to slow with a certain lag
on activity, giving rise to a significant decelera-
tion in productivity from the already low rate of
growth of 1997.
Of the different branches of industrial activi-
ty, the metal processing industry and the ex-
tractive and chemicals industries behaved in
the same way as the aggregate of the industrial
sector. Both branches grew on average in 1998
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CHART III.4
Net external demand
and its main determinants (a)
Sources: IMF, OECD, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and
Banco de España.
(a) Year-on-year real rate of change.
(b) Growth of world trade in goods (IMF).
( c ) Inverse of the Spanish exports deflator in relation to
rest-of-the-world exchange-rate-adjusted export prices.
(d) Positive values denote a gain in the competitiveness of
exports, imports and the Spanish tourism sector, respectively;
negative values denote a loss.
( e ) Producer price index in relation to Spanish imports
deflator.
(f) Average of the GDP of the countries of origin of tourism
to Spain, weighted according to the relative significance of the
number of visitors.
( g ) Inverse of the real effective exchange rate against the
OECD countries..
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at similar rates to the previous year, despite a
gradual slowdown. In the metal processing in-
dustry the vitality of car manufacturing was no-
table. According to the industrial production in-
dex (IPI) its annual growth was 12.1 %, 1.5 per-
centage points higher than in 1997. Among the
basic industries, the extraction of non-metallic
minerals was the sector with the highest growth
rate, at 9.1 % according to the IPI. Finally,
among the set of activities which make up other
manufacturing industry the recovery of food
production in the second half of 1998, in con-
trast to the slowdown predominant in other in-
dustrial activities, should be emphasised.
In 1998 construction expanded sharply, con-
solidating the recovery that dated back to mid-
1996. The average annual growth of its value-
added was 6 %, notably higher than in the rest
of the branches of activity and well above the
1 % growth in construction activity the previous
year. In consequence, its contribution to GDP
growth was 0.4 percentage points, three tenths
of a point higher than in 1997. Over the course
of the year, this branch was characterised by
continuous expansion, reaching a rate of
growth of 6.8 % at year-end. Similarly, employ-
ment rose by 5.2 % in the year as a whole, its
year-on-year rate standing at 10.1 % in the
fourth quarter.
The various components of construction fol-
lowed different paths. Thus, while the growing
profile of construction activity was underpinned,
to a large extent, by the buoyancy of residential
building – where the strength of demand played
an important role – the profile of housing refur-
bishment and non-residential building was one
of continuous deceleration. Civil engineering,
for its part, recovered significantly, driven by the
greater demand from general government.
As a whole, services activities grew by 2.7 %
in 1998, five tenths of a percentage point below
the rate of change of the previous year, which
resulted in a contribution to GDP growth of 1.5
percentage points. This slowdown affected the
two main components of the branch, although
with differing intensity over the year. The loss of
vigour in market services basically occurred in
the first quarter of 1998, after which the situa-
tion was stable. In year-on-year terms, the rate
of growth of these activities fell from 3.5 % at
end-1997 to 3 % in the final quarter of 1998.
Employment, however, recovered, growing
more briskly than value-added in the year as a
whole. Activity in non-market services rose to a
lesser extent (a result of the drive to control
government consumption), its rate of growth
falling from 1.9 % at end-1997 to 0.9 % in the fi-
nal quarter of 1998.
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CHART III.5
Real growth, employment, wages, productivity
and unemployment rate (a)
S o u r c e :Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
(a) Year-on-year rate of change, except in the case of the
unemployment rate.
(b) Quarterly National Accounts. GDP in constant pese-
t a s .
(c) GDP/employed person [as per note (b)].
( d ) Ratio of average earnings per worker per month, in
terms of total payments, to the GDP deflator.
(e) EPA (Labour Force Survey). Number of unemployed as
a percentage of the labour force.
(f) Persons unemployed for more than one year as a per-
centage of the labour force.
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The vigour of private consumption fed
through to the distributive trade which, together
with hotels and catering and telecommunica-
tions, were the only branches of the tertiary
sector to show a recovery in 1998. The distribu-
tive trade expanded throughout the year, as
shown by the sales and employment indicators,
which were consistent with the improvement in
the climate of confidence in the retail trade. Ac-
cording to the indicators of visits and overnight
stays, there was growing buoyancy in hotels
and catering. However, this did not lead to a
greater increase in employment. Telecommuni-
cations was the other expanding branch, as
shown by the acceleration in its employment.
Finally, the value-added of the rest of the activi-
ties of the tertiary sector decelerated.
III.3.2. The labour market
The high rate of growth of employment in
1998, at 3.3 %, involved the net creation of
around 450,000 jobs during the year, according
to National Accounts figures. This increase was
primarily a result of the greater vigour of pro-
ductive activity, the effect of which was rein-
forced by the moderation of labour costs. The
latter stemmed from lower wage settlements
under collective agreements, the lower weight
of inertial factors (such as length of service) in
the determination of wages and the effect of so-
cial security contribution reductions aimed at
fostering permanent contracts. These factors
are analysed in the following section.
The expansion of employment and the
smooth slowdown in the labour force were con-
ducive to a fall in unemployment. The result
was that the rate of unemployment stood on av-
erage in 1998 at 18.8 %, two percentage points
below the rate of the preceding year, and at
18.2 % at year-end. The rate of long-term un-
employment (see Chart III.5) continued to de-
cline, although it should be noted that the pro-
portion of long-term unemployment still exceeds
50 % of the total. Strong resistance to a reduc-
tion in this proportion is seen among the over-
40s, so that its decline is concentrated in the
younger age groups.
The generation of new jobs was greatest
among wage-earners, while numbers of self-
employed rose by only 10,000 in 1998. Among
wage-earners, the new type of permanent con-
tract, introduced after the Employment Stability
Agreement between the employers’ associa-
tions and trade unions in May 1997, and which
incorporates a lower cost of dismissal and a re-
duction in the social security contributions
payable by employers, continued to bear fruit in
1998. On Labour Force Survey (EPA) data, the
number of wage-earners with permanent con-
tracts rose by 5.4 %, while those on temporary
contracts rose by 3 %. The proportion of tempo-
rary employment thus fell by five tenths of a
percentage point to stand at 33 %. Despite the
positive trend in permanent employment, the
proportion of temporary employment remained
very high and its rate of decline slow. Moreover,
1998 saw a further cut in the average duration
of temporary contracts and, therefore, an in-
crease in the rate of turnover.
Numbers of part-time wage-earners grew by
5.3 %, well below the rate of the preceding
year. The slowdown can be explained by vari-
ous factors, including the wait-and-see situa-
tion created by the negotiations between the
government and trade unions to amend this
type of contract, which were not completed un-
til the end of the year. Also, failure to apply the
reductions for permanent contracts to part-time
contracts until January 1999, and the abolition,
as from March 1998, of certain reductions in
the contributions associated with some of
these contracts may have had a negative im-
pact on part-time hiring. In any event, the pro-
portion of part-time wage-earners remained
practically unchanged at around 80 %, still well
below the EU average of 16 %. In 19th Decem-
ber 98, this type of contract was finally amend-
ed by Royal Legislative Decree 15/1998. Part-
time employment was more precisely defined
and access to the mechanisms of the Social
Protection System facilitated. In addition, tem-
porary part-time contracts were penalised,
while incentives were provided for permanent
part-time contracts, as in the case of other per-
manent contracts.
As regards the broad lines of more medium
and long-term employment policies, it should be
recalled that it was decided at the extraordinary
summit in Luxembourg in November 1997 to
co-ordinate EU member countries’ employment
policies, with the establishment of a set of
guidelines which all of them adopted in 1998. In
the case of Spain, these guidelines were set out
in the National Employment Plan, which the
government approved and presented to the Eu-
ropean Commission in spring 1998. In 1999 the
Commission assessed the progress made in
applying the employment guidelines, identifying
the main obstacles which remain. These will be
taken into consideration in the 1999 National
Employment Plans. 
III.4. PRICES AND COSTS
As already mentioned, price developments
 1998 were very favourable. Practically all the
inflation indicators reached very low levels,
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which was especially significant as they proved
to be compatible with highly buoyant activity
and employment and a reduction of two per-
centage points in the unemployment rate. Un-
doubtedly, low inflation expectations and their
consequence in terms of low wage settlements
was essential to achieve these results, but the
slowdown in prices in the international sphere
also played a very prominent role.
In fact, the largest contribution to the reduc-
tion in the rate of growth of the final demand de-
flator came from the costs of imported products,
while domestic costs trended less favourably.
Of the latter, unit labour costs decelerated
slightly, but less than in the previous year, as
the moderation in labour costs per worker was
partly offset by the slowdown in apparent labour
productivity. Unit business margins grew by
more than in the previous year, although this
buoyancy did not affect all branches of activity.
While in the majority of manufacturing activities
there was a small reduction in the gross margin
per unit of output, in market services the in-
crease was across the board.
III.4.1. Costs and price formation
In 1998, the economy’s final demand defla-
tor grew by 1.2 %, seven tenths of a percent-
age point less than in the previous year. As
seen in Chart III.7 and in Table III.3, the slow-
down, very marked up until the summer, was a
consequence of the reduction in import costs,
since domestic costs (taking the GDP deflator
as a first approximation) grew at a moderately
higher rate of 2.2 % on average during the
year. The favourable performance of import
prices, with a decline of 0.6 % in the related
deflator, was the result of several factors, in-
cluding notably: the fall in commodity prices (in
US dollars, the price of crude oil fell by 30 %,
that of food commodities by 16 % and that of
industrial commodities by 20 %), the conse-
quent moderation in the prices of industrial
products sold on international markets and the
significant devaluations in the currencies of
certain emerging economies. The latter pre-
dominated over the slight depreciation in the
peseta against the currencies of the developed
countries, which was in any event less than in
the previous year.
As regards the domestic omponent of
costs, as already mentioned, unit labour costs,
measured in terms of compensation per em-
ployed person, increased by 1.7 %, two tenths
of a percentage point less than in the previous
year. The slowdown in unit labour costs was a
consequence of the trend in compensation per
employed person. Its rate of growth in 1998
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CHART III.6
Gross value added, employment
and productivity (a)
S o u r c e :Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
(a) Annual percentage change.
(b) The contribution of taxes to GDP growth is not depicted.
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( 2 . 2%) was down five tenths of a percentage
point on 1997. Meanwhile, apparent labour pro-
ductivity made very little headway (0.5 %). As in
recent years, the growth in compensation per
employee (which excludes wage growth at-
tributable to the self-employed) was less than
that of compensation per employed person, al-
though there was a minimal acceleration with
respect to the previous year (2.1 % in 1998,
against 2 % in 1997). The differences between
compensation per employee and compensation
attributed to the self-employed stem from the
fact that the social security contributions of self-
employed workers continued to increase at a
brisk rate in 1998, while those of wage-earners
moderated notably. This is because the reduc-
tions associated with the new forms of stable
hiring more than offset the effect of progressive
abolition of the ceilings existing for the different
occupational categories. 
The slight acceleration in compensation per
employee in the economy as a whole was due
to the behaviour of wages in general govern-
ment. After the 1997 wage freeze, the remuner-
ation of public-sector employees rose in line
with the inflation forecast included in the 1998
budget (2.1 %). In the rest of the sectors, col-
lective bargaining produced an average wage
settlement of 2.6 %, four tenths of a percentage
point less than in 1997, in line with the reduc-
tion in inflation forecast in the budget. Average
hourly earnings according to the wages survey
(a statistic which covers industry and services)
slowed by more than wages under collective
agreements, with an increase of 2.9 % against
4.1 % in 1997. The difference compared with
wage settlements reflects lower wage drift, a
consequence of the hiring of new workers on
lower wages, the disappearance of remunera-
tion for length of service in certain branches of
activity and less recourse to overtime than in
1998. Average monthly wages, also according
to the wages survey, increased by 2.4 %, less
than hourly earnings, as in the previous two
years. This difference is explained by the cut in
the average working hours of the workers rep-
resented in the survey. 
The above-inflation wage growth did not re-
sult in an increase in the price of the labour fac-
tor for employers. The moderating effect, men-
tioned above, of social security contributions
per worker meant that compensation per em-
ployee (an approximate measure of the per
capita cost of labour to firms) rose by 1.8 % in
the economy as a whole, and by 1.5 % if public
sector employees are excluded. These rates
are very close to those of final prices. Moreover
labour productivity increased moderately, help-
ing to reduce the cost of labour per unit of
output.
By branch of activity, the largest increases
in hourly pay per person, according to the
wages survey, were in industry and construc-
tion (3.3%). However, in industry there was a
continuous slowdown over the year and in con-
struction a gradual acceleration. In services the
increase in hourly pay per person was 2.8 %,
with a marked slowdown over the year. It was
in this branch that wage drift was lowest (it was
in fact negative), being that which is most ben-
efiting from the greater flexibility being intro-
duced into the labour market. Moreover, it is in
services that the largest differences are seen
between hourly and monthly wages, since it is
here that most part-time employment is to be
f o u n d .
Indirect taxes net of subsidies, another com-
ponent of final prices, grew at a high rate in
1998 (7.8 %), increasing their contribution to
the growth of the GDP deflator. This was a con-
sequence of the large increase in receipts from
indirect taxes (around 10 %), which offset the
rise in subsidies (23 %). The increase in re-
ceipts is explained partly by the rise in certain
tax rates, although it reflects, above all, the re-
covery in consumption and, in particular, in
those components of consumption which attract
the highest rates of VAT.
Finally, the gross operating surplus per unit
of output (corrected for the compensation at-
tributed to self-employed workers) grew by
1.7% in 1998, four tenths of a percentage point
higher than in 1997, but below the increase in
the GDP deflator. As a result, the share of the
surplus in GDP fell. As will be seen in the fol-
lowing section, the moderate advance in the
unit surplus in the economy as a whole masks
certain differences in the paths of margins in
the various branches of activity. These lie at the
root of the duality which characterises inflation
in Spain, since the paths of the costs borne by
the various branches run more closely than do
those of their selling prices.
III.4.2. Price formation in the productive
branches
This section offers a view of the process of
price formation in the main productive branch-
es, excluding non-market and financial ser-
vices. The indicators used cover, inter alia, in-
formation on final prices net of taxes (both on
the domestic and external markets) for the dif-
ferent productive branches, variable costs
(which combine inputs and labour costs), the
prices of equivalent products on external mar-
kets and indicators of demand pressure. The
comparison of final prices with variable costs
enables an approximation to be obtained, as a
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residual, of the path of the gross operating sur-
plus.
In agriculture, final prices are estimated to
have fallen by 0.4 % in 1998, a much smaller
fall than in 1997 (4.6 %). This further decline in
prices was a consequence of the slowdown in
variable costs, the path of external food prices
and subdued demand (see Chart III.8). Among
the variable costs, the reduction in the cost of
intermediate goods, both domestic and import-
ed, and the moderation in unit labour costs, due
to the greater vigour of apparent labour produc-
tivity, were notable. The overall result was that
the gross operating margin as a percentage of
output rose to levels similar to those of 1996.
In the energy branch, production prices fell
considerably in 1998 due to the sharp fall in the
price of crude oil on international markets. In
addition, moderating effects arose from the var-
ious reforms being introduced in these markets.
Electricity utilities reduced their prices under the
schedule of cuts agreed with the government,
as a step towards greater liberalisation of the
sector (see Box III.3). It is estimated that the
gross operating margin per unit of output re-
mained unchanged at the levels reached in pre-
vious years.
In the manufacturing branches, final prices
are estimated to have grown on average by
0.3%, almost one-and-a-half percentage points
less than in 1997. Moreover, the increase in
prices on the domestic market was lower than
that of export prices. The smaller increase in
prices was the result of two counteracting fac-
tors: on the one hand, the high pressure of de-
mand faced by these branches and, on the oth-
er, external competition, given that the peseta
prices of competing products slowed consider-
ably. By contrast, the growth of variable costs
was similar to that of the preceding year, the
slowdown in intermediate costs being offset by
the acceleration in unit labour costs, due to the
paltry rise in apparent labour productivity. In
consequence, the gross operating surplus tend-
ed to contract, with certain exceptions, such as
transport materials, where demand was very
high, not only domestically but also abroad, and
the textile industry, which made a significant ad-
justment to its employment.
The retail branch is that which enables the
production (and import) prices of goods to be
linked to consumer prices. The difference be-
tween these two sets of prices broadly approxi-
mates the retail margin. During 1998, retail sell-
ing prices net of taxes slowed markedly, with
growth of 0.6 %. This more subdued behaviour
was a result of the sharp moderation in the buy-
ing prices of products, partially offset by the
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CHART III.7
GDP, final demand and imports
deflators (a)
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Ministerio de
Economía y Hacienda.
(a) Annual percentage change.
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TABLE III.3
Composition of GDP and
final demand deflators
Rate of change
Unit labour costs 4.7 0.8 2.4 2.7 1.9 1.7
Compensation per employee 6.6 3.6 3.3 3.6 2.8 2.2
Output per employee 1.8 2.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.5
Real GDP –1.2 2.3 2.7 2.4 3.5 3.8
Total employment –2.9 –0.5 1.8 1.5 2.7 3.3
Net indirect taxes (a) –12.2 10.6 2.5 8.1 7.2 7.9
Gross operating surplus ( a ) 8.4 8.7 9.7 2.9 1.0 1.7
GDP deflator 4.3 4.0 4.8 3.2 2.0 2.2
Domestic costs 5.3 2.0 2.9 2.0 –0.1 0.4
GDP per unit of final demand 0.9 –1.9 –1.8 –1.2 –2.1 –1.8
GDP deflator 4.3 4.0 4.8 3.2 2.0 2.2
Import costs 3.1 12.9 11.1 5.2 10.2 4.1
Imports per unit of final demand–3.2 6.8 6.1 3.6 6.1 4.7
Imports deflator 6.5 5.7 4.7 1.6 3.9 –0.6
Final demand deflator 4.9 3.8 4.4 2.6 1.9 1.2
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
ULCs (b) 4.9 0.0 2.1 2.9 1.5 1.3
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
(a) Per unit of output.
(b) ULCs calculated using compensation per employee.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
high pressure of demand associated with the
strength of private consumption. In conse-
quence the gross retail margin rose slightly, and
this rise was passed through to the operating
margin, since variable costs, especially labour
costs, were very restrained, due to the strong
gain in productivity and wage moderation.
The construction branch recorded one of the
smallest slowdowns in final prices, which grew
by 2 %, only two tenths of a percentage point be-
low the 1997 rate. This was due to the strength
of demand, already referred to in the preceding
sections. In addition, variable costs decelerated
to a lesser extent than in the rest of the branch-
es, since the composition of its intermediate in-
puts benefited less from conditions in the interna-
tional environment. By contrast, unit labour costs
slowed considerably, because apparent labour
productivity recovered its usual rate of growth
and wages also moderated somewhat. As a re-
sult, operating margins held stable.
Finally, the prices of market non-financial
services rose by 3.7 %, as against 3.4 % in
1997. This strong inflationary bias is due to the
behaviour of margins. The path of variable
costs is much more in line with that of the rest
of the branches, or even more positive, since
this branch is one of those which most benefits
from the reforms introduced into the labour mar-
ket, and wages thus rose more moderately
here. This phenomenon is a consequence of
the limited pass-through to final prices of the
permanent gains in costs, which are only re-
flected in them after a number of years, due to
the insufficiency of domestic competition and
the small moderating effect exerted by the ex-
ternal sector. In any case, in certain branches in
which domestic competition is somewhat
greater, such as hotels and catering, the strong
demand pushed up their selling prices. In con-
sequence, the increase in margins was com-
mon to all services branches. Transport, how-
ever, should be highlighted. Its prices continued
to grow at a healthy rate, despite its fundamen-
tal input, energy, becoming drastically cheaper.
Only in communications and professional ser-
vices have margins tended to moderate in re-
cent years, these branches being precisely
those in which the introduction of competition
has progressed furthest.
III.4.3. Final demand deflators
With the sole exception of the government
consumption deflator, all the final demand de-
flators displayed markedly decelerating profiles
in 1998. Notable for the size of their decelera-
tions were, first, the exports deflator and, sec-
ond, the capital goods investment deflator.
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CHART III.8
Price formation (a)
S o u r c e s :Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Banco de España
and Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
(a) Annual percentage change based on trend.
(b) Excluding the distributive trade.
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BOX III.3
Regulation, competition and inflation
Lack of competition affects price formation in goods and
services markets. This box analyses the reforms recently un-
dertaken in three sectors: the electricity sector, which is follow-
ing a process of gradual liberalisation; and petrol and diesel oil
distribution and telecommunications, in which the liberalisation
is at a more advanced stage.
The rules for liberalisation of the electricity sector were es-
tablished in the Electricity Protocol, signed on December 11th
1996, between the electricity utilities and the Ministry of Indus-
try and Energy (MINER). This agreement granted major con-
sumers the opportunity to choose their suppliers, and a
timetable was agreed for step-by-step liberalisation. Also a se-
ries of minimum reductions in the average tariff was agreed:
3 % for 1997, 2% for 1998 and 1 % for the period between
1999 and 2001. However the reduction in electricity tariffs
agreed for 1999 (1.9 %) was the result of a new agreement be-
tween the MINER and the electricity utilities. This agreement
set the tariff reductions for 2000 and 2001 at 1 %, abolished the
cases which, under the Protocol, enabled larger reductions to
be implemented and regulated certain other aspects of the sec-
tor: the timetable for choosing suppliers was brought forward;
access tariffs and capacity payments were reduced; and a
large part of the costs of transition to competition was securi-
tised. Subsequently, in May of this year, following the entry into
force of Royal Legislative Decree 6/1999, on urgent measures
for liberalisation and increasing competition, the tariff for do-
mestic consumers was cut by a further 1.5 %. As a result, the
average tariff for all consumers has finally been reduced by
2.5% in 1999.
In sum, the negotiated opening up of the sector has been
accompanied by a reduction of 8.9 % in the average tariff for
consumers who cannot choose their supplier between 1997
and 1999, inclusive. For households the reduction has been
somewhat less (7.1 %), although in 1999, unlike in the previous
two years, the average reduction applied (3.5 %) has been
greater than that for businesses.
The introduction of competition into petrol and diesel oil
distribution was conceived as a step-by-step process, to ensure
that liberalisation was accompanied by adequate consumer
protection. For this purpose, it was decided to apply in the initial
stages of liberalisation a system of automatically determined
maximum prices, based on the price of crude in international
markets, the US dollar exchange rate and the average pre-tax
price applied by the six largest European countries. The system
of maximum prices for petrol and diesel oil was introduced on
July 10th 1990, with diesel oil prices finally liberalised in June
1996 and petrol prices in October 1998. One way of seeing the
impact of liberalisation on competition is to compare final pre-
tax prices in Spain with the price of crude on international mar-
kets. This comparison shows that the pass-through of price
movements on international markets was incomplete, both at
times of falling prices and rising prices, although it tended to be
more rapid when prices were rising. Nonetheless, the system of
maximum prices and certain aspects of the way in which these
are determined, prevent definitive conclusions being drawn
from this comparison. An alternative method is to assess the
degree of competition by comparing the prices actually charged
for the various products with their maximum prices. As seen in
Chart 1, the divergences between the maximum prices and
those actually charged for diesel oil during the period such
maximum prices were in force were of some significance. This
is explained by the fact that the supply to this market was chan-
nelled through direct sales to major consumers. In the case of petrol, however, except in specific periods, the differences between these
two sets of prices were small, which indicates scant competition.
The telecommunications market has also been opened up through a step-by-step process, ending on December 1st 1998, when the
supply of all services was fully liberalised. New operators may now set their rates freely, while the Telecommunications Market Commis-
sion is responsible for, temporarily, establishing the price-setting criteria for the sector’s leading operator and mechanisms for controlling
it. Charges for interconnection to the main operator’s network must be in line with the costs of the services. Following liberalisation there
are three national operators in basic telephony. This has created the conditions for the appearance of new arrangements, involving
billing innovations and, in the final analysis, cheaper phone calls. The consumer price index (CPI) only reflects general offers maintained
for at least several months and the rates of new suppliers are only taken into account after a year on the market. For these reasons, tele-
phone and telegraph prices in the CPI may overestimate the prices actually charged. Even with the appropriate caveats, as shown by
Chart2, which represents this CPI sub-class, the opening-up of the sector has involved a fall in the price of telephone calls. The size of
the fall has, however, been affected by the partial adjustment of rates in August 1998 to eliminate cross subsidies(1). This raised the 12-
month rate of the telephone and telegraph sub-class of the CPI by 5.3 %(2). Nonetheless, it is expected that after the entry into force of
Royal Legislative Decree 6/1999, the growth of this sub-class will return to negative rates in 1999.
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Ministerio de
Industria y Energía.
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(1) Traditionally, rates for local calls have not reflected their actual cost, but have been subsidised by provincial, interprovincial and
international rates.
(2) In particular, rates for local calls rose, but only for those exceeding 160 seconds, as did connection charges (by ESP 200), but
provincial rates were reduced by 5 %, interprovincial rates by 15 % and international rates by 12 %.
The private consumption deflator grew by
2 % year-on-year, five tenths of a percentage
point less than in 1997. This growth was once
again higher than that of the CPI, its main short-
term indicator, which grew on average by 1.8 %
(see Chart III.9). The difference between these
two indices was less than in 1997, since the
prices of home-consumed food behaved less
satisfactorily. This is the component with the
greatest discrepancy between its weight in the
private consumption deflator and in the CPI (the
component which offsets this difference in
weight is food consumed outside the home,
which is classified in the services category). Ac-
cording to the CPI, food prices grew by 1.7 % in
1998, more than one percentage point above
the rate in 1997, in line with the path of agricul-
tural prices, but in clear contrast to the deceler-
ation in the producer price index (PPI) for food
products and in the imports unit value index for
food products. The prices of the energy goods
included in the CPI fell by 3.8 % in 1998, as a
consequence of reductions in the prices of
these products at prior stages of production: the
PPI for energy products fell by 7.7 % and the
imports unit value index by 29.5 %(1). The con-
sumer prices of non-energy industrial goods
grew by 1.5 %, two tenths of a percentage point
less than in 1997 and in line with their main de-
terminants, since the PPI for this type of good
rose by 1.1 % and the import unit value index
by 3.5 %. By contrast, service prices accelerat-
ed slightly on average over the year to a rate
of 3.6 %.
The government consumption deflator grew
by 1.9 % in 1998, as against 1.3 % in 1997.
This acceleration was concentrated in the first
half of the year and was the result of the in-
crease in the remuneration of public-sector em-
ployees, which was not revised upwards in
1997. The deflators of the other two compo-
nents of government consumption - fixed capital
consumption and net purchases of goods and
services – decelerated slightly during the year,
in line with the path of the prices of these goods
for the economy as a whole.
In 1998 the gross fixed capital formation de-
flator decelerated considerably, with growth of
0.9 %, as against 1.9 % in 1997. Both the con-
struction deflator and the capital goods invest-
ment deflator contributed to the slowdown,
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CHART III.9
Final demand deflators (a)
S o u r c e s :Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Ministerio de
Fomento and Subdirección General de Previsión y Coyuntura.
(a) Annual percentage change.
( b ) 1995 = 100.
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(1) To understand these differences it should be taken
into account that the weight of the oil products component
in the PPI is much greater than in the CPI, and in the unit
value index practically the only relevant item is the price of
crude oil. Moreover, both in the PPI and in the CPI what is
calculated is the price of oil products, which includes other
costs in their refining and, more significantly, excise duties,
which represent a hign proportion of the retail selling price.
which was concentrated in the first quarter, the
deflator remaining fairly stable thereafter. At a
disaggregated level, while the growth of the
construction deflator reached a floor in the sec-
ond quarter of 1998, and subsequently acceler-
ated, the capital goods investment deflator end-
ed the year with a decline of 0.7 %, reflecting
the path of the domestic producer prices of this
type of good, which in the year as a whole rose
by 1.1 %, and of imports, which fell by 2.8 %.
Finally, the goods and services exports de-
flator moderated considerably in 1998, with
growth of 0.4 %, more than two percentage
points less than in 1997. Although tourism
prices continued to grow at a higher rate than
goods exports prices, both slowed significantly,
the latter falling by 1.2 %. This decline was a
consequence of the significant moderation in
prices on external markets, against a back-
ground of exchange rate stability.
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CHAPTER IV
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
AND ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL FLOWS
IV.1. INTRODUCTION
Throughout this Annual report it has been
described how, in 1998, headway continued to
be made in applying a more balanced macroe-
conomic policy mix. As regards fiscal policy, the
fiscal deficit was reduced for the third year run-
ning, to stand at 1.8 % of GDP, the lowest level
for the past 20 years. Moreover, this reduction,
which stemmed both from a fall in spending and
an increase in revenue (both as percentages of
GDP), was compatible with a significant in-
crease in capital spending. Monetary policy was
loosened progressively during 1997, in the con-
text of relatively comfortable compliance with
the objective programmed by the Banco de Es-
paña (namely, to keep the 12-month rate of
growth of the CPI close to 2 %), and of gradual
convergence of the monetary conditions of the
countries that would initiate Stage Three of
EMU in January 1999. The Banco de España
used the available leeway to distribute the cuts
in its intervention rates over the year, preserv-
ing in so far as possible the contribution of mon-
etary policy to the regulation of aggregate de-
mand. The marginal interest rate at regular auc-
tions fell in 1998 by 1.75 percentage points (a
large part of the fall being concentrated in the fi-
nal quarter), to stand at 3 % at year-end.
The benefits of this more balanced macroe-
conomic policy mix for the Spanish economy
are particularly evident when a longer time
frame is considered. As seen in Chart IV.1,
throughout the expansionary phase of the last
business cycle, which commenced around
1987, fiscal policy was pro-cyclical, leaving
monetary policy with the task of addressing
macroeconomic imbalances. As a result, the
latter had to be very restrictive. The difficulty of
regulating the rate of expansion of aggregate
demand with an unbalanced combination of
economic policy instruments, led to significant
overshooting of the annual references for infla-
tion in the budget and a pattern of economic
growth biased against private investment and
the export sector. This meant that, after the ex-
pansionary stage of the cycle, the recession in
the early nineties was particularly severe. In this
period, the large structural component of the
budget deficit and the high level of public debt,
accumulated in the boom years, considerably
limited the capacity of fiscal policy to stimulate
the economy, so that once again monetary con-
ditions had a more countercyclical profile (see
Chart IV.1). However, in these years, despite
the weakness of the economy, there continued
to be significant overshooting of the inflation
goals laid down in the budgets.
The situation has changed significantly in
the new expansionary phase that commenced
in 1994. Fiscal policy has been gradually as-
suming a more active role in the regulation of
macroeconomic conditions, which has given
monetary policy, once inflation was set on a
course towards price stability, greater leeway to
be more accommodating, as can be seen in the
chart.
The healthy performance of the Spanish
economy in recent years is reflected both in the
markets and financial intermediaries and in
agent’s economic and financial flows. In 1998
there was again a significant revaluation of the
assets traded on financial markets, which was
particularly large in the case of equities, and
turnover rose significantly. This strong expan-
sion was compatible with the volume of funds
channelled through financial intermediaries con-
tinuing to grow in 1998 at a higher rate than
GDP. The strong increase in credit demand and
the need to obtain funds to finance it are some
of the factors which, as in previous years, gov-
ern the behaviour of deposit money institutions.
As for mutual funds, they continued to raise
funds from the private sector, albeit at a more
moderate rate than in previous years, basically
as a result of the smaller net investment in
money market funds. By contrast, the informa-
tion available on pension funds and insurance
companies indicates that their absorption of
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funds from the non-financial sector of the econ-
omy continued to grow very strongly.
Analysis of the recent financial saving of the
economic sectors, especially when it is com-
pared with previous patterns of behaviour, also
enables elements to be identified which confirm
the healthy pattern of growth of the Spanish
economy. Chart IV.2 and Table IV.1 help this
comparison to be made, by simultaneously de-
picting net financial saving as a percentage of
GDP in the current and preceding cyclical re-
coveries. In terms of the nation as a whole, it is
notable that during the last four years a positive
financing capacity has been sustained. This
contrasts with the sharp deterioration in the ex-
ternal balance during the economy’s previous
cyclical recovery.
This marked difference in the path of the na-
tion’s financial saving is a reflection, in turn, of
important changes in the behaviour of the vari-
ous sectors of the economy. As mentioned
above and as seen in Chart IV.2, the general
government borrowing requirement has been
progressively declining, to stand at below 2 %
of GDP, while in the previous cyclical expansion
it stood systematically at around 4 % of GDP.
As regards the financial situation of firms,
throughout the five years of the current cyclical
recovery they have maintained gross saving
and gross capital formation at very similar lev-
els, so that higher indebtedness has been ac-
companied by higher rates of acquisition of fi-
nancial assets, increasingly channelled towards
foreign direct investment. As can be seen in
Chart IV.2, the previous cyclical expansion was
characterised by a rapid deterioration in the
gross saving and net financial saving of firms,
prompted, among other factors, by the strong
increase in labour and financial costs. By con-
trast, in the current cyclical recovery both fac-
tors have tended to operate in the opposite di-
rection, putting firms in a much more favourable
position to invest.
Finally, as regards households, although
they started the current cyclical recovery with
savings ratios and a financing capacity signifi-
cantly higher than in the previous period, these
variables have followed a markedly counter-
cyclical path, in clear contrast to what hap-
pened in the previous cycle. Nonetheless, the
decline in household saving over the last few
years reflects the higher degree of confidence
in the country’s economic situation and the in-
crease in the net financial wealth of this sector.
The composition of economic agents’ finan-
cial assets and liabilities evidences the signifi-
cant changes occurring in their financial be-
haviour as a consequence of the new environ-
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CHART IV.1
Business cycle, inflation
and macroeconomic policies
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Percentage deviation from the GDP trend, estimated on
the basis of the Hodrick-Prescott procedure.
(b) Cumulative fiscal impulses estimated following the IMF
methodology. Fiscal impulses measure the fiscal stance in any
year, taking the previous year as a reference and subtracting
from the change in the deficit the part attributable to cyclical
factors. An increase (decrease) in the indicator corresponds to
a loose (tight) fiscal stance.
( c ) Calculated as a weighted average of the variations in
the real exchange rate and in the real short-term interest rate
since a given base year. An increase (decrease) in the indica-
tor corresponds to a loose (tight) monetary stance.
(d) Established in the State Budget.
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TABLE IV.1
Use of income, capital and financial accounts. National economy.
Breakdown by sector (% of GDP)
1. Gross disposable income 99.6 99.3 99.8 99.3 99.4 99.2 99.4 99.2 99.1
General government 15.9 14.1 17.0 16.3 16.8 16.1 15.7 17.2 18.0
Financial institutions 2.6 2.3 2.8 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.3
Non-financial firms and households81.1 82.9 80.0 81.1 80.5 81.3 81.8 80.5 79.8
Households 70.4 71.8 69.5 70.3 71.3 69.9 70.1 69.3 69.1
Non-financial firms 10.7 11.1 10.5 10.8 9.2 11.4 11.7 11.3 10.8
2. Consumption 78.3 78.5 78.1 79.1 80.4 78.6 78.5 78.1 77.6
General government 15.0 14.4 15.4 16.7 17.3 16.4 16.6 16.2 15.8
Households 63.3 64.2 62.7 62.4 63.1 62.1 61.9 62.0 61.8
3. Gross national saving (1– 2) 21.4 20.8 21.7 20.2 18.9 20.7 20.9 21.0 21.5
General government 0.9 –0.2 1.6 –0.4 –0.5 –0.3 –0.9 1.0 2.2
Financial institutions 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.1
Non-financial firms and households18.3 18.9 17.9 18.9 17.7 19.4 20.0 18.7 18.2
Households 7.6 7.9 7.4 8.1 8.5 8.0 8.3 7.5 7.4
Non-financial firms 10.7 11.1 10.5 10.8 9.2 11.4 11.7 11.3 10.8
4. Gross capital formation (a) 22.2 19.4 23.9 20.1 20.7 19.8 19.5 19.5 20.5
General government 5.5 5.5 5.4 4.3 4.9 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.9
Financial institutions 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2
Non-financial firms and households16.1 13.4 17.8 15.2 15.0 15.3 15.4 15.7 16.3
Households 5.1 4.7 5.3 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.9
Non-financial firms 11.1 8.7 12.5 10.5 10.4 10.5 10.4 10.9 11.4
5. Net lending (+) or borrowing (–)
of the nation (3– 4 ) – 0 . 8 1 . 4 – 2 . 1 0 . 1 – 1 . 7 0 . 8 1 . 3 1 . 6 1 . 0
General government – 4 . 7 – 5 . 9 – 3 . 9 – 4 . 9 – 5 . 6 – 4 . 6 – 4 . 7 – 2 . 6 – 1 . 8
Financial institutions 1 . 6 1 . 6 1 . 5 1 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 2 0 . 9 0 . 9
Non-financial firms and households 2 . 3 5 . 7 0 . 3 3 . 8 2 . 8 4 . 3 4 . 8 3 . 3 2 . 0
H o u s e h o l d s 2 . 8 3 . 3 2 . 4 3 . 7 4 . 1 3 . 6 3 . 6 3 . 0 2 . 7
Non-financial firms – 0 . 4 2 . 3 – 2 . 1 0 . 1 – 1 . 3 0 . 7 1 . 1 0 . 3 – 0 . 7
6 . Net financial saving (7– 8 ) – 0 . 9 1 . 4 – 2 . 3 0 . 1 – 1 . 7 0 . 8 1 . 3 1 . 6 0 . 9
General government – 4 . 7 – 5 . 9 – 4 . 0 – 4 . 9 – 5 . 6 – 4 . 6 – 4 . 7 – 2 . 6 – 1 . 8
Financial institutions 1 . 5 1 . 6 1 . 4 1 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 3 0 . 8 0 . 9
Non-financial firms and households 2 . 3 5 . 7 0 . 3 3 . 9 2 . 9 4 . 3 4 . 7 3 . 4 1 . 9
H o u s e h o l d s 4 . 9 7 . 3 3 . 5 5 . 4 6 . 5 4 . 9 5 . 3 4 . 2 2 . 9
Non-financial firms – 2 . 6 – 1 . 7 – 3 . 2 – 1 . 5 – 3 . 7 – 0 . 7 – 0 . 6 – 0 . 8 – 1 . 0
7 . Change in financial assets 4 4 . 3 4 2 . 8 4 5 . 2 3 9 . 7 4 5 . 0 3 7 . 5 3 8 . 2 4 2 . 0 4 8 . 3
General government 2 . 2 3 . 5 1 . 4 2 . 3 4 . 1 1 . 6 3 . 8 0 . 7 1 . 2
Financial institutions 2 3 . 2 2 2 . 2 2 3 . 9 2 1 . 5 2 7 . 2 1 9 . 3 2 1 . 0 2 3 . 6 2 4 . 9
Non-financial firms and households 1 8 . 9 1 7 . 2 1 9 . 9 1 5 . 8 1 3 . 8 1 6 . 6 1 3 . 5 1 7 . 7 2 2 . 2
H o u s e h o l d s 1 1 . 7 1 2 . 7 1 1 . 0 1 0 . 1 1 1 . 3 9 . 6 8 . 5 1 0 . 3 1 1 . 1
Non-financial firms 7 . 2 4 . 5 8 . 9 5 . 8 2 . 5 7 . 1 4 . 9 7 . 4 1 1 . 1
8 . Change in financial liabilities 4 5 . 2 4 1 . 4 4 7 . 5 3 9 . 6 4 6 . 7 3 6 . 7 3 6 . 9 4 0 . 4 4 7 . 4
General government 6 . 8 9 . 3 5 . 4 7 . 2 9 . 7 6 . 2 8 . 5 3 . 3 3 . 1
Financial institutions 2 1 . 7 2 0 . 5 2 2 . 5 2 0 . 4 2 6 . 2 1 8 . 2 1 9 . 7 2 2 . 8 2 4 . 0
Non-financial firms and households 1 6 . 6 1 1 . 5 1 9 . 7 1 2 . 0 1 0 . 9 1 2 . 4 8 . 7 1 4 . 4 2 0 . 3
H o u s e h o l d s 6 . 8 5 . 4 7 . 6 4 . 7 4 . 8 4 . 6 3 . 2 6 . 1 8 . 2
Non-financial firms 9 . 9 6 . 1 1 2 . 1 7 . 3 6 . 1 7 . 8 5 . 5 8 . 3 1 2 . 1
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
(a) Includes net capital transfers.
(b) Covers a complete cycle of the economy defined as the period between two cyclical troughs of GDP.
(c) Cyclical downturn.
(d) Cyclical upturn.
(e) Covers the elapsed period of the economy’s current cycle.
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ment of macroeconomic stability. The most no-
table changes are those relating to the interna-
tionalisation and disintermediation of financial
flows and the restoration of financial health un-
dertaken, principally by firms and general gov-
ernment. In recent years there has been a sig-
nificant increase in financial transactions with
the external sector, closely related to the com-
plete liberalisation of Spanish capital move-
ments – with a view to the creation of EMU –
and to the possibilities of obtaining high yields
on markets that are less mature than the Span-
ish one. The process of financial disintermedia-
tion has also intensified. Economic agents, and
particularly households, have increasingly in-
vested their savings in non-bank financial in-
struments, such as shares in mutual funds, in-
surance products or, directly in equities, to the
detriment of bank deposits which have tradition-
ally attracted the bulk of private sector saving.
This has led to a considerable expansion in the
external activity of credit institutions, which
have had to replace domestic financing with ex-
ternal funds in order to finance the strong
growth in lending to the private sector.
IV.2. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
IV.2.1. Fiscal policy
Fiscal policy in 1998 remained geared, as in
the preceding two years, to reducing budgetary
imbalances. This permitted a general govern-
ment deficit of 1.8 % of fiscal GDP, eight tenths
of a percentage point less than in the previous
year (Box IV.1 describes the changes in the
measurement of GDP and the effects on the
deficit and public debt data). This result was an
improvement on the initial forecasts (the budget
had set a deficit target of 2.4 %) and the figure
included in the April 1997 Convergence Pro-
gramme, against a background of higher-than-
expected economic growth. This fiscal policy
stance was set in the framework of the commit-
ment to comply with the Stability and Growth
Pact, which requires that public finances be
close to balance in the medium term and that
budget deficits should not exceed 3 % of GDP
in normal cyclical situations.
To examine the fiscal policy implemented
last year, it is useful to analyse first how this
policy was designed in the budget. The target
set was to reduce the general government
deficit by six tenths of a percentage point of
GDP, exclusively through a deceleration of con-
solidated expenditure, for which an increase
of 3.8 % was budgeted. Consolidated revenue
was forecast to grow at a similar rate to GDP
(6%).
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CHART IV.2
Net financial saving
in cyclical upturns
Source: Banco de España.
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The scheduled reduction in expenditure as a
proportion of GDP was based on interest pay-
ments (estimated to fall by 7.7 % as a conse-
quence of the effects of the decline in interest
rates since 1995 and lower public indebted-
ness) and on unemployment benefits (down 2.7
% owing to the expected reduction in unem-
ployment). At the same time, significant growth
in capital spending (actual investment and capi-
tal transfers) was planned, to reverse the down-
ward trend of previous years. As regards the
forecast for revenue, first, indirect taxes were
expected to grow strongly (10.2 %), as a result
of buoyant consumption and imports, as well as
the expected revenue impact of the creation of
the duty on electricity, and the increase in the
rate at which the Insurance Premium Tax is
levied. Second, it was estimated that direct tax-
es and social security contributions would grow
more moderately (5.6 %), in line with the fore-
casts for growth of employment and wages and
with the effect of certain legislative amend-
ments (the speeding up of personal income tax
and corporate income tax rebates, among oth-
ers), as well as the reduction in investment in-
come owing to the reduction in interest rates.
Finally, under other revenue, the fall in profits
and dividends was notable, due to the lower
profits than in 1997 from the disposal of public-
sector firms, and lower receipts obtained under
the heading of rates and other income, as a
consequence of the decline in revenue from
public debt issuance premiums.
The new agreement on the financing of
health for the period 1998-2001, approved by
the Fiscal and Financial Policy Board in Novem-
ber 1997, entered into force in 1998, setting an
annual increase in health spending in terms of
nominal GDP. In 1998, the Board made certain
changes to the model for financing regional
government in force for the period 1997-2001.
These changes involved strengthening the sys-
tem of financial guarantees to avoid losses of
revenue by the regional governments as a re-
sult of the reform of personal income tax. Final-
ly, the government reached an agreement with
practically all the regional governments to
achieve a balanced budget in 2001.
The fiscal policy implemented in 1998 en-
abled the fiscal deficit to be reduced. This re-
duction was the result of two factors. First, an
increase in revenue, largely driven by the ex-
pansion in economic activity and, second, a re-
duction in total expenditure as a proportion of
GDP, stemming basically from interest pay-
ments, unemployment benefits and government
consumption, with similar contributions from
each of these items (see Chart IV.3). The
healthy behaviour of revenue and the modera-
tion of expenditure enabled a primary surplus to
be sustained for the third year running, which
rose to 2.2 % of GDP in 1998. The drive to re-
duce the deficit was centred on the State,
whose deficit fell to 1.5 % of GDP (2.1 % in
1997), while the deficits of territorial govern-
ment and the social security system stood at
0.2 % and 0.1 % of GDP, respectively (0.3 %
and 0.2 % in 1997).
As regards revenue, the contrast between
direct and indirect taxes is notable. The former
f ll by three tenths of a percentage point of
GDP as a consequence of the moderation in
the growth of personal income tax receipts. This
moderation is basically explained by the reduc-
tion in withholdings on investment income and
by rebates being made earlier than in 1997.
Corporate income tax receipts, however, grew
at a high rate, as result of the performance of
corporate profits, which neutralised the negative
effect on revenue of other factors. These includ-
ed, notably, the falls in withholdings on invest-
ment income, the levy on balance sheet re-
statement and the increase in payments on ac-
count, which affected the figures in 1997. Indi-
rect taxes, for their part, rose as a proportion of
GDP by seven tenths of a percentage point,
driven by the healthy behaviour of consumption
and influenced by the increase in the tax rate
payable on insurance premiums and by the cre-
tion of the new tax on electricity. Social securi-
ty contributions rose at a similar rate to that of
the previous year, despite the acceleration in
the number of contributors. Finally, other rev-
enue and transfers grew slightly faster than in
1997, while capital receipts rose moderately, af-
ter the fall in 1997, as a result of the high inher-
itance tax receipts and the increase in the
transfers of funds from the EU.
With regard to public expenditure, its decline
with respect to GDP is explained by a number
of factors: first, the low growth of social bene-
fits, which fell by four tenths of a percentage
point of GDP mainly as a consequence of the
reduction in unemployment benefits and sick
pay; second, lower interest payments, which al-
so fell by four tenths of a percentage point of
GDP, owing to lower interest rates and the re-
duction in the weight of public debt in GDP over
the last two years; and, finally, government con-
sumption, which fell by four tenths of a percent-
age point of GDP, as a result of the moderate
growth in compensation of wage earners and,
to a lesser extent, net purchases of goods and
services. By contrast, public investment grew
significantly, to stand at 3.3 % of GDP. Operat-
ing subsidies also rose (by three tenths of a
percentage point of GDP), particularly those re-
ceived by RENFE, those used to finance coal
utilities and the reductions and rebates of em-
ployers’ social security contributions, as did
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capital transfers, which rose by one tenth of a
percentage point of GDP.
The fiscal consolidation drive was part of a
medium and long-term strategy. Pursuant to the
Stability and Growth Pact, the Spanish govern-
ment presented its first Stability Programme at
the beginning of 1999. This laid down as public
finance objectives the achievement of a bal-
anced budget and a reduction in the public-
debt-to-GDP ratio to below 60 % in 2002. In ad-
dition, it has been announced that these objec-
tives must be compatible with a reduction in the
tax burden, so that the burden of the adjust-
ment must fall on public expenditure and, within
the latter, current expenditure, since it is
planned to increase public investment. The Pro-
gram incorporates in its forecasts the effects of
the reform of personal income tax, already ap-
proved, which will entail an average reduction
of 11.1 % in the tax burden on households and
a reduction in the number of rate bands and de-
ductions. It is also planned to amend the Gen-
eral Budget Law, in order to improve the control
of the budget outturn and the effectiveness of
public expenditure, and furthermore it is ac-
knowledged that progress must be made in ra-
tionalising the social security system in order to
ensure its financial sustainability.
IV.2.2. Monetary policy
1998 marked the end of a four-year period in
which monetary policy was implemented under
a regime of independence, pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de
España of June 1994, within a framework
based on the establishment of direct inflation
targets aimed at achieving price stability in the
medium term. Although the objectives of mone-
tary policy in 1998 were, once more, set within
this framework, they were formulated taking into
account the singularity of 1998. If, – as was
considered likely – Spain joined the Monetary
Union, the transition to a new monetary policy
regime had to be carried out that year. This re-
quired the Banco de España to respond to do-
mestic factors, but at the same time to modu-
late interest rate movements to ensure that by
year-end the monetary conditions of the Span-
ish economy were in line with those of the
group of countries adopting the euro.
Mindful of these considerations, the Banco
de España set a target for 1998 consisting of
keeping the 12-month growth rate of the CPI
over the course of the year close to 2 %. Such
a goal was considered sufficient to consolidate
price stability in the Spanish economy. More-
over, it was in line with the objectives that the
ESCB might have been expected to establish,
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CHART IV.3
General government:
Main variables
S o u r c e s :Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Ministerio de
Economía y Hacienda, and Banco de España.
(a) Cyclical deviation of GDP: sign reversed.
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BOX IV.1
Changes in the measurement of macroeconomic aggregates:ESA 95 implementation timetable
and its repercussions on the Stability and Growth Pact deficit and public debt data
This box explains the recent changes in EU countries’ macroeconomic statistics and those
scheduled for the near future. The aim is to reduce, as far as possible, the confusion that these
types of changes cause among analysts. These statistics are a part of certain EU legal texts,
such as those relating to the Excessive Deficit Procedure/Stability and Growth Pact
(EDP/SGP), the Community Budget and Own Resources, etc. Accordingly, any revision of, or
conceptual change in, these series affects very sensitive areas. This largely accounts for the
graduality with which it is planned to introduce ESA 95.
The revisions in question, indicating the period, scope and context in which they have
arisen, with particular reference to the case of Spain, may be listed as follows:
1. Gross domestic product (GDP): Spanish National Accounts (CNE) GDP versus “fiscal”
GDP. The Spanish GDP referred to, unless otherwise indicated, both in this Annual Report and
in Chapter I of the complementary publication Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
(FASE), is that published by INE (National Statistics Institute) in Contabilidad Nacional de Es-
paña. Base 1986 (CNE),which has been prepared in accordance with ESA 79. However, for
the purposes of calculating the deficit and public debt ratios under the EDP/SGP framework,
and the contribution to the Community budget, the so-called “fiscal” GDP or “GNP Directive”
GDP is used. In principle, CNE GDP and “fiscal” GDP, also calculated by INE, should be identi-
cal (both are based on ESA 79). But for various reasons INE has not considered it appropriate
to incorporate the result of the harmonisation undertaken by Eurostat, for the aforementioned
“fiscal” ends, into the official CNE series. In Spain’s case, this harmonisation has taken the spe-
cific form of: a) treatment alternative to that in the CNE relative to lotteries, education subsidies
and certain means of transport, insurance services and income vis-à-vis the rest of the world,
and b) the result of the exercise on exhaustiveness, concluded in March 1999. As a result, cur-
rent “fiscal“ GDP is higher than CNE GDP (1998 data) by 2.7 %, 2.2 percentage points of which
relate to the exhaustiveness exercise (see the CNE GDP and “fiscal” GDP amounts in Table
I.1.1 of FASE). There is every indication that, once INE draws up the CNE in terms of ESA 95
(see below), this GDP duplicity will end.
2. Introducing ESA 95. This will be done in stages, as established in the related regula-
tions (EC Regulation No. 2223/96). Specifically, in May or June 1999, INE will publish the series
1995-1998, relating to the macroeconomic aggregates, with specific additions but without in-
cluding the non-financial accounts of the institutional sectors, among which those of the Gener-
al Government sector which, evidently, will include measurements of the deficit and – to some
extent – of public debt. The non-financial accounts of the institutional sectors will, like the finan-
cial accounts prepared by the Banco de España, be published in September or October 1999,
and likewise for the period 1995-1998, although the series will subsequently be extended for
previous years.
3. SGP (formerly EDP) Notifications. The next Notifications are those for September 1999
and March 2000. Under Article 8.2 of the ESA 95 Regulation, the September 1999 Notification
will still be within the ESA 79 framework. Accordingly, when the GDP data are being released,
and deficit and debt data are on the point of being published within the ESA 95 framework, this
Notification will use deficit, debt and GDP data within the ESA 79 framework, which may cause
some confusion. The reason for this apparent inconsistency is of a fiscal nature. Certain net-
contributor countries to the Community did not endorse approval of the ESA 95 Regulation
(which came into force in November 1996) while it was not stipulated that, until the financing ar-
rangements for the European Community were amended (scheduled for the year 2000), the
GDP actually to be used for determining countries’ contribution to the Community budget was
that of the GNP Directive, i.e. ESA 79, and not that inferred by the application of ESA 95. As
from the Notification for the year 2000, the deficit, debt and GDP data will be calculated in terms
of the ESA 95 framework.
so that it facilitated the transition to the single
monetary policy.
In the design of monetary policy in 1998, the
Banco de España weighed up the favourable
contribution of macroeconomic conditions to the
shaping of a low inflation environment. As for
the international setting, prices on international
markets were expected to continue to display
moderation and the tempo of economic activity
was expected to be favourable to price stability.
In the domestic arena, the maintenance of a
balanced pattern of growth was considered like-
ly, with national demand, stimulated by the ex-
pansion in investment and by the recovery of
private consumption, gathering momentum,
while the contribution from the external sector
diminished owing to the strength of imports.
This scenario, subject to some uncertainty re-
garding the impact of the south-east Asian cri-
sis, was considered consistent with the inflation
targets and rigorous implementation of the bud-
getary policy, with a further cut in the general
government deficit, as described in the previous
section. Finally, the Banco de España reaf-
firmed the framework of analysis for taking
monetary policy decisions of previous years,
based on the monitoring of a broad range of
economic, monetary and financial indicators.
Among these, the money stock and the fulfil-
ment of commitments arising from membership
of the ERM continued to be very important. As
for presentation to the public of the assessment
of the inflationary situation and monetary policy
actions, the Banco de España continued,
throughout 1998, to use the regular channels
available to it, notably the half-yearly I n f l a t i o n
Report,the final edition of which was released
in September.
The encouraging inflation figures and
favourable prospects for prices in the medium
term facilitated the convergence of Spanish
monetary conditions on those set at the outset
of Stage Three of EMU. The intervention rate of
the Banco de España was cut by a total of 1.75
percentage points in 1998, to 3 % (see Chart
IV.4). However, the cuts were unevenly dis-
tributed over the year, reflecting the growing
weight of external factors in monetary policy de-
cisions. Thus, by October, the intervention rate
had been cut by 0.50 percentage points, as a
result of two cuts of 0.25 percentage points
each in February and May, the latter when
Spain’s participation in Stage Three of EMU
had been confirmed. The bulk of the adjustment
was therefore made in the final quarter of the
year, when the Banco de España reduced its
10-day intervention rate on three occasions
(October 6th, November 3rd and December
3rd) by a total of 1.25 percentage points (see
Chart IV.4). The reduction of 0.50 percentage
points on December 3rd was the result of the
concerted action of the central banks that were
going to participate in Stage Three of EMU and
was based on considerations relating to the
area as a whole. This action sought, moreover,
to dispel the uncertainty regarding the monetary
conditions at the outset of Stage Three of EMU
and so smooth its opening.
This latter decision was influenced by the
crisis in international financial markets, which
was at a height between August and October,
and by the downward revision to economic
growth prospects within Europe. The easing of
monetary policy led to significant reductions in
short-term interest rates in most Western coun-
tries and enabled the stock market recovery to
be consolidated, following the sharp falls in
prices in August and September. Long-term in-
terest rates also fell in the last few months of
1998, to stand below the already low levels they
had reached in the industrialised countries.
1998 therefore ended with monetary and finan-
cial conditions in Spain practically in line with
those of the countries which were going to
make up the euro area and with very low real
interest rates. In the first quarter of 1999, the
ECB, after analysing the different factors affect-
ing its basic objective of maintaining price sta-
bility, decided to leave the initial level of the
main monetary policy interest rate unchanged
at 3 %. However, on April 8th, the Governing
Council of the ECB decided to cut this rate of
interest by half a percentage point to 2.5 % for
the reasons already set out in Chapter II.
As regards the path of monetary aggregates
in Spain in 1998, liquid assets held by the pub-
lic (ALP) continued to follow the decelerating
path that commenced in 1995, to reach a very
low growth rate (1 %) by the end of the year
(see Chart IV.2). By contrast, as seen in Chart
IV.5, ALPF (which includes shares in money-
market and fixed-income mutual funds, to which
a large amount of funds invested in bank de-
posits were moved) grew at a year-on-year rate
closer to that of nominal GDP (around 6 %),
which was nonetheless below the 1997 rate of
almost 8 %. The low level of interest rates and
the buoyancy of domestic demand led to strong
growth in the narrowest monetary aggregates,
so that the rate of expansion of M2, for exam-
ple, which includes cash and sight and savings
deposits, was close to 14 % at the end of the
year.
In 1998, the rate of growth of financing to
firms and households continued to accelerate,
to reach a year-on-year rate of 16.6 % by year-
end, as against 12 % the preceding year. This
increase was explained by financial conditions
that were very favourable for borrowing and by
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the encouraging economic prospects, particu-
larly in the case of households, as reflected by
consumer confidence indicators. Other factors
that may have influenced the private-sector de-
mand for credit are analysed in more detail in
Box IV.2. This expansion of private-sector cred-
it was almost totally offset by the lower general
government borrowing requirement, which grew
at a rate of only 2 %, as against 7 % in 1997.
Total financing to non-financial resident sectors
thus increased at a rate of 11.2 %, slightly
above the 10 % rate of 1997. 
The process whereby credit institutions resi-
dent in Spain raise net financial liabilities
abroad, which had commenced in previous
years, intensified in 1998, with the result that
the net debtor position vis-à-vis the external
sector increased notably. At the same time
there was a reduction in the external assets
held by the Banco de España, so that the total
debtor position of the credit system increased.
Turning to the implementation of monetary
policy, the Banco de España progressively
adapted the operating framework of Spanish
monetary policy to the new framework for the
single monetary policy, especially when, during
the last few months of 1998, the ECB finalised
decisions on the questions remaining open in
this area. Specifically, measures were intro-
duced in 1998 to control the risks involved in
accepting collateral, similar to those which were
going to be established by the ESCB. In July
1998 a deposit facility was introduced, along-
side the already existing credit facility, in order
for the institutions to familiarise themselves with
the instruments which were going to be avail-
able to them from 1999. Likewise, in November,
the Banco de España began to hold weekly liq-
uidity-providing tenders with 14-day maturity, at
the same time as it modified the computation
period for reserve requirements to one month,
and proposed reducing the frequency of fine-
tuning operations, in anticipation of the expect-
ed model for Stage Three, in which these oper-
ations were likely to be very sporadic. Finally,
both for calculating the monetary aggregates,
which play an important role in the monetary
policy strategy of the Eurosystem, and for the
compliance with reserve requirements, the rele-
vant information obligations were established
for Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs), con-
sisting basically of credit institutions and mon-
ey-market funds. In order to ease the
changeover to the single monetary policy, these
obligations were brought into effect early and
Spanish MFIs began to send information on
their balance sheets to the Banco de España
monthly from June1998.
IV.3. THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
Developments on the Spanish financial mar-
kets in 1998 were characterised by the continu-
ation of some of the trends observed in 1997,
although they were also influenced by the inter-
national financial crisis which occurred during
the summer months. Thus, interest rates contin-
ued to decline and equity prices rose over the
year as a whole. On primary markets the supply
of fixed-income securities continued to deceler-
ate, since private-sector securities, despite their
expansion, failed to completely offset the small-
er volume of public issuance. All these issues
are set out and analysed below in greater de-
tail, starting with prices and then continuing with
the behaviour of turnover on primary and sec-
ondary markets. 
On the interbank deposit market, i n t e r e s t
rates adjusted to the successive movements in
the Banco de España intervention rates –
which, as indicated in the preceding section,
were reduced by 1.75 percentage points over
the year – and the expectations regarding fu-
ture changes. Consequently, the reductions
ranged from 1.9 percentage points for overnight
deposits to 1.4 percentage points for the one-
year maturity. Overall, the yield curve had a
negative slope for most of the year (see Chart
IV.6), reflecting expectations of cuts in interven-
tion rates. Nonetheless, during the final quarter
the curve tended to flatten out, as the leeway
85
CHART IV.4
Interest rates
Source: Banco de España.
( a ) Interest rate on the main ECB financing operations
since January 1999
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14BANCO DE ESPAÑA
INTERVENTION RATE (a)
%%
ONE-YEAR
INTERBANK RATE
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
ON TEN-YEAR DEBT
BANK LENDING
RATE
BANK BORROWING
RATE
for cutting intervention rates to the forecast
level of the EMU convergence rate was ex-
hausted.
The public debt market yield curve also shift-
ed continuously downwards (see Chart IV.6).
The decline in yields was smaller the longer the
maturity, ranging from two percentage points at
the short end of the curve to 1.3 percentage
points at the longer end. Consequently, the
positive slope of the yield curve increased until
the spread between the long and short maturi-
ties reached 1.9 percentage points. In 1999 to
date, the spread has continued to widen due to
the reductions in short-term rates and the in-
crease in long-term rates. The positive slope of
the curve is also reflected by the term structure
of one-year forward rates, under which the lat-
ter increase with the time horizon.
As in the rest of the industrialised econ-
omies, continuation in 1998 of the downward
path of previous years has taken long-term pub-
lic debt yields to very low levels (see Chart
IV.6). The size of the decline in Spanish long-
term interest rates in 1998 was very similar to
that in rates on the sovereign debt of the rest of
the countries which have adopted the euro. The
backdrop to this decline was increasing certain-
ty as to completion of the monetary integration
project on schedule and convergence of infla-
tion rates and short-term interest rates. The
downward movement of long-term interest rates
was also helped by the flight to quality securi-
ties of the more stable industrialised countries,
in particular fixed-income securities, and by the
easing of monetary policy in the United States
and in Europe.
Prices on Spanish equity markets, as on the
majority of international markets, were charac-
terised by their high level of volatility (see Chart.
IV.7). Thus, to mid-July there was a marked up-
ward trend in prices, which resulted in a 51 %
rise in the Spanish Ibex 35 stock exchange in-
dex. However, as mentioned in Chapter II, after
the financial crisis in Russia market sentiment
deteriorated sharply. These circumstances, to-
gether with the fact that prices were at very high
levels, led to large price falls in August and
September. As a result, by the beginning of Oc-
tober, the Ibex 35 index had lost all the ground
gained to mid-July and even stood slightly be-
low its end-1997 level. In October, however, co-
inciding with the easing of US monetary policy
and the revision of some of the more pes-
simistic scenarios contemplated at the begin-
ning of the crisis, there commenced a recovery
in prices which enabled 1998 to close with sig-
nificant gains. Thus, the Ibex 35 rose by 35.6 %
in the year as a whole, which was larger than
the rise in the Euro Stoxx (29.8 %) and in the
S&P 500 (26.9 %).
In 1999 to date, stock market prices have
continued to display high levels of volatility.
During the first few days of the year, coinciding
with the commencement of trading in euro,
there were large price rises in the markets of
the countries forming the common currency
area. However, in mid-January, coinciding with
the devaluation of the Brazilian real, the previ-
ous rises were wiped out by falls. Since then,
the Ibex 35 has been fluctuating without any
clear direction. At the beginning of May its level
was slightly higher than at an end-1998.
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TABLE IV.2
Monetary and credit aggregates.
End-year twelve-month growth rates
MONETARY AGGREGATES:
M1 2.3 7.5 12.4 15.3
M2 2.6 7.5 11.0 14.2
M3 10.8 4.2 3.5 1.7
ALP 9.2 6.5 3.7 1.1
ALPF 8.0 9.8 7.9 6.4
CREDIT AGGREGATES:
HF (a) +Gen. gvt.(b) 9.7 9.4 10.1 11.2
HF (a) 7.1 7.7 12.1 16.6
Gen. gvt. (b) 14.3 12.4 6.9 2.2
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Domestic credit to households and firms plus commercial paper and foreign direct credit.
(b) Domestic credit to general government plus outright debt held by the public and foreign direct financing.
1998199719961995
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BOX IV.2
The expansion of bank credit in Spain
The high growth rates in 1998 of the demand by house-
holds and non-financial firms for credit are the continuation of a
process which began in late 1995 and which is largely based
on the downward trend of interest rates and on the pick-up in
economic activity since mid-1996.
In the period from 1996 to 1998, households increasingly
resorted to the various financing sources available: the resident
credit sector, non-resident credit institutions and the corporate
sector (via trade credit), as highlighted in the main body of this
chapter. The factors traditionally accounting for the behaviour
of households’ credit financing have essentially been related to
their spending decisions: consumption and housing demand.
The lower cost of financing, arising both from interest rate cuts
and from the generalisation of floating-rate loans, mainly on
mortgage loans, have further boosted the demand for credit. As
regards non-financial firms, all their forms of financing have al-
so expanded since late 1996. In this case, private productive
investment (the main indicator of firms’ typical activity) is the
variable which has accounted for the course of corporate credit
financing.
However, there has been an increase in credit financing in
both sectors since 1997 which is significantly greater than what
would be consistent with historical patterns. The usual demand
factors (private consumption, residential investment, private
productive investment and cost of financing) have ceased to be
the driving force behind the behaviour of credit. Evidence of
this is the fact that currently available econometric estimates of
equations of the demand for credit by non-financial firms and
households have shown significant prediction errors throughout
1998, as can be seen in the adjoining chart.
The explanatory factors of this growth of financing to
households, factors of a different nature to those underlying
previous situations of strong credit growth, may be related both
to the demand for and supply of credit. Among the demand fac-
tors is a considerable improvement in the capacity of house-
holds to meet the payment commitments arising from their
debt, the result of the decline in actual interest paid as a pro-
portion of gross disposable income. In 1990, this proportion
was approximately 6.2 %, dipping to 4.4 % in 1994 and, finally,
to 3.5 % in 1998. Hence, households might be prepared to in-
cur debt in a greater proportion than previously to satisfy the
same spending requirements, having to make a lesser relative
effort in terms of their disposable income. Among the supply
factors, the degree of rationing normally applied by banks in ex-
tending credit has been eased, against a background of height-
ened competition for banking business. In this connection, one
influential factor combining both supply and demand-related
considerations is the ongoing rise in the value of households’ fi-
nancial wealth since 1996, due principally to the increased val-
ue of equity holdings and shares in mutual funds. The chart
shows the estimation errors of the equation compared with an
estimation of the rise in the value of households’ net financial
wealth, derived exclusively from the rise in the price of financial
assets. The possibility of households having used financial assets whose price has risen sizeably as collateral for their credit may have
given rise to a shift in the demand for credit. In turn, the supply of credit by financial institutions might also be shifting, given their greater
proclivity to lend to a sector with a healthier financial position.
Particularly relevant among the factors accounting for much of the growth seen in credit to non-financial firms is the strong growth of
investment abroad by Spanish firms, mainly through equity acquisitions. The figures of the Balance of Payments financial account show
that foreign direct investment by agents included under other esident sectors was around 3% of GDP in 1998, compared with 2.1%
and 1% in 1997 and 1996, respectively. In the chart relating to firms, the credit equation estimation errors are shown for the sector set
against their foreign direct investment, with a certain correspondence discernible since mid-1997. It may be assumed that a significant
portion of the resources needed to finance such foreign investment will have been obtained through bank credit.
Data from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Office suggest there are additional factors that may also be encouraging
greater resort to bank credit by firms. Specifically, firms are obtaining a far higher return than what borrowed funds are costing them,
whereby they are more interested in taking on debt than in resorting to equity financing. Thus, the greater leverage on borrowed re-
sources results in higher returns for shareholders. Further, the extensive creation of firms witnessed in recent years, the establishment of
which entails sizeable financing needs, may also explain a part of credit growth. This latter factor may likewise be affecting the growth of
credit to households, since there has been a strong increase in the number of individual entrepreneurs, who are classified under the
household sector.
Source: Banco de España.
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As for turnover on the financial markets, the
slowdown in the growth in the total supply of
marketable fixed-income securities on the p r i-
mary markets already seen in 1997 continued
in 1998. This slowdown is attributable to the
trend in assets issued by the State and, to a
lesser extent, by territorial government (see
Table IV.3). In fact, the lower Treasury borrow-
ing requirement helped to reduce its volume of
net issuance from EUR 15.5 billion (ESP 2.6
trillion) in 1997 to EUR 5.5 billion (ESP 0.9 tril-
lion) in 1998. As issuance was concentrated at
the medium and long terms, while the net is-
suance of Treasury bills was negative, there
was a significant shift in the composition of out-
standing debt towards the longer dates. By
year-end the average life of the debt had risen
from 3.5 to 5 years. The net issuance of territo-
rial government also slowed in relation to previ-
ous years, this being mainly attributable to the
assets issued by the Regional (Autonomous)
Governments. As in previous years, issuance
was concentrated on the medium and long
terms, although it was also here that the volume
of net issuance fell.
On the primary markets for the fixed-income
securities of other resident sectors, the volume
of net issuance, at EUR 4.8 billion (ESP 0.8 tril-
lion), was at a significantly higher level than in
previous years. This enabled the size of these
markets, until now little developed in Spain, to
grow considerably. The greater dynamism of
these markets in 1998 is explained principally
by the large issues of securitisation bonds in
the fourth quarter, which were stimulated (as
mentioned in Box IV.3) by the approval of a
new legal regulation. The favourable trend in
the commercial paper market was also notable.
The volume of net issuance was positive again,
after several years of decline in the stock of out-
standing paper.
Growth in the supply of new marketable se-
curities was highest in the equity markets,
where turnover exceeded EUR 18 billion (ESP
3 trillion). This is attributable both to the high
volume of public offerings for the second year
running (primarily due to the privatisation of
state-owned firms) and to capital increases
(which were much higher than in previous
years). According to the information available
on the distribution of placements, households
and to a lesser extent non-residents continued
to absorb a significant proportion of the new
supply of shares.
Developments on the primary markets as a
whole during 1998 significantly changed the
distribution of the supply of marketable securi-
ties: the relative weight of instruments issued by
general government fell, while that of instru-
ments issued by private firms rose, and there
was a significant increase, in absolute and rela-
tive terms, in equities. This was the result of a
number of factors of various kinds, which have
affected both the supply and the demand for
marketable securities. On the supply side, pri-
vatisation policy and the reduction in the fiscal
deficit have led to a strong increase in the sup-
ply of equities and a slowdown in State is-
suance, while the new regulation on securitisa-
tion has extended the range of instruments ca-
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CHART IV.5
Monetary and credit aggregates(a)
Source: Banco de España.
(a) 12-month rate on original series.
( b ) Domestic credit to general government plus outright
debt held by the public and direct financing.
(c) Domestic credit to households and firms plus commer-
cial paper and foreign direct credit.
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pable of being securitised and introduced
greater flexibility into such operations. On the
demand side, the greater stability of the Span-
ish economy and the lower nominal return on
low-risk assets have stimulated a shift from as-
sets issued by the State to others with a higher
expected return and, consequently, greater risk,
such as equities and fixed income securities is-
sued by private firms. Moreover, the inclusion of
some securities issued by private firms in the
lists of collateral eligible for the monetary policy
operations of the Eurosystem has boosted
credit institutions’ demand for these securities.
On the secondary markets,the behaviour of
turnover differed according to instruments and
markets (See Table IV.4). Thus, in the book-en-
try public debt market volumes continued to
grow in almost all types of trading, although at a
lower rate than in previous years. In the AIAF
fixed-income market, turnover reached
E U R 43.1 billion (ESP 7.2 trillion), double the
figure for the preceding year. On the stock mar-
ket, turnover in fixed-income fell to EUR 53.1
billion (ESP 8.8 trillion). By contrast, turnover in
equities rose again significantly for the third
year running, reaching EUR 261.3 billion
(ESP 43.5 trillion), 60% higher than in the pre-
ceding year. The upward trend in turnover on
this market is a consequence of investors’
growing interest in this type of securities, al-
though, as mentioned above, it has also been
helped by the strong increase in the supply of
marketable instruments.
On the derivatives markets he behaviour of
turnover varied with the nature of the underlying
asset. Thus, activity with contracts based on
fixed-income contracted significantly. This con-
traction, which was particularly intense in the fi-
nal quarter of 1998 and has continued in the
first few months of 1999, is explained by the
fact that the high correlation between interest
rates in the different euro area countries means
that fixed-income derivatives trading is tending
to shift to the larger markets. By contrast, activi-
ty with contracts based on equities continued to
grow, following a very similar profile to the spot
market. The behaviour of turnover in the two
segments mentioned resulted in a fall in the
overall turnover on MEFF markets to EUR 2.7
trillion (ESP 442.8 trillion).
Finally, it should be noted that, since the be-
ginning of 1999, cash and securities accounts
in all money and securities markets have been
re-denominated in euro as regards contracts,
pricing and settlement. This process has coin-
cided with the entry into force of the reform of
the Securities Market Law (Law 37/1998),
which adapts Spanish law to various Communi-
ty directives and opens up Spanish markets to
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CHART IV.6
Interest rates and spreads
Source: Banco de España.
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foreign competition, by establishing the princi-
ple of freedom of establishment and provision
of investment services within the EU.
IV.4. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
Although there has been a notable expan-
sion of organised financial markets in recent
years, the nature and characteristics of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism con-
tinue to depend largely on the behaviour and
decisions of the financial intermediaries. The
prominent role they play in the channelling of
flows of savings and financing means that they
have a significant impact upon agents’ spend-
ing decisions, at the same time as their activity
is very directly influenced by monetary policy
decisions. For both reasons, the behaviour of
the sector will be analysed below. In addition to
deposit money institutions, the sector includes
other intermediaries, such as mutual funds,
pension funds and insurance companies. This
section describes the changes in the main
items of the structure of their balance sheets
and, in the case of deposit money institutions,
attention is also given to their pricing policy and
their profit and loss accounts are briefly anal-
ysed.
The volume of funds channelled through fi-
nancial intermediaries (the credit system, port-
folio investment institutions, securities-dealer
companies and securities agencies, insurance
companies and pension funds) grew again in
1998, to reach the equivalent of 49 % of GDP, if
we consider the acquisition of assets and liabili-
ties together, the financial saving of all the fi-
nancial intermediaries being 0.9 % of GDP. De-
posit money institutions and portfolio invest-
ment institutions were the intermediaries that
contributed most to the growth in the financial
transactions of the sector (somewhat more than
80%). Of the other financial intermediaries, se-
curities-dealer companies and securities agen-
cies recorded the largest increase in the volume
of transactions.
IV.4.1. Deposit money institutions
The progress of deposit money institutions is
reflected in their balance sheet and profit and
loss account. As regards the former, the activity
of the deposit money institutions in 1998 was
characterised, once again, by the strong growth
of lending and by the need to raise funds to fi-
nance this growth, given the slower growth in
deposits as a result of the greater attractive-
ness of mutual funds. In consequence, foreign
currency borrowing, mainly through loans grant-
ed by non-resident credit institutions, continued
to be one of the main sources of funds for these
institutions, although its increase was mitigated
by the recovery in financing from the domestic
market and the Banco de España, the rate of
expansion of which was in line with the growth
of average total assets.
Considering the different items of the ass ts,
it was normal lending activity, net of doubtful
debts, that grew most in 1998. At an average
rate of 14.9 % in 1998 its growth was well
above the 8 % growth in average total assets.
As a result the share of lending in the average
total assets of the deposit money institutions
rose by 2.4 percentage points (see Table IV.5).
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CHART IV.7
Stock exchange indices
Sources: BIS and Banco de España.
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The component which contributed most to this
buoyancy was lending to the private sector
(“other resident sectors”), which increased its
weight in average total assets by somewhat
more than three percentage points, with aver-
age annual growth of 17.6 %. Lending to non-
residents also rose notably in 1998, although its
contribution to the growth of total lending was
much smaller. Lending to general government,
in contrast, grew at negative rates, continuing
the decline that began in 1997.
Another notable fact is that, during 1998,
there was a change in the relative importance
of lending in pesetas and in foreign currencies,
since the decline in interest rates on domestic
markets and the prospects for exchange-rate
stability boosted the demand for financing in pe-
setas. In 1998, all forms of lending grew strong-
ly, with the exception of discounting, which
nonetheless grew faster than in 1997. The most
buoyant component continue to be lending to
the resident private sector with security on
property, which grew at a rate of 20.3 % on av-
erage during the year.
Unlike in the case of lending, the weight of
portfolio investment in average total assets of
deposit money institutions fell again in 1998.
This was basically a result of the decline in the
stock of State debt, whose weight in the bal-
ance sheet fell by 1.2 percentage points (see
Table IV.5). By contrast, the equity portfolio
grew significantly, as a consequence of the rise
n holdings in group companies and other hold-
ings.
Among the other asset items, the most sig-
nificant change was in interbank market posi-
tions, which include forward accounts and re-
pos vis-à-vis other resident and non-resident
credit institutions, both in pesetas and foreign
currencies. The growth in these positions was
well below the average expansion of total as-
sets, due to the reduction in the stock of for-
ward accounts, basically vis-à-vis non-resident
institutions. The recovery in 1998 in repos only
partially offset this decline, so that interbank
market positions as a percentage of average to-
tal assets fell by 1.3 percentage points (see
Table IV.5). The other asset items grew at a
similar rate to average total assets so that there
was hardly any change in their weight in the
latter.
As regards the liabilities of deposit money in-
stitutions, some of the most characteristic fea-
tures of the previous year were sustained in
1998, although they were less pronounced.
Thus, the growth in foreign-currency denomi-
nated interbank loans (mostly granted by non-
resident credit institutions) continued, their
weight in the balance sheet rising by 0.6 per-
centage points, as compared with a rise of 1.8
percentage points in 1997. At the same time,
the financing obtained on the domestic market,
from the Banco de España and other credit in-
stitutions was practically unchanged as a per-
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TABLE IV.3
Issues and public offerings of marketable securities
EUR millions
Net issues 28,151 32,827 19,707 20,530
Fixed income 23,722 30,700 18,716 11,401
State 22.832 28.897 15.530 5.493
Territorial governments 2,013 1,977 2,194 1,064
Credit institutions (a) 1,046 793 2,572 1,370
Other resident sectors (b) –2,170 –968 –1,581 3,474
Equities 4,429 2,128 992 9,129
Credit institutions 577 204 210 4,868
Other resident sectors 3,852 1,923 781 4,261
Public offerings and underwritings (c) 1,575 1,376 8,271 9,236
Public offerings 1,575 1,376 8,099 8,852
Privatisations 1,260 1,224 7,316 8,138
Other 315 151 784 714
Public underwritings 0 0 171 385
Sources: CNMV and Banco de España.
(a) The short-term issues are the notes registered by the CNMV.
(b) The short-term issues are the notes placed via banks and savings banks.
(c) Includes only the domestic tranche.
1998199719961995
centage of average total assets, in contrast to
1997, when it fell by 1.6 percentage points.
One aspect which distinguishes the financ-
ing of the deposit money institutions in the last
two years is the change in the structure of funds
raised from clients. While to 1997, the weight in
average total assets of repos with the resident
private sector increased considerably, in 1998
there was a moderation in their rate of growth,
which stood at 4.1 % on average during the
year. This development is closely related to the
decline in money market funds (FIAMMs) – dis-
cussed below – as well as to the low volume of
government securities held by deposit money
institutions that are available to be assigned un-
der repos. Private sector funds in the form of
deposits showed signs, by contrast, of a no-
table recovery, increasing by almost 7 % on av-
erage during the year, well above the 2.7 %
rate of the previous year. This acceleration,
which was nonetheless clearly insufficient to
cover the growth in lending, stemmed primarily
from the behaviour of the banks, since savings
bank deposits grew by only 5.4 %. Foreign
branches played an important role in this pro-
cess, since they raised more than 40 % of the
increase in the bank deposits of the resident
private sector. A significant part of these funds
seems to come from Spanish insurance compa-
nies and non-financial firms. As in previous
years, the various types of deposits behaved
differently: while current and savings accounts
grew strongly, time deposits, denominated in
pesetas and in foreign currencies, hardly
changed.
As regards the institutions’ pricing policy,a
basic determinant of the profit and loss ac-
count, the interest rates set by the banks con-
tinued todecline during 1998, in line with the
reductions on money markets and public-debt
rates. Nonetheless, the reductions in the syn-
thetic lending and borrowing rates were more
moderate than in 1997. Unlike in that year,
both rates fell by a similar amount in 1998, so
that the spread between the synthetic lending
and borrowing rates tended to stabilise (see
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TABLE IV.4
Turnover on money and financial markets
EUR millions
Interbank deposit market 2,277,264 2,777,335 2,920,397 3,020,575
Government debt book-entry market (a) (b) 6,108,092 8,439,412 11,684,348 14,034,492
Spot 1,151,070 1,608,200 2,110,190 2,311,156
Repos 4,922,620 6,800,843 9,544,535 11,700,053
Forward 34,402 30,369 29,624 23,283
AIAF fixed-income market (a) 15,662 14,929 21,174 43,117
Commercial paper 5,103 3,474 4,447 7,933
Ordinary and securitisation bonds, long-term
bonds and mortgage-backed notes 8,877 8,823 10,950 28,758
Matador bonds 1,683 2,632 5,776 6,425
Fixed-income stock market (a) 31,824 78,071 54,217 53,141
Government debt 21,264 53,226 21,889 601
Territorial government debt 6,870 21,047 30,045 51,789
Other 3,690 3,798 2,284 751
Equities stock market 48,303 77,140 163,265 261,278
SIB 46,428 75,932 160,939 257,846
Ring trading 1,875 1,208 2,326 3,432
MEFF derivatives market (c) 1,353,045 2,284,027 3,283,376 2,661,316
Fixed income 1,288,570 2,194,385 3,012,657 2,111,987
Short-term 413,190 904,866 1,631,754 1,125,443
Medium and long-term 875,380 1,289,520 1,380,903 986,543
Equities (d) 64,475 89,642 270,719 549,329
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Nominal volumes.
(b) Only includes transactions with government securities.
(c) Volumes are expressed in monetary units and have been obtained by multiplying the number of contracts traded by their size.
(d) Does not include contracts involving on individual securities.
1995 1996 1997 1998
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BOX IV.3
The growth of securitisation in 1998
Asset securitisation involves the conversion of assets on a spe-
cific entity’s balance sheet into securities that may be transferred,
assigned or sold. This process, which has attained a high level of
expansion on the main financial markets, has developed belatedly
and fairly slowly in Spain. The year 1998 might, however, mark a
turning point in this respect. This box summarises the main reasons
potentially behind this change, indicating and putting into perspec-
tive the recent growth of this market.
In 1998 Royal Decree 926/1998, of May 14th, was approved.
This legislation included two new aspects which, at least potentially,
could significantly boost this market. First, the range of assets quali-
fying for securitisation was considerably broadened. Second, the
foundations were laid to improve the solvency of securitisation
funds; along with securitisation bonds, loans from credit institutions
and institutional investors (which are subsidiary to the former) were
allowed to be included in the liabilities of these funds.
Furthermore, these legal changes came about in a context in
which a series of factors were shaping a framework conducive to the
growth of this market in Spain. Thus, on the demand side, the grow-
ing “institutionalisation” of savings was considerably fuelling the de-
mand for marketable securities in Spain while, at the same time, the
application of the Stability and Growth Pact was laying the bases so
that the relative weight of public debt on Spanish financial markets
might be progressively reduced. Likewise, the growing stability of
the Spanish economy and the subsequent reduction in the nominal
return on lower-risk assets was beginning to encourage a switch to-
wards higher-risk investment strategies. Although all these factors
point to greater demand for private fixed-income securities, in gener-
al, securitisation bonds could benefit particularly in view of the scant
issues traditionally made by Spanish small and medium-sized non-
financial firms.
On the supply side, the main attraction of securitisation for fi-
nancial firms (which are the driving force behind the process) lies in
the opportunities provided to them to add flexibility to the structure of
their balance sheet. This greater flexibility is particularly attractive in
a setting of heightened competition such as that perceptible in the
euro area. Also, asset securitisation enables them to increase their
holdings of eligible assets as collateral for monetary policy loans.
In sum, the expansion of the Spanish market for securitised as-
sets began to become discernible in mid-1998. The initial data avail-
able on its growth in 1998 and in the first quarter of the current year
confirm this trend. At end-1998, the total outstanding balance
amounted to EUR 13.4 billion, 12.8 billion of which related to the se-
curitisation of assets from financial intermediaries. These figures
signify a growth rate of 45% on the previous year. The contrast with
prior-year growth is even more marked for the assets from financial
intermediaries (54 % growth in 1998) and, hereunder, for securitisa-
tion bonds, the outstanding balance of which has increased by 3.5
times. The forecasts for the first quarter of 1999 show higher growth
still.
In order to put this strong growth into perspective, the adjoining
chart respectively offers comparisons with the growth of the other
domestic fixed-income markets and with the growth of securitisation
in European countries. As the top half of the chart shows, the growth
of securitisation assets in 1998 was greater not only than the growth
of other private fixed-income assets but also than that of securities
traded on the market for book-entry debt. The chart also shows the
first signs of the loss of relative weight of the market for book-entry
debt, and the scant growth of private fixed income other than that
arising from securitisation. The lower half of the chart shows that
new issues on the Spanish market in 1998 accounted for somewhat
more than 10 % of the total issues on European markets (which
amounted to almost $ 47 billion), compared with a share of only 2.4
% the previous year.
In short, 1998 appears to mark a turning point in the hitherto slow development of securitisation in Spain. Given the scant issuance tradition of
Spanish firms, the growth of this market is particularly significant set against the current foreseeable growth in the demand for private fixed-income
securities, although the distance separating it from the main Spanish financial markets remains great. Thus, the end-1998 outstanding balance is
still far off the EUR 46 billion relating to the rest of the private fixed-income market (matador bonds included), and much more so from the almost
238 billion for book-entry debt or the over 286 billion corresponding to market capitalisation.
Securitisation assets in Spain. Outstanding balances
EUR millions
1995 6,495 1,203 7,698 0 7,698
1996 6,704 996 7,700 1,208 8,908
1997 6,910 1,422 8,332 926 9,258
1998 7,783 5,035 12,818 595 13,413
1999H1 (p) 7,777 7,140 14,917 505 15,422
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Includes short-term assets.
Total
(3)+(4)
Nuclear
moratorium
(4)
Total
fin. inst.
(3)=(1)+(2)
Securitisation
bonds (a)
(2)
Mortgage-backed
notes
(1)
Year
Sources: Moody’s and  Banco de España.
( a ) Excluding securities corresponding to the nuclear moratorium.
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ChartIV.8), after several years in which it had
been gradually narrowing.
Analysis of the profit and loss accounti n
1998 shows a moderation in the rate of decline
of net interest income in relation to total assets,
although interest expenses continued to fall
less than interest income. Nonetheless, signifi-
cant differences were observed between banks
and savings banks, with the deterioration in net
interest income being much greater in the case
of the latter.
The fall in total net interest income was al-
most completely passed through to gross in-
come, since the favourable performance of
commissions was offset by the decline in profits
on financial operations. The commissions which
grew most continued to be those obtained from
the marketing of non-banking products, such as
mutual funds, pension funds and insurance.
In 1998, the total combined net income of
banks and savings banks declined further in re-
lation to average total assets. However, in the
case of banks it held steady, while in that of
savings banks it declined notably. Overall, the
reduction in the net income of deposit money
institutions in relation to total assets was some-
what more moderate than in the previous year.
One factor which provides a partial explanation
is the slower growth of operating expenses in
1998 (4.4 %, against 5.2 % in 1997), although
the rate is still higher than in previous years. In
recent years, the increase in operating expens-
es has been governed by the behaviour of staff
costs. In 1998, however, staff costs slowed by
more than operating expenses as a whole, with
overheads accelerating in relation to recent
years. Investment carried out to ensure that
computer systems can deal with the introduc-
tion of the euro and are year 2000 compliant –
apparent in the strong growth in the “comput-
ing” and “communications” items in 1998 – al-
most completely explains this acceleration. The
result of these developments has been a slight
decline in operating expenses in relation to
gross income, a return to the pattern of recent
years which had been departed from in 1997.
The magnitude of provisions for write-downs
and special funds per unit of assets in 1998 en-
tailed a reduction in the rate of decline that had
prevailed over the previous five years. This was
a result both of the increase in provisions to se-
curities fluctuation funds and the lower rate of
decline of provisions for bad and doubtful debts.
However, despite the increase in write-offs and
provisions, their weight in the balance sheet fell
again last year. This, together with the growth
of other income, basically due to sales of secu-
rities held as investments, enabled pre-tax prof-
its to rise by more than average total assets.
Analysis of the profit and loss accountof the
deposit-money institutions in 1998 confirms,
once again, a phenomenon that has prevailed
for several years. Despite the reduction in mar-
gins in relation to the size of the balance sheet,
pre-tax profits per unit of assets continue to in-
crease; while in 1994 they represented 0.75 %,
in 1998 they were equivalent to 0.93 %. A deci-
sive factor in explaining this behaviour is the
decline in provisions for write-downs in relation
to average total assets, stemming from the sig-
nificant reduction in default indices (see Chart
IV.9). It seems unlikely that this trend can be
sustained for much longer, however, given the
very low levels these indices have reached.
Nonetheless, there are other factors making for
moderately optimistic expectations of future
profitability. First, the gross return on capital
sustained, in 1998, the upward path of recent
years, to stand at 16.23 %. Second, the im-
provement in the profitability ratios of the con-
solidated statements reflects the significant
contribution to the profits of banking groups
from their subsidiaries, among which mutual
fund management companies and the financial
institutions acquired in Latin America are no-
table. Box IV.4 provides specific information on
the process of internationalisation of the activity
of Spanish credit institutions and on the way in
which they are addressing the risks arising from
such activity.
IV.4.2. Other financial intermediaries
In recent years non-bank financial intermedi-
aries have developed significantly. These in-
clude: portfolio investments institutions, which
manage professionally the portfolios of a large
number of investors (e.g. securities funds); cap-
italisation and savings institutions, whose re-
turns are used to cover retirement (pension
funds); and institutions which offer products to
cover certain contingencies or risks. This set of
institutions constitutes an important alternative
for the investment of the savings of economic
agents and their decisions are influential in the
financial markets, given the volume of funds
they manage. For these reasons, this section
analyses the recent trends in the net asset val-
ue and investments of this set of intermediaries,
also known as institutional investors.
The net asset value of mutual fundsg r e w
trongly in 1998, increasing by EUR 41.3 billion
(ESP 6,876 billion), to reach EUR 203.8 billion
(ESP 33,905 billion) at the end of the year. This
increase was less than in 1997, although similar
to that which took place in 1996. The divergent
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TABLE IV.5
Deposit money institutions
Structure of balance sheet and profit and loss account
% of average total assets
ASSETS:
Cash and banks (b) 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.2
Interbank market assets (c) 26.5 25.2 32.0 31.0 16.7 15.2
Lending 44.8 47.2 41.2 42.9 51.1 54.2
General government 4.3 3.4 3.9 3.2 5.3 3.9
Other resident sectors 36.1 39.3 31.6 33.7 43.6 48.3
Non-residents 3.1 3.6 4.6 5.3 0.5 0.8
Doubtful assets 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.2
Securities portfolio 20.6 19.6 19.3 18.5 23.8 22.3
Of which:
Government debt 12.9 11.7 11.5 10.6 16.0 14.1
Equities 3.8 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.7 4.3
Other assets (d) 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.1 6.0
LIABILITIES:
Credit and savings institutions and Banco de España (e) 30.4 31.0 41.7 41.7 10.7 12.8
Peseta borrowing 19.1 9.0 25.3 25.0 8.2 8.8
Foreign-currency borrowing 11.3 11.9 16.4 16.7 2.5 4.0
Asset repo sales to other resident sectors 11.2 10.8 9.5 9.1 15.2 14.6
Other customer funds 45.5 45.3 35.9 36.0 61.7 60.1
Accounts payable: general government 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.4
Accounts payable: other resident sectors 36.7 36.3 25.5 25.7 55.3 53.3
Accounts payable: non-residents 4.8 4.9 6.5 6.7 1.9 1.9
Borrowing 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.4 2.1 2.5
Own funds, special reserves and other accounts 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.2 12.4 12.5
Of which:
Subordinated financing 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.1 0.6 0.8
(+) Interest income 6.67 5.70 6.50 5.62 6.94 5.82
(–) Interest expenses 4.25 3.39 4.56 3.70 3.74 2.88
Net interest income 2.42 2.31 1.94 1.91 3.20 2.94
(+) Commissions 0.60 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.58 0.64
(+) Profits on financial operations 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.13 0.13 0.15
Gross income 3.22 3.12 2.80 2.73 3.91 3.73
(–) Operating expenses 2.08 2.01 1.85 1.78 2.45 2.38
Net income 1.14 1.11 0.94 0.95 1.46 1.35
(–) Write-downs and provisions 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.38 0.55 0.46
(+) Other income 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.30
Pre-tax profit 0.90 0.93 0.74 0.76 1.16 1.19
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Pre-tax profit
(as a % of own funds) 15.58 16.23 13.74 14.75 18.45 18.52
Average total assets (EUR millions) 831,897 898,838 533,771 572,224 271,507 297,243
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Banks, savings banks, and credit co-operatives. Total turnover figures, including foreign branches of banks.
(b) Includes cash and central banks (except repos) and credit and savings institutions (except forward accounts, repos and securities
lending).
(c) Includes credit and savings institutions (except forward accounts, repos and securities lending).
(d) Includes premises and equipment, and other asset accounts.
(e) Includes all financing from credit and savings institutions and Banco de España.
Total (a)
1997 1998 1998 19981997 1997
Banks Savings banks
behaviour in 1998 of the net asset value of
money market funds (FIAMMs) and other secu-
rities funds (FIMs) (see Chart IV.10) was no-
table. The net asset value of the former fell by
EUR 10,5 billion, while that of the latter in-
creased by EUR 51.8 billion. Two very different
factors underlie this result: the revaluation of
FIMs as a result of the decline in interest rates;
and, above all, very different volumes of net in-
vestment (negative in the case of FIAMMs and
positive in that of FIMs (see Table IV.6)). The
declining returns offered by FIAMMs in recent
years (see Chart IV.10) and the expectations
that FIMs will continue to provide higher returns
in future were, probably, the main reasons ex-
plaining the difference in the funds invested in
these two types of mutual funds.
A second aspect characterising the be-
haviour of FIMs in 1998 was the expansion of
equity funds and international funds. At the end
of 1998, they represented 12 % and 10 %, re-
spectively, of the total net asset value managed
by mutual funds, having represented only 9 %
and 3 % at end-1997. The weight of guaranteed
funds also increased during the year.
In 1998, there were also important changes
in the composition of the portfolios of mutual
funds. Both FIMs and FIAMMs reduced the
share of repos in their portfolios (see Chart
IV.10) and increased the weight of investments
in foreign-issued assets. This adjustment in the
investments of the funds was due, among other
actors, to the shortage of public-debt securities
held by deposit-money institutions available to
be assigned, and the general insufficiency of a
wide range of domestic marketable securities
with which to meet the growing demand for this
ype of asset from Spanish institutional in-
vestors. Moreover, the international financial
crisis led fund managers to moderate the
growth of the equity portfolio and, given the
above-mentioned shortage of securities in the
domestic market, there was a strong increase in
holdings of foreign fixed-income securities.
As for pension funds,their net asset value
continued to grow at high rates in 1998. On in-
formation provided by the Directorate General
for Insurance and INVERCO, the net asset val-
ue of pension funds rose by almost 25 % last
year, an increase of about EUR 5.3 billion (ESP
900 billion) (see Table IV.6). Although this fig-
ure represents a relatively small volume of
funds, in comparison with the amount raised by
other financial intermediaries such as mutual
funds, it is nonetheless a significant amount in
absolute terms and comparable in magnitude to
the changes in the mathematical reserves of in-
surance companies in previous years (see
Table IV.6).
According to the latest data on the balance
sheet of the insurance companies, correspond-
ing to 1997, the mathematical reserves of the
sector sustained steady growth of close to 22 %
in the last three years for which information is
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CHART IV.8
Interest rates: banks
and savings banks
Source: Banco de España.
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Non-performing assets and the economic cycle (a)
Banks and savings banks
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Ratio of non-performing assets to credit in pesetas.
(b) Sign reversed.
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available. The estimates available for 1998 indi-
cate a rather more moderate increase. This
may be explained by certain investors waiting to
take out single premium insurance in order to
take advantage of the more favourable tax
treatment which the latest reform of personal in-
come tax grants to this type of transaction.
According to the Annual financial accounts,
the structure of the financial assets of pension
funds and insurance companies is charac-
terised by the large weight of fixed-income in-
vestments. However, their importance has been
declining in the last three years for which full in-
formation is available (see Chart IV.10). By con-
trast, the importance of bank deposits and equi-
ties has been growing. Likewise, the informa-
tion available for 1998 on the investments of
pension funds suggests that there has been a
certain shift towards external assets in the
fixed-income and equity portfolio of the sector
as a whole, with the external portfolio of pen-
sion funds reaching 18 % in 1998. At the same
time, the share of equities in the total invest-
ments of these intermediaries rose from 8.6 %
in 1996 to 23 % in 1998.
The information available for 1998 shows a
significant shift towards external assets and eq-
uities in the investments of this set of financial
intermediaries. This indicates the commence-
ment of a process of greater international diver-
sification of their portfolios and a search for
higher returns than those offered by the mar-
kets for fixed-income securities, traditionally the
mainstay of their investments. When explaining
this change in the investment policy of insur-
ance companies and pension funds, the slow-
down in the supply of domestic fixed-income
securities referred to above needs to be taken
into account. In this respect, general govern-
ment has been significantly moderating the rate
of net issuance of public debt, and placements
of private fixed-income securities by national is-
suers are still at very modest levels. 
IV.5. SAVING AND ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL FLOWS
In 1998, the financing capacity of the Span-
ish economy vis-à-vis the rest of the world was
positive for the fourth consecutive year, al-
though at 0.9 % of GDP it was less than in pre-
vious years. In terms of financial saving by sec-
tor, this outcome was the result of a decline in
the saving of households and firms, owing to
the buoyancy of consumption and investment,
which was only partially offset by the greater
saving of general government (see Chart
IV.11), stemming from the drive to contain the
fiscal deficit. A detailed analysis is set out below
of the contribution of each sector, as well as of
the economic and financial flows with the rest of
he world through the balance of payments.
IV.5.1 Households and firms
In 1998, the financing capacity of the non-fi-
nancial private sector fell to 2 % of GDP, from
3.3 % in 1997. It thus continued along the
downward path that commenced in 1995, when
this variable stood at 7 % of GDP. In the case
of firms, their financing capacity fell from 0.3 %
in 1997 to –0.7 % in 1998, the first time since
1992 that it had been negative. This reduction
in financing capacity was due both to a reduc-
tion in firms’ gross saving and to an increase in
gross capital formation. If the flows of firms’ fi-
nancial assets and liabilities are analysed to-
gether with these variables, it can be seen that
in recent years there has been an increase in
the liabilities contracted by firms, which, along
with gross saving, have financed not only gross
fixed capital formation, but also growing acqui-
sition of financial assets. As analysed in more
detail below, a significant part of these assets
represents foreign direct investment by firms,
so that their investment activity, taking into ac-
count this external dimension, would be more
dynamic in recent years than the figures for
gross fixed capital formation suggest (see Chart
IV.12).
In terms of net financial saving (which is ob-
tained from the financial assets and liabilities of
the sectors and which, therefore, may not ex-
actly coincide with the figures for financing ca-
pacity, which come from the use of income and
capital accounts), that of non-financial firms fell
slightly, in comparison with previous years, to
–1 % of GDP(1).
Although firms’ net financial saving was neg-
ative, the increase in the value of their equity
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( 1 ) In theory, the balance of the financial transactions
account, i.e. the net financial saving of any sector, should
match the balance of the capital account, i.e. the financing
capacity or requirements of the sector in question. In prac-
tice discrepancies arise between these two measurements,
basically with respect to the balances of “Non-financial
firms” and “Households”. The reasons for the discrepancy
between the balances of the non-financial and financial ac-
counts are of a statistical nature: different preparation
timetables, different sources for the base statistics, different
compilers and, even, different institutional definitions of the
two sectors between one approximation and the other (See
Scheme 1 of the Methodological notes at the beginning of
the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy 1989-
1998).The size of these discrepancies is expected to be re-
duced with the forthcoming introduction of ESA 95. In any
case, it should be taken into account that the profiles of the
historic series of both balances in the two sectors men-
tioned are similar.
holdings has led to a continuous increase in
their net financial wealth,defined as the differ-
ence between the balances of financial assets
and liabilities (see Chart IV.13). The increase
has been very significant in recent years, partic-
ularly in 1998, and stems from the rise in the
prices of equities, which represent about 28 %
of all the financial assets of the sector. In addi-
tion to the increase in the financial wealth of the
sector, interest payments as a percentage of
gross operating profit, which may give an indi-
cation of the risks associated with the level of
indebtedness, fell from 42 % in 1992 to 22 % in
1998.
By instrument, it is seen that a portion of the
new financial assets of firms does indeed corre-
spond to equities (see Table IV.7). It is also es-
tablished that the acquisition of equities issued
by foreign firms exceeds the total acquisition of
this type of instrument, which suggests that
Spanish firms have reduced their holdings in
domestic firms. Part of the explanation for this
may lie in the privatisations carried out in 1998,
which have entailed a fall in the balance of the
equities held by certain companies (such as the
State Industrial Holdings Company (SEPI)), in
whose accounts the shares of the privatised
public-sector companies were recorded. In turn,
the boom in direct investment since 1997, con-
centrated on Latin America, may be interpreted
as a response by non-financial firms to the new
environment of macroeconomic stability, to the
completion of the single European market, to
growing international economic integration and
to the possibilities of obtaining higher returns in
less mature markets than the Spanish one. This
behaviour has also been stimulated by the
favourable credit conditions prevailing in Spain,
with historically low and foreseeably stable in-
terest rates. At the same time, the favourable
treasury position of firms has been reflected in
the growth of their deposits, which rose by 4.4
percentage points of GDP, as against increases
of around 2.5 percentage points of GDP in the
previous two years.
On the liabilities side, bank lending by do-
mestic credit institutions to firms was around
40% of GDP, slightly below the level prevailing
a decade ago (46 % in 1989). In any event, it
should be noted that lending from the rest of the
world expanded strongly in 1998, increasing by
1.7% relative to GDP. This suggests that Span-
ish firms’ strategy of direct investment abroad
may partly have been financed by foreign bor-
rowing.
It should also be noted that the gross is-
suance of securities, which represented 0.5 %
of GDP in 1996 and 1997, rose to 2.5 % of
GDP in 1998. Admittedly, this is still a moderate
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CHART IV.10
Institutional inverstors
Sources: CNMV and Banco de España.
(a) Cumulative return over last 12 months.
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BOX IV.4
The internationalisation of Spanish banks
In recent years, the progressive liberalisation of capital movements, the growing globalisation of economic and financial activity and
the ongoing consolidation of the single market for financial services in Europe have prompted a general tendency towards a greater de-
gree of internationalisation of banking activity. This has been reflected in an increase in the relative weight of activity with non-residents
and/or in foreign currency on bank balance sheets.
The Spanish banking system has also been party to this tendency. As the adjoining table shows, the relative weight of Spanish
banks’ activity with non-residents and/or in foreign currency under the most significant captions of their balance sheets has increased.
Nonetheless, if activity through subsidiaries is not considered, the increase in international activity has been limited and has focused par-
ticularly on two areas: interbank financing and, to a lesser extent, lending and deposit activity. Moreover, the growth of both has been
more influenced by factors specific to the Spanish banking system than by the factors that have driven the internationalisation process.
However, if activity through the foreign subsidiaries of Spanish banking groups is taken into consideration, the degree of internation-
alisation rises significantly, with increases of almost six percentage points in assets and almost nine points in resources obtained be-
tween 1995 and 1998. The increase in international activity has been much sharper in the case of banks and, hereunder, it has been the
biggest institutions behind most of the increase, concentrating almost 70 % of the Spanish banking system’s international activity.
These figures highlight the fact that the internationalisation of the Spanish banking system has come about mainly through the ac-
quisition of subsidiaries abroad, and not through direct action by Spanish banking institutions. Indeed, the principal factor behind the in-
crease in the international activity of the main Spanish banking groups has been the process of expansion in Latin-American financial
markets via the acquisition of majority stakes in the financial institutions established in these countries. The heightened presence of
Spanish banks in the area responds to a strategy geared to consolidating long-term investments in (mainly) majority holdings enabling
them to control the management of the investee entities. Moreover, the goodwill arising on these purchases is subject to accelerated
amortisation and the exchange rate risk and country risk associated with these investments is being covered. Lastly, the financial posi-
tion of the investee entities is generally sound, since investments have mainly targeted the entities best positioned in their respective
sectors. As a result of the foregoing, the risks associated with these investments have been limited.
In the future, the Spanish banking system’s degree of internationalisation is expected to continue increasing, since it is still at low
levels compared with other European countries (approximately half that of France or Germany). The main reason for these differences
lies in the scant significance of the smallest banking institutions’ activity abroad. Along with investment in emerging countries, it is also
highly likely that, as the degree of integration of European financial markets progressively increases, Spanish banking institutions will in-
crease their business with institutions and customers established in other euro-area countries.
Admittedly, the increase in international activity makes the control of risks associated with banking business more difficult as it
spreads to countries and markets with widely differing regulations and practices. Moreover, the knowledge of such new markets is com-
paratively less, foreign exchange risks increase in the case of markets outside the euro area and, in many cases, operations are under-
taken in economies with higher country-risk levels. Accordingly, this process requires that both banks and the supervisory authorities
should reinforce risk control mechanisms. However, the process will also enable banks to diversify their sources of finance and their in-
vestment to a greater extent. 
Internationalisation of the Spanish banking system (a)
EXCLUDING SUBSIDIARIES. AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVITY:
Activity with non-residents
Lending(b) 7.27 7.75 9.20 9.88
Deposits(b) 8.41 8.68 8.80 9.58
Credit institutions: asset-side accounts 46.24 44.84 40.42 39.06
Credit institutions: liabilities-side accounts 28.39 35.23 40.45 41.94
Total activity with non-residents (c) 19.34 19.23 19.78 19.94
Activity in foreign currency
Lending(b) 7.65 8.43 9.88 10.52
Deposits(b) 5.47 5.41 6.12 7.66
Activity with credit institutions (d) 31.24 32.37 35.74 34.17
Total assets 15.31 15.52 16.62 16.09
INCLUDING SUBSIDIARIES. AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS:
Activity with non-residents
Total assets(e) 21.58 22.36 26.78 27.22
Subsidiaries 3.35 4.72 9.97 10.63
Direct 18.91 18.45 17.80 17.44
Total funds(e) 16.24 19.46 24.09 25.14
Subsidiaries 2.57 3.03 5.62 5.65
Direct 13.66 16.43 18.47 19.49
MEMORANDUM ITEM. AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS:
Banks
Total assets(e) 27.59 29.62 36.66 37.52
Total funds(e) 21.99 27.29 33.88 35.57
Savings banks
Total assets(e) 9.33 8.21 7.45 8.67
Total funds(e) 4.53 4.21 4.91 6.36
(a) Banks and savings banks.
(b) Operations with credit institutions are excluded.
(c) The total is calculated for all those captions in which there is breakdown of activity with non-residents.
(d) Sum of asset- and liabilities-side accounts with credit institutions.
(e) Also includes activity with credit institutions.
1998199719961995
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level, but it does involve an increased presence
on the part of Spanish firms on the securities
markets and it is consistent with the process of
disintermediation taking place in Spain. In this
respect, the positive net issuance of fixed-in-
come securities – short-term securities and
bonds – is especially significant, as already ex-
plained in this chapter, given that the outstand-
ing stock of such securities has been falling
continuously since 1990. As regards equities,
as seen in Section IV.3, the favourable stock
market situation in the first half of 1998 and the
positive economic outlook significantly boosted
issuance and increases in capital.
As in the case of firms, the decline in the fi-
nancing capacity of households (from 3 % in
1997 to 2.7 % in 1998) stemmed from both a
reduction in their gross saving and a slight in-
crease in investment. Joint consideration of fi-
nancial flows, gross saving and residential in-
vestment shows that, in recent years, the in-
creasing incurrence of financial liabilities by
households has been reflected in greater accu-
mulation of assets, as seen in Chart IV.12. As
in the case of non-financial firms, the net finan-
cial wealthof households has risen continuous-
ly since 1992, to reach a current level of 91 %
of GDP (see Chart IV.14). The revaluation of
equities (shares and mutual funds) has played
a prominent role in this increase during the last
two years. The revaluation effect also appears
to have been progressively stronger, since
households have been channelling their invest-
ments towards equities, long-term fixed-income
securities and foreign securities, all of which are
assets whose prices are most sensitive to
changes in interest rates and exchange rates.
As regards the breakdown of households’ fi-
nancial assets by instrument, there has been a
certain polarisation of demand (see Table IV.7).
On one hand, the reduction in the inflation rate
and interest rates to very low levels and confi-
ence in the stability of these trends have led to
a reduction in the opportunity cost of holding
very liquid assets, such as cash and sight de-
posits. At the same time, the decline in the in-
terest rates paid on bank deposits and fixed-in-
come securities (particularly public debt), which
have traditionally represented the bulk of the
sector’s investments, has prompted households
to seek alternative investments, offering higher
expected returns, but possibly with greater risk.
Accordingly, there has been a very notable in-
crease in the acquisition of shares, both directly
and through mutual funds. As a result, house-
holds’ holdings of shares now represent 29 %
of GDP and 18 % of their total financial assets.
Adding households’ indirect holdings through
mutual funds gives a total figure for shares held
by households of 32 % of GDP, which is equiv-
alent to one fifth of all the financial assets of this
ector.
TABLE IV.6
Funds raised by other financial intermadiaries
EUR millions
Total 8,003 41,390 52,692 — —
Pension funds
(change in net asset value) 2,682 4,270 4,500 5,253 27,147
Insurance companies
(change in mathematical provisions) 5,351 6,343 7,905 — —
Securities funds
(net subscriptions) (a) –30 30,777 40,287 28,166 203,774
FIAMMs 3,237 11,668 1,532 –12,267 50,643
FIMs –3,267 19,109 38,755 40,433 153,131
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Deposit money institutions
(change in customer funds) (b) 45,286 24,491 32,160 24,858 519,250
Deposit money institutions (change
in other resident sectors’ funds) (c) 43,399 21,084 25,339 15,795 434,922
Sources: Banco de España (Cuentas financieras anuales), Dirección General de Seguros, INVERCO and CNMV.
(a) In the “Balances” column is the net asset value.
(b) Includes the total of the items accounts payable and borrowings.
(c) Includes accounts payable of other resident sectors.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1998Balances
The search for higher returns, together with
the greater facilities for and attractions of in-
vesting abroad, deriving from the growing finan-
cial integration and exchange rate stability with-
in Europe, have also led to a significant expan-
sion in the acquisition of assets issued by non-
residents. In 1998 the stock of such assets held
by households rose to 13 % of GDP. Most of
this foreign investment has been channelled
through institutional investors.
This polarisation of households’ demand for
financial assets towards, on one hand, very liq-
uid assets and, on the other, shares and foreign
securities, may have repercussions on the
spending capacity of agents and on the work-
ings of the financial system. As regards the for-
mer, the larger holdings of very liquid assets
are, by their very nature, capable of financing
households’ spending decisions with ease. As
regards the latter, the increase in the holdings
of financial instruments which are very sensitive
to changes in interest rates and in economic
prospects introduces a novel element into the fi-
nancial position of households. This may help
to strengthen the transmission of monetary poli-
cy, but also to increase its sensitivity in periods
of uncertainty or in the event of unfavourable
developments in the economic or financial envi-
ronment. Finally, the greater demand for instru-
ments not intermediated by the credit system
has led credit institutions to resort to foreign
borrowing to cover the gap between their de-
posits and lending, as mentioned in Section
IV.4. In any event, the approximation of the tax
treatment of medium and long-term deposits to
that of mutual funds may help to halt this trend
and stimulate the demand for bank time de-
posits.
Among the other financial assets of house-
holds, their continuous investment in financial
insurance products over the past decade is no-
table. It is true that the aim of these products,
which is to cover, through constant saving, the
uncertainty of retirement, among other risks,
makes it difficult for them to absorb a high per-
centage of the gross saving of the sector. Yet
their very nature generates a flow of constant
saving, which in recent years has represented
almost 3 % of GDP per annum. Probably, the
fact that these assets have not increased more
strongly is also due to the financial and tax ad-
vantages which mutual funds have enjoyed in
recent years, making them the preferred instru-
ment, even over insurance, to cover certain
risks. However, at the end of 1998 the financial
insurance products of households stood at
20 % of GDP, which is equal to 13 % of the to-
tal assets held by households.
As regards households’ liabilities, the sus-
tained increase in bank credit, which represent-
ed at end-1998 45 % of GDP, as against 35 %
ten years previously, is notable. In 1998, in ad-
dition to the strong growth in recent years of fi-
nancing for house purchases, there was a
strong expansion in credit to finance consumer
durables and other purposes, which may be re-
lated to pleasure, education or, even, the acqui-
sition of other financial assets. However, if the
risk associated with this level of indebtedness is
assessed in terms of the capacity of agents to
pay the interest accruing, as was done in the
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CHART IV.11
Net financial saving and the internationalisation
of the economy
Source: Banco de España.
( a ) Including assets vis-à-vis rest of the world indirectly
held by households and firms through mutual funds and insur-
ance companies.
(b) Assets less liabilities of deposit money institutions vis-à-
vis rest of the world.
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case of firms, the situation of households has
improved as a consequence of the increase in
disposable income and the reduction in interest
rates. Thus, while in 1991 6 % of the disposable
income of households had to be allocated to in-
terest payments, that percentage had fallen to
3.5% in 1998.
As to the composition of the intersectoral
flows of households, the reduction in their net fi-
nancial saving, which fell from 6 % of GDP on
average in 1996 and 1997 to 2.9 % in 1998, did
not give rise to a reduction in their acquisition of
assets. On the contrary, the latter grew at a
higher rate than GDP and consequently house-
holds had to increase their net liabilities vis-à-
vis credit institutions significantly. Compared to
the balance maintained on average in recent
years they rose by an amount equivalent to
5.5 % of GDP at end-1998. At the same time,
households have increased their asset position
vis-à-vis institutional investors (mutual funds
and insurance companies) by 8.5 % of GDP in
1998. This has supplied funds to such investors
to acquire financial instruments issued by non-
residents. Finally, households have also directly
increased their asset position vis-à-vis the ex-
CHART IV.12
Use of financial resources by non-financial firms and households
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Extended gross capital formation is calculated as the sum of gross capital formation plus foreign equities. This item is subtracted
from assets to give the adjusted assets.
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ternal sector, principally through the delocation
of deposits.
IV.5.2. General government
In 1998 there was an increase in the gross
saving of general government. The relatively
stable public investment ratio enabled this in-
crease to be translated into a reduction in the
borrowing requirement of the sector, as already
discussed in detail in Section IV.2.1. In terms of
balances, in 1998, as in 1997, there was a re-
duction in the net debtor position of general
government. In terms of the Excessive Deficit
Protocol, general government debt as a per-
centage of GDP fell, from the high reached in
1996 (70.4 %), to 69.3 % in 1997 and 67.4 % in
1998.
By instrument, it should be noted that the
more stable economic and financial conditions
prevailing also had a bearing on the financial
behaviour of general government, accentuating
the trends of recent years (see Chart IV.15).
Specifically, the existence of low medium and
long-term interest rates and more liquid and
deeper debt markets have been conducive, as
mentioned in Section IV.3, to the progressive
lengthening of the maturity at issue of public
debt since the beginning of the nineties. More-
over, the introduction of strippable debt in July
1997, which abolishes withholdings on coupons
for investors who are legal persons, has further
boosted the demand for medium and long-term
public debt. As a result, short-term securities
now only represent 16 % of the liabilities of gen-
eral government, as against 50 % ten years
ago.
With regard to State financing, specific men-
tion should be made of the use by the Treasury
of its deposit with the Banco de España as a
mechanism to cushion fluctuations in the timing
of the State’s receipts and expenses. The prohi-
bition, since 1994, on the Banco de España’s fi-
nancing general government has required the
Treasury to establish a relatively high balance
on its current account with the Banco de Es-
paña to enable it to cope with possible cash
flow shortages, without needing to raise short-
term funds on the market. In the last two years,
for example, the balance on this current ac-
count hardly fell below EUR 6 billion (somewhat
less than ESP 1 trillion). Moreover, the Trea-
sury has attempted to stabilise the rate of is-
suance of securities, especially in the medium
and long-term segments, so that the market al-
ways has an adequate stock of public securi-
ties. As a result, since 1996, the Treasury has
set issuance targets for its bond auctions. To
the extent that these targets have not been fully
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CHART IV.13
Financial wealth of non-financial firms
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Excludes shares.
(b) Includes both resident and non-resident shares, contri-
butions to mutual funds, and other equity.
(c) Calculated as assets revaluation less liabilities revalua-
tion (excluding shares).
(d) Includes resident and non-resident institutions.
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TABLE IV.7
Financial transactions
EUR millions and %
Net financial saving –0.6 –0.8 –1.0
Net change in financial assets 4.9 7.4 11.1
Net change in financial liabilities 5.5 8.3 12.1
Net financial saving –2,497 –3,952 –5,137
As a % of GDP –0.6 –0.8 –1.0
Net change in financial assets 21,857 34,709 54,946
As a % of GDP 4.9 7.4 11.1
Cash and transferable deposits 0.6 2.4 3.3
Other deposits 2.0 0.0 1.1
Of which: rest of the world 0.8 1.5 2.3
Short-term securities and bonds –0.1 0.4 0.3
Equities 1.6 0.5 1.5
Of which: rest of the world 0.7 1.2 2.0
Credit 0.6 2.9 3.4
Insurance technical reserves and other 0.1 1.3 1.5
Net change in financial liabilities 24,354 38,660 60,082
As a % of GDP 5.5 8.3 12.1
Short-term scurities and bonds –0.4 –0.3 0.9
Equities 1.0 0.8 1.7
Credit 2.9 7.2 9.0
Of which:
Credit institutions 1.9 4.5 4.9
Trade credit 1.0 2.6 2.4
Rest of the world 0.0 0.1 1.7
Insurance technical reserves and other 1.9 0.5 0.5
Net financial saving 5.3 4.2 2.9
Net change in financial assets 8.5 10.3 11.1
Net change in financial liabilities 3.2 6.1 8.2
Net financial saving 23,540 19,702 14,474
As a % of GDP 5.3 4.2 2.9
Net change in financial assets 37,870 48,259 55,106
As a % of GDP 8.5 10.3 11.1
Cash and transferable deposits 0.9 1.0 0.9
Other deposits –0.4 –1.8 –0.2
Of which: rest of the world 0.0 0.2 0.2
Short-term scurities and bonds –0.6 –0.2 –0.7
Equities 7.1 10.0 7.5
Of which: shares in mutual funds 7.3 8.6 5.9
Insurance technical reserves 2.7 2.9 2.8
Credit and other –1.2 –1.5 0.7
Net change in financial liabilities 14,330 28,556 40,632
As a % of GDP 3.2 6.1 8.2
Credit 1.8 5.2 7.4
Of which
Credit institutions 3.5 4.8 6.8
Trade credit –1.9 0.0 0.1
Rest of the world 0.3 0.4 0.4
Other 1.4 0.9 0.8
MEMORANDUM ITEM: ASSETS, INCLUDING
THOSE HELD THROUGH FUNDS:
Shares –0.1 2.8 3.0
Cumulative balance 14.2 23.5 32.2
Assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world 0.8 2.3 6.1
Cumulative balance 5.2 7.4 13.1
Source: Banco de España.
1996 1997 1998
HOUSEHOLDS
NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS
adjusted to the timing of receipts and expenses
of the State, the Treasury’s deposit at the Ban-
co de España has been used more intensively,
both to cover the lack of funds to finance public
spending and to take up the excess financing
obtained by the Treasury on the market. The
latter has been rather common in recent years
and, in particular, in 1998, when the balance of
the Treasury’s deposit exceeded EUR 18 billion
(approximately, ESP 3 trillion) for a large part of
the second half.
As for general government, its net financial
borrowing as a percentage of GDP fell again in
1998, to stand at 0.2 %. With respect to the
composition of the financial liabilities of the sec-
tor, the decrease in funds obtained from the se-
curities markets and, in particular, from the is-
suance of bonds, which was less than half the
annual net issuance in the period 1993-1997,
was notable. By contrast, bank credit rose mod-
erately in 1998. As to its composition, the bal-
ance of credit from domestic credit institutions
fell, while foreign currency credit from non-resi-
dent institutions rose significantly. In terms of
stocks, credit in pesetas from credit institutions
continues to make up the bulk of the financial li-
abilities of the sector, with a share of 47 %,
while credit financing from the rest of the world
is only 8 %. Issued securities, primarily medium
and long-dated, constitute 30 % of all general
government liabilities.
Breaking down the stocks of general govern-
ment liabilities by holder shows that the activity
of institutional investors continued to boom.
These investors were the only ones, other than
non-resident investors, to have acquired public-
sector liabilities, in net terms, in recent years
(see Chart IV.15). By contrast, credit institutions
and firms and households have reduced their
holdings of public-sector assets, in net terms.
IV.5.3. The balance of payments: saving
and net borrowing of the economy
The surplus on current and capital account
deteriorated significantly in 1998, to stand at
EUR 4,355 million (ESP 725 billion), as against
EUR 7,653 million (ESP 1,273 billion) in 1997
(see Table IV. 8). In terms of GDP, the com-
bined balance on the two accounts stood at
0 . 9%, as against 1.6 % in 1997. This outturn
reflects the deterioration in the current transac-
tions balance as the year elapsed, which was
translated into a deficit of EUR 1,269 million
(ESP 211 billion), which contrasts with the sur-
plus accumulated in the preceding three years.
This worsening arose, in turn, from the progres-
sive increase in the trade deficit, which was not
offset by the excellent tourism results.
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CHART IV.14
Household financial wealth
Source: Banco de España.
( a ) Includes both resident and non-resident shares, and
shares in mutual funds.
(b) Calculated as assets revaluation less liabilities revalua-
tion.
(c) Includes resident and non-resident institutions.
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As mentioned in Chapter III of this report,
the persistence of the crisis on Asian markets,
the collapse of the Russian economy and the
difficulties besetting certain Latin American
countries led to a gradual slowdown in exports
over the course of 1998. This slowdown gained
considerable momentum in the final quarter,
when a certain weakness in the demand of the
European countries was also apparent. Imports,
in contrast, grew at high rates over the year as
a whole, driven by the strength of domestic de-
mand. Consequently, the trade gap widened
considerably, despite the improvement in the
terms of trade. As regards the services balance,
tourism receipts were very expansionary, as a
result of the larger influx of tourists from Ger-
many and France. Tourism payments also grew
at very high rates. As for other services, freight
transactions slowed, while corporate and com-
puter services expanded notably, in line with
the progress made in recent years in the liberal-
isation of trade in these services.
The investment income deficit worsened
again in 1998, with very high rates of growth of
both receipts and payments, reflecting the no-
table increase in cross-border capital move-
ments in recent years. On the receipts side, the
buoyancy of those of the non-financial private
sector was noteworthy. This was linked to the
increase in this sector’s external assets (in the
form of both direct investment and mutual funds
and short-term loans and deposits), prompted
by the search for higher returns than in the do-
mestic market. The receipts of the credit sys-
tem, by contrast, increased more moderately.
As for payments, their buoyancy primarily re-
flects the intense growth of those made by the
resident credit system, in line with the rise in its
short-term external liabilities. The payments of
the non-financial private sector also increased
due to the rise in foreign holdings in mutual
funds and short and long-term loans received
from abroad.
As regards cross-border transfers, the cur-
rent transfers surplus improved again as a con-
sequence of the increase in flows from the EU
under EAGGF-Guarantee, since those received
from the European Social Fund declined. The
balance on capital transfers stabilised at the
same level as in 1997, as the notable increase
in Community structural funds was offset by the
decline in capital transfers received by the pri-
vate sector, which had reached a very high lev-
el in 1997.
The financial account of the balance of pay-
ments continued to record a net outflow of capi-
tal in 1998, although there was a slight reduc-
tion with respect to the previous year (see
Table IV. 8). In fact, the increase in the external
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CHART IV.15
General government
Source: Banco de España.
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TABLE IV.8
Balance of payments
EUR millions
Current account 154,416 152,369 2,047 167,024 168,293 –1,269
Merchandise 93,700 105,287 –11,587 98,485 115,160 –16,676
Services 38,876 21,902 16,974 43,973 24,982 18,991
Tourism 23,668 3,973 19,694 26,793 4,491 22,302
Other services 15,208 17,929 –2,721 17,179 20,491 –3,312
Factor income 11,554 17,464 –5,910 13,027 19,774 –6,746
Current transers 10,286 7,716 2,570 11,540 8,377 3,163
Capital account 6,341 735 5,606 6,363 739 5,624
Financial account 34,479 37,236 –2,757 65,681 66,671 –990
Spanish investment abroad — 25,328 –25,328 — 57,293 –57,293
Foreign investment in Spain 16,689 — 16,689 25,506 — 25,506
Spanish loans and deposits abroad — 1,555 –1,555 — 21,625 –21,625
Foreign loans and deposits in Spain 17,790 — 17,790 40,176 — 40,176
Reserves — 10,352 –10,352 — –12,248 12,248
Unclassified items, errors and omissions — — –4,897 — — –3,365
FINANCIAL-ACCOUNT BALANCE –2,757 –990
Change in external liabilities 34,479 65,681
Investment 16,689 25,506
Excluding marketable securities 5,621 10,152
Marketable securities 11,068 15,353
General government 9,952 4,125
Other resident sectors 1,183 8,469
Credit system –67 2,760
Other investment 17,790 40,176
General government 21 866
Other resident sectors 544 4,319
Credit system 17,226 34,991
Of which:
Loans and long-term deposits 3,090 11,462
Short-term deposits and repos 14,135 23,529
Change in external assets 37,236 66,671
Investment 25,328 57,293
Other resident sectors 19,890 44,627
Credit system 5,454 12,863
Other investment 1,555 21,625
General government 331 388
Other resident sectors 12,392 17,668
Credit system –11,168 3,569
Of which
Loans and short-term deposits
and repos –13,113 2,452
Reserves 10,352 –12,248
BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR:
1. Net flows (change in liabilities – ch. in assets) 7,596 –13,237
General government 9,658 4,800
Other resident sectors –25,042 –39,563
Credit system 23,022 21,527
2. Reserves 10,352 –12,248
3. Financial account balance (1 – 2) –2,757 –990
Source: Banco de España.
1997
Receipts Payments Balance Receipts Payments Balance
1998
Net change
in
liabilities
Net change
in
in assets
Balance
Net change
in
liabilities
Net change
in
in assets
Balance
FINANCIAL ACCOUNT BREAKDOWN
assets held by resident investors was much
greater than the change in liabilities, and this
difference was financed, in part, by the fall in
the reserve assets held by Banco de España. In
addition, the significant increase in the volume
of cross-border financial transactions in 1998,
to approximately double the previous year’s to-
tal, was notable. This expansion was related,
among other factors, to the behaviour of house-
holds and firms, as analysed in the previous
section. Over the last decade the external as-
sets and liabilities of residents have almost
tripled as a proportion of GDP: assets rose from
24 % of GDP in 1989 to 69 % in 1998, while lia-
bilities increased from 34 % in 1989 to 89 % in
1998.
The most important feature identified by a
sectoral analysis of these flows is the high level
of foreign direct investment, more than half of
which went to Latin America. Meanwhile the in-
crease in households’ net external assets has
largely been channelled through institutional in-
vestors. It stems from the search for higher re-
turns, and also from the relative shortage of se-
curities in Spanish financial markets. Unlike the
case of direct investment, the purchase of for-
eign securities has primarily been orientated to-
wards the OECD developed countries. Also, a
significant portion of the external assets of resi-
dent sectors is made up of bank deposits (in-
cluded in Table IV.8 under the heading “other
investment”), which again increased significant-
ly in 1998.
In contrast, capital inflows have been con-
centrated under the heading of loans to the
credit system. The cross-border financial flows
f these institutions have been strongly gov-
erned by the behaviour of the other two sectors.
Specifically, the increase in bank credit to
households and firms, together with the disin-
termediation of the savings of these agents, has
forced credit institutions to cover the gap with
foreign financing (see Section IV.4.2). Finally,
general government has continued to raise
funds abroad, albeit less than in 1997.
In short, certain processes that were first ap-
parent in 1996 intensified in 1998. These repre-
sent a notable change in the structure of capital
movements between Spain and the rest of the
world. First, there was an increase in the rate of
acquisition of external assets, especially by
on-financial firms and institutional investors,
which contrasts with the traditional dependence
on foreign investment. Second, although the
current account surplus enabled part of these
capital outflows to be financed, the most signifi-
cant portion has been financed through the in-
currence of a large amount of net liabilities by
credit institutions. This has meant that the net
external position of credit institutions moved in-
to debit in 1997, and increased further in 1998.
108
BANCO DE ESPAÑA BALANCE SHEET
AND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
1. BANCO DE ESPAÑA BALANCE SHEET
AND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
The balance sheet and profit and loss ac-
count are provisional as they are pending go-
vernment approval under the terms provided for
by article 4.2 of the Law of Autonomy of the Ban-
co de España (Law 13 dated June 1st 1994).
The main captions of this balance sheet, or
those that have changed most markedly in
1998, are discussed below.
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Balance sheet of the Banco de España
ESP bn
Assets
Foreign assets 8,677 –1,956
State 1,721 –39
Other public-sector accounts 306 –9
Credit to financial institutions 4,471 2,205
Investment securities 688 123
Premises and equipment 38 –1
Bills and other accounts receivable 73 —
Sundry accounts 129 57
Accrual accounts 128 –34
TOTAL ASSETS 16,231 346
Liabilities
Banco de España nationalisation capital — —
Reserve funds 1,794 –191
Notes in circulation 8,774 136
Special drawing rights assigned 60 –1
Foreign liabilities 9 1
State 1,709 74
Independent government agencies 447 132
Other public-sector accounts 148 5
Accounts payable to financial institutions 2,359 –195
Accounts payable to other agents 3 —
Bills and other accounts payable 98 28
Sundry accounts 103 3
Income pending payment to the Treasury 701 359
Accrual accounts 26 –5
TOTAL LIABILITIES 16,231 346
Change on
31.12.1997
Balances as of
31.12.1998
1.1. Balance sheet
1.1.1. Foreign assets
This balance sheet caption details the equi-
valent peseta value of the foreign reserves po-
sition, the basic components of which are gold
(ESP 801 billion), convertible currency (ESP 7.5
trillion), and the net IMF position (ESP 300 bi-
llion).
1.1.2. State
The State asset-side balance, totalling ESP
1,721 billion, breaks down as follows:
1.1.3. Other public-sector accounts
Credit to Social Security Funds under the
sixth transitory provision of Law 41/1994 of De-
cember 30th 1994 (1995 State Budget Law).
1.1.4. Securities portfolio
2. Profit and loss account
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State. Accounts
ESP bn
Specific credit 1,721
Special account, Law 3/1983 422
Special account, Law 4/1990 1,156
Credit for payment of participations in,
contributions to, and membership dues
for international organisations 136
Subrogation for Tabacalera, S.A.,
Law 31/1991 7
Investment securities. Type of security
ESP bn
Book-entry government debt 522.7 613.7
Medium- and long-term bonds 522.7 613.7
Share of the capital of the European
Central Bank 74.0 74.0
Balance 596.7 687.7
Other public-sector accounts
ESP bn
Social Security Funds, Law 41/1994
Principal 256
Interest 50
Balance 306
Amount
Nominal
Pesetas
Effective
Pesetas
Profit and loss account (a)
ESP bn
GROSS INCOME 909.2 1,291.7
Return on domestic operations 253.5 255.1
Interest 185.7 163.3
Investment securities 51.0 51.6
Other 16.8 40.2
Return on external operations 559.3 1,000.0
Interest and yields 541.4 619.1
Other 17.9 380.9
Profit/loss on foreign-exchange
dealing 96.4 36.6
TOTAL EXPENSES 207.8 215.4
Administrative expenses 40.1 42.2
Personnel 26.2 27.2
Wages and salaries 19.4 20.0
Social Security contributions 4.3 4.7
Welfare schemes 2.5 2.5
Issuance and distribution of notes 6.9 7.4
Overheads 7.0 7.6
Debt repayment 2.6 2.6
Financial expenses 145.2 155.1
Domestic operations 142.3 152.3
Banco de España certificates 103.8 77.3
Interest on Treasury accounts 23.0 56.0
Interest on Regional (Autonomous)
Government accounts 2.1 1.9
Interest on Social Security accounts 8.1 14.7
Repos 5.3 0.3
Monetary policy operations — 2.1
External operations 2.9 2.8
Provisions to special reserve 18.5 13.3
Art. 3º. Law 192/64 1.4 2.2
PROFIT 701.4 1,076.3
(a) The 1997 data have been adjusted to make them com-
parable with the 1998 data, which follow the ESCB’s accoun-
ting criteria.
1997 1998
113
Breakdown of notes in circulation
Annual change
DENOMINATION:
10,000 488.7 468.4 4,887.1 4,684.0 30.7 29.6 55.7 54.2
5,000 641.2 659.3 3,206.2 3,296.5 40.2 41.6 36.5 38.2
2,000 217.0 203.5 434.0 407.0 13.6 12.8 4.9 4.7
1,000 246.5 246.2 246.5 246.2 15.5 15.5 2.8 2.9
Subtotal 1,593.4 1,577.4 8,773.7 8,633.7 100.0 99.5 100.0 100.0
500 (a) 7.7 3.8 0.5 0.0
TOTAL 1,593.4 1,585.1 8,773.7 8,637.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(a) Notes being phased out (exchange period ends: 22.6.1998).
% shareCirculation
In millions of notes ESP bn
31.12.1998 31.12.1997 31.12.1998 31.12.1997 31.12.1998 31.12.1997 31.12.1998 31.12.1997
Of the number
of notes
Of the value
in circulation
Breakdown of coins in circulation
Annual change
DENOMINATION:
2,000 19.6 18.4 39.1 36.7 0.2 0.2 10.2 10.4
500 211.9 202.8 105.9 101.4 2.2 2.4 27.7 28.6
200 80.1 69.5 16.0 13.9 0.8 0.8 4.2 3.9
100 1,349.8 1,238.5 135.0 123.8 13.9 14.6 35.4 35.0
50 118.0 113.5 5.9 5.7 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6
25 1,704.8 1,557.2 42.6 38.9 17.6 18.3 11.2 11.0
10 372.0 372.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.4 1.0 1.1
5 3,839.2 3,215.2 19.2 16.1 39.5 37.9 5.0 4.5
1 2,015.5 1,703.2 2.0 1.7 20.7 20.1 0.5 0.5
Commemorative issues 3.2 3.1 12.3 12.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.4
TOTAL 9,713.9 8,494.0 381.8 354.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% shareCirculation
In millions of coins ESP bn
31.12.1998 31.12.1997 31.12.1998 31.12.1997 31.12.1998 31.12.1997 31.12.1998 31.12.1997
Of the number
of coins
Of the value
in circulation
2. ISSUE AND CIRCULATION OF NOTES AND COINS
INDICES
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